The development of professional military education at the United States Air Force Academy by Kennedy, Douglas Blake
  
The Development of Professional Military Education at the United States Air Force Academy 
 
 
by 
 
 
Douglas Blake Kennedy 
 
 
 
B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 1989 
M.A., University of Georgia, Athens, 1997 
 
 
 
AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
 
 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
 
Department of History 
College of Arts and Sciences 
 
 
 
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY 
Manhattan, Kansas 
 
 
2017 
 
  
  
Abstract 
This dissertation examines the development of the professional military studies 
curriculum at the United States Air Force Academy. The study explores the rationale behind 
establishing an Air Force Academy, along the lines similar to the U.S. Military Academy at West 
Point or the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. The quest for an additional academy emphasized 
the need for specialized training of air force cadets and creating a common bond for its future 
officer corps, rather than recognizing the necessity to equip them with a professional military 
education regarding warfare and how air power influences war, for example. This trend 
continued in the two main studies used to justify the Air Force Academy, as well as the 
development of the initial curriculum, where an integrated academic curriculum, one that 
emphasized both the sciences and engineering as well as the social sciences and humanities, 
placed any discussion of professional military studies on the back burner.  The challenge of the 
Academy’s general academic curriculum on the cadet’s time left little room for the development 
of a strong, rigorous professional military studies program. However, the confluence of a 
cheating scandal at West Point and the resulting report, as well as a reflection during the 25th 
anniversary of the Academy’s founding in 1979, which developed questions on the professional 
military studies program within the curriculum, led to the establishment of a Permanent 
Professor within the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction, and resulted in drastic 
changes to the curriculum for the cadets, specifically involving professional military studies. 
Today, the United States Air Force Academy has a Department of Military and Strategic Studies 
under the overall authority of the Dean of Faculty. This department has as its charter the role to 
provide “the study of the context, theory, and application of military power”—with special 
emphasis on the role of airpower to the art and science of war.  The document that helps define 
the duty of the department also states that this necessary study for officer candidates constitutes 
“the essence of a military academy education” and, most certainly, the central core of a 
professional military studies program.  
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Introduction 
“You officers amuse yourselves with God knows what buffooneries and never dream in the least 
of serious service. This is a source of stupidity which would become most dangerous in case of 
serious conflict.”1 
    Frederick the Great 
 
 In an interview provided in 1999 for the U.S. Air Force Academy’s Department of 
History’s Oral History Project, retired Brigadier General Philip Caine, the first Permanent 
Professor in the office of the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction, told the interviewer, 
Lieutenant Colonel Vance Skarstedt: “When you were a cadet you didn’t have professional 
military studies. You had military training, and military training occurred at God knows what 
time and what location, taught by what person on what subject. It was utter hodgepodge. Well, as 
I approached that I said the first thing I’ve got to do is I’ve got to have military studies. If you’re 
going to teach the profession, the things people need to know professionally, then we’ve got to 
do it in an academic atmosphere.”2 Lt. Col. Skarstedt had graduated from the Academy in 1978. 
Just a year later, on the authority of the Superintendent, the Academy undertook a thorough 
review of its programs, especially the curriculum, on the 25th anniversary of its founding. A 
conclusion of that review was that the Academy lacked a solid professional military studies 
program, one that was academically rigorous. Also, the office of the Commandant of Cadets did 
not have a stable cadre of personnel to administer any rigorous, academic course work. The 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Paul Yingling, Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, “A Failure of Generalship,” 
Armed Forces Journal (May 2007): 1, accessed August 27, 2007, 
http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2007/05/2635198. 
2 USAFA Special Collections, “Interview of Brigadier General (Retired) Philip D. Caine 
by Lieutenant Colonel Vance Skarstedt, Department of History, 13 December 1999,” 5. 
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result was the appointment of an academically credentialed, professionally successful officer 
from the Dean of Faculty beginning the tenure on the Commandant’s staff to effectively change 
and institute a credible and stable military studies program. 
 The main question this exchange raises is why it took twenty-five years to establish a 
solid professional military studies program at a service academy? Also, why do professional 
military studies have such a minimal focus and importance at the Air Force Academy, and what 
does this say and how does this affect the greater Air Force? The answer could lie in the familiar 
disparaging remark that the Air Force is not a highly intellectual institution and instead focuses 
too much on specialized training, though this is beyond the scope of this work. This study 
suggests that the inclusion of professional military studies competes with the general academic 
education program, which involved, and continues to involve, a highly demanding course load 
that includes an emphasis on the sciences and engineering, as well as the social sciences and 
humanities. The core curriculum consists of a robust number of classes that leaves little time for 
military studies, which does not carry the weight of the more common academic course work. 
Additionally, the idea of what constitutes military studies often gets confused with material that 
would most align with military training. However, during the critical period of review in 1979, 
when individuals recognized the need for greater emphasis on military studies, the 
Superintendent of the Academy appointed the first Permanent Professor housed within the 
Commandant of Cadets’ sphere, and the institution marginally adjusted the vector in a more 
positive, influential, and meaningful direction for the officer candidate’s professional military 
education. 
 With the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq remaining muddled endeavors in the fall of 2009, 
Congressman Ike Skelton queried the Academy’s Dean of Faculty on a book list for “a budding 
xii 
strategist.” The Congressman even provided his own suggestions. Reaching out to the 
departments that were “most closely linked to ‘strategy’,” the Dean asked for inputs from the 
departments of History, Political Science, and Military and Strategic Studies. As the Permanent 
Professor and Department Head for History, then-Colonel Mark Wells replied, regarding 
building strategists: 
I believe we need to start here at USAFA—from the very beginning of a cadet’s career—
in encouraging them to begin to think about conflict (in all its forms and at all levels), the 
profession of arms, and their role in society. Frankly, I’m not convinced everyone is 
wired to be a visionary, nor to think in truly strategic terms. Nevertheless, our job as 
faculty, in part, is to “increase the pool” of potential strategists by challenging and 
inspiring them at appropriate educational levels throughout the four years. If we wait 
until our officers are captains or majors to introduce them to the notion of strategy, or, 
even worse, as colonels, we will suffer what Dr. Richard Kohn has so eloquently called 
the “withering of strategy which has been manifest in a continual string of military 
problems.”3 
 
Trying to study the subject on the role of professional military studies program at the 
U.S. Air Force Academy is made more feasible by the fact that a vast body of resources is 
available in the Special Collections Branch on the top floor of the Air Force Academy library. 
Each year, Air Force Academy historians write a summary of the past year’s events. This 
tradition began at the Academy in 1956 when Lieutenant Colonel Edgar A. Holt, on the direction 
of the second Superintendent, Major General James E. Briggs, developed a history discussing the 
origins of the Academy. Colonel Holt’s history of 1954-1956 also includes a multi-volume 
                                                 
3 Mark Wells, “Books for Strategists,” email received by author, 21 July 2009. This email 
responded to an email from the Dean’s office, with the subject, “HOT! Reading List from 
CM Skelton.” 
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appendix that contains some of the relevant material used to create his history. Holt, a former 
Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Omaha and Chairman of the 
History Department at the University of Kansas City, was recalled back to active service during 
the Korean War, and he fulfilled a need that the Air Force had for an historian. In this initial role, 
he first documented the participation of the 5th Air Forces in the Korean conflict as part of the 
USAF Historical Division. Soon afterwards, he ended up at the Pentagon with the Air University 
Historical Liaison Officer, and then took a job at the Air Force Academy as the Chief of the 
Historical Division—part of the Office of Information Services.4  The Air Force saw that the 
kind of work he had done as a college professor teaching history would be beneficial for the 
service.  General Idwal Edwards noted: “For once [the Air Force] got a round peg in a round 
hole!”5 Colonel Holt’s initial history laid the groundwork for years of annual histories 
concerning the Air Force Academy. 
The histories primarily followed the fiscal year, which was the period from 1 July to 30 
June in its early years—this makes it seem to follow some sort of academic year, since this is 
how most of the historical periods of the Academy are made. The first historical study completed 
in August 1957 actually covered two years, 1954-1956, but it also included commentary on the 
entire period prior to the Academy’s establishment. The historians for these volumes—two 
volumes of history and another five appendices—were then-Lieutenant Colonel Edgar Holt, Dr. 
                                                 
4 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 3, “Record of Interview of Lt General 
Idwal H. Edwards by Air Force Academy Historian in Washington, D.C., 26 October 
1956,” 1-2; AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 2, 1033. 
5 Quoted in AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 3, “Record of Interview of 
Lt General Idwal H. Edwards by Air Force Academy Historian in Washington, D.C., 26 
October 1956,” 1. 
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M. Hamlin Cannon, and Dr. Carlos R. Allen, Jr. The annual histories for most other years take 
between one and three volumes. 
In a January 1957 interview with Brigadier General Charles Lindbergh, the Air Force 
Academy Command Historian, then-Major Edgar Holt, queried: “Do you think that the emphasis 
at the Air Force Academy should be on technical training, a broad basic education in the sciences 
and in the humanities as well as military studies, or on purely military studies?” The famous 
aviator remarked: “That is really a tough question and I supposed we will be trying to find the 
best answer for a long time to come.”6 This history is an examination on the evolution of military 
studies within the overall Academy curriculum. To the proposed question, however, General 
Lindbergh responded expansively: 
In one sense, Air Force Academy planners are faced with the need of providing future air 
commanders who are primarily concerned with physical survival in atomic war; but in 
the long run physical survival depends on a good deal more than technical training and 
military excellence. A study of the humanities is also of great importance. Such civilian 
institutions as MIT and Cal Tech are faced with this problem. Each year engineers and 
scientists require more and more specialized training to keep up with the complicated 
developments of our times. But I believe it is wise to keep in mind Arnold Toynbee’s 
statement to the effect that the emphasis and perfection of techniques, both military and 
civil, have accompanied the disintegrating stages of past civilizations. 
I think this can be summarized by saying that while our short-term survival may depend 
on military strength, our long-term survival depends on such relatively intangible 
elements as character, spirit, and wisdom for the use of our military strength. These latter 
elements cannot be attained through the overemphasis of technical training. They require 
a balance in training which fluctuates with time, and for which probably no formula can 
                                                 
6 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 6, “Record of Interview of Brigadier 
General Charles A. Lindbergh by Air Force Academy Historian at Headquarters United 
States Air Force Academy on 3 January 1957,” 4-5. 
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be written. But it is upon this balance that the life of our civilization depends; and since it 
relates to survival, it is of essential importance in planning the courses to be given at the 
Air Force Academy.7 
 
The importance of learning about strategic thinking and planning stems from the fact that it is a 
specialized ability, and it is one that can be developed over time.  As defense analyst and 
commentator Andrew Krepinevich has observed:  
The strategist’s situation is fundamentally different from the engineer’s. Engineering 
problems deal with physical laws and regularities, which means they can have genuine 
solutions. In war or business a given strategy may succeed, but then again it may not — 
especially if one has overlooked important features of the situation or the opponent 
responds with an effective counterstrategy. Strategies, consequently, are always 
conditional, hostage to how events play out in the unpredictable future, and subject to 
unforeseen changes in the nature of the competitive environment.8   
 
Moreover, the “mindset” of individuals may be set at an early time, so that it is harder to achieve 
the ability to conduct effective strategic thinking and planning if one waits too long.  
Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts have observed: “By the time most individuals reach their early 
twenties, they either have developed the cognitive skills for strategy or they have not.”9 The role 
of military studies in coordination with a liberal arts foundation assists with this development. 
                                                 
7 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 6, “Record of interview of Brigadier 
General Charles A. Lindbergh by Air Force Academy Historian at Headquarters United 
States Air Force Academy on 3 January 1957,” 5. 
8 Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, “Regaining Strategic Competence,” 2009 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments from the Strategy for the Long Haul 
Series, 17. 
9 Krepinevich and Watts, “Regaining Strategic Competence,” 18. 
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Right after World War II, after serving on the Operations and Plans Division (OPD) of 
the General Staff of the War Department, Major General George “Abe” Lincoln, a Rhodes 
Scholar recipient in 1929 upon his graduation from West Point, was asked by Colonel Herman 
Beukema to return to West Point to teach.  Beukema “convinced [Lincoln] that the powerful 
strategy for intervening in the education of general officers was to equip them for handling 
political and military high command matters at West Point—not at the military war colleges.”10 
The service academy is a good time to begin an education in military studies as an officer 
candidate. 
Today the United States Air Force Academy has a Department of Military and Strategic 
Studies under the overall authority of the Dean of Faculty. This department has as its charter the 
role to provide “the study of the context, theory, and application of military power”—with 
special emphasis on the role of airpower to the art and science of war.  The document that helps 
define the duty of the department also states that this necessary study for officer candidates 
constitutes “the essence of a military academy education” and, most certainly, the central core of 
a professional military studies program.11 
                                                 
10 Robert S. Jordan, An Unsung Soldier: The Life of Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster 
(Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2013), 5, 13, 162n4. Lincoln was the first 
West Point recipient of the Rhodes Scholar and would work under Beukema as the 
deputy head of the then soon-to-be-named Department of Social Sciences. Lincoln took a 
two-rank demotion to Colonel to accept the position. Lincoln also established his 
“Lincoln Brigade” in the Strategy and Policy Group, which was situated in OPD, in 
which he actively recruited Rhodes Scholars. See again, Jordan, 13. 
11 USAFA Special Collections, Thomas A. Drohan and Steven Pomeroy, “Who Speaks 
for our Profession? Military and Strategic Studies at the USAF Academy” Airman 
Scholar Journal 17, no. 1 (Fall 2011): 1. 
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The Air Force established its Academy in the foothills of Colorado Springs in 1954. The 
role was to “educate, train and motivate many of the men who are to command the air power of 
the United States.”12 In the same month that President Eisenhower signed the Congressional bill 
to establish the Academy, April 1954, the cover of Newsweek magazine was graced with the 
question, “The Bomb—What Odds for Survival Now?” There was also a picture of a Vietnamese 
paratrooper, who was supporting the French forces in Indochina around Dien Bien Phu.13 A year 
later, in the same month in which the new air cadets showed up at the interim campus, housed at 
Lowry AFB, Colorado, just outside of Denver, the magazine had a picture on the cover of a 
French Foreign Legionnaire with his formation of other, similarly-uniformed troops, with the 
cover title, “Foreign Legion: Time’s Running Out for Beau Geste; Can French Arms Save North 
Africa?—See International.”14  The problem suggested by covers such as these and the stories to 
which they applied was the difficulty of trying to predict the character and processes of future 
wars.  Even as the Air Force Academy was established, then, there were questions and 
uncertainties about what needed to be done and what needed to be taught. 
                                                 
12 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol 1, vii. Major General James E. Briggs, Superintendent, US 
Air Force Academy, in the “Foreword” to the first volume of the US Air Force 
Academy’s official history. 
13 Newsweek, 5 April 1954 and 26 April 1954, respectively. The April 26 edition also had 
a ribbon on it with the caption, “Inside the New Communist Party, U.S.A.” 
14 Newsweek, 11 July 1955. The cover explanation on page 9 states, “The Cover: Amid 
mounting terror and unrest in North Africa, the French Legionnaire stands as the symbol 
of French determination. For a report on the struggle between Arab Nationalism and 
French Colonialism, see page 35.” 
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So what constitutes the most appropriate form of education for the military 
professional?  Josiah Bunting suggested early on an argument that he maintained for 
decades:  
It is the liberal education which can best teach a man [that they learn the value of what 
they may have to defend, to learn to love the richness and variety of their culture and of 
other cultures, to shape in their minds some conception of what is meant by the phrase 
the good life, to learn tolerance and charity, to develop standards of criticism, to learn to 
refresh their minds with the tonic of great literature and history and their spirit with great 
music and art, to learn the fierce corrosiveness of hate, to learn that military victory must 
not be purchased in ways that utterly defeat the purpose for which campaigns are 
undertaken.]  
It is a kind of education least likely to flourish, at least in any formal, academic 
way, in times of great economic crisis and international tension. But, it should be the 
heart of the education of men who take their soldier’s pay.15  
 
In his scathing indictment on American generalship and the lack of accountability since 
World War II—what he terms the “Marshall system”—veteran journalist Thomas E. Ricks 
discusses the inadequacy of the education of modern American generals to develop strategic 
understanding as the basis for sound action. Ricks attributes the failure of today’s generals to the 
“feud” between two generals, General William DePuy and Major General John Cushman, who 
                                                 
15 Josiah Bunting, “The Humanities in the Education of the Military Professional,” in The 
System for Educating Military Officers in the U.S., ed. Lawrence J. Korb (Pittsburgh, PA: 
University of Pittsburgh, 1976), 158. In Bunting’s lecture he quotes what John Rosenberg 
told cadets years back—this is the material above in brackets, as Bunting suggests this 
role of the humanities is why liberal education is best for the military person. Bunting 
gave these remarks while presenting on a panel, “Civilian Education for the Military 
Officer” at the International Studies Association (ISA) convention in Washington, D.C., 
1975. The above document is a publication of ISA. 
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could not compromise their different and complex views of how to rejuvenate the Army after 
Vietnam. The result was a system and a doctrine that “emphasized training, which prepares 
soldiers for the known, far more than education, which prepares them to deal with the unknown.” 
DePuy’s vision resulted in producing generals unable to resolve the ambiguous wars in the 
Middle East and Central Asia in the twenty-first century.16 
 
In a collection specifically addressing military education of past, present, and future, the 
editors claim that the lack of rigorous professional military education is understandable.   They 
observe: “Burdened with the responsibility to be operationally capable, and often short of 
money, men, and equipment, the professional military has always seen a purely academic 
education as a luxury.”17 Unfortunately, “[w]ar fighting is the greatest challenge to a student’s 
capacity for dealing with the unknown, and those trained, as opposed to educated, have seldom 
managed to muster the wherewithal to cope with the environment” of war.18 
                                                 
16 Thomas E. Ricks, The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to 
Today (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 346, 349. The entire chapter on “DePuy’s 
Great Rebuilding” does an excellent job of outlining the difficulties of professional 
military studies, between those who believe in training versus education—the resulting 
conflict between General DePuy and General Cushman, who advocated the broad 
education and understanding of warfare. See ibid., pp. 335—353. According to Ricks, the 
resulting failures in strategic generalship of General Tommy Franks and Lieutenant 
General Ricardo Sanchez in Iraq came from the DePuy system—one that was training 
dominant—that raised them. See ibid., 398, 419-421. 
17 Gregory C. Kennedy and Keith Nelson, eds., Military Education: Past, Present, and 
Future (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Publishers, 2002), x. 
18 Kennedy and Nelson, xi. 
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In his address to the military history symposium on officer education, General Philip 
Caine, who was the first Permanent Professor and Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction 
in the Commandant’s Office overseeing military education, observed:  
Given the mission of the service academies, it follows that professional military studies 
should be the cornerstone of that portion of the core curriculum (the courses required of 
all cadets regardless of major) which sets these institutions apart from the normal college 
or university. The professional part of the core curriculum includes the relatively few 
courses generally unique to service academies and essential in the military preparation of 
officers. At the Air Force Academy these include military history, aeronautical 
engineering, leadership concepts, language and expression, and ethics. Together with 
military studies, they form what I call the professional core.19 
This analysis, then, explores the role (or lack of role, during some periods) of professional 
military education at the Air Force Academy—those studies that develop the officer candidate to 
become a life-long learner in the profession of arms, national defense, and the nature and 
character of warfare. As General Caine suggested:  
[The professional curriculum at the Air Force Academy] builds the base for 
understanding the military profession and the responsibilities of service so that graduates, 
throughout their careers, will realize the importance of keeping current and continually 
broadening their knowledge and understanding of their chosen profession . . . .  This is 
the responsibility of the military studies curriculum and those who teach it. A great deal 
of progress has been made in this cornerstone of military education. Nevertheless, there 
are still very basic issues to deal with and to solve before the total professional 
                                                 
19 Philip D. Caine, Brigadier General, Retired, “A U.S. Air Force Academy Dilemma: 
Professional Military Studies,” in Elliot V. Converse, III, ed., Forging the Sword: 
Selecting, Educating, and Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern World 
(Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1998), 226. 
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curriculum, and military studies in particular, provides the optimum professional 
curriculum education for every academy graduate.20 
This work offers a discussion on what the path was on why military studies was not emphasized 
at the Academy and how there was finally a recognition and a proper and effective role for 
professional military studies at the Air Force Academy, at least to some degree. 
I have chosen to end this discussion in 2005. Although the professional military 
education program continues to confront challenges, it was in 2005 that the Academy decided to 
create a Department of Military and Strategic Studies, the department being placed within the 
authority of the Dean of Faculty, cementing the idea that forming a strong officer candidate 
required a solid education in the more specific content pertaining to the military profession. 
A special focus for the Air Force has always been the development and integration of 
new technologies, which is understandable given the roles and functions of the service.  
However, as the airpower historian, David MacIsaac reflected: “Machines can be made to do 
work, but they never have nor ever can build an air force that will work.”21  A department 
                                                 
20 Caine, 235-236. 
21 David MacIsaac, Lt. Col., (USAF), “Commentary” in Alfred F. Hurley and Robert C. 
Ehrhart, eds. Air Power and Warfare, (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 
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focused on studying the military profession itself was to be a major step to providing a remedy 
for this problem. 
1 
Chapter 1 - The Need for Military Studies 
“US airmen have long been known for their fascination with technology and the mental 
toughness required to press home a bombing attack against fierce resistance or to outduel 
an enemy fighter. But they have never been known for their academic inquisitiveness, 
their devotion to the study of the art of war, or their contributions to the theory of 
airpower. Instead, American airmen have remained ‘doers’ rather than introspective 
‘thinkers’.”22 
Dennis M. Drew  
 The Air War College (AWC) was the institution set up to provide Air Force field grade 
officers with strategic-level preparation.23 In the days of insurgent warfare of the 1960s, an AWC 
student paper did provide “a more balanced view of airpower in counterinsurgent operations.” 
Colonel Robert Hardie prepared a paper that examined the British and French efforts in Malaysia 
and Algeria, respectively, that emphasized the integration and cooperation of military and non-
military means to have strategic effects in insurgent warfare. This paper was the first, and one of 
the only, serious papers “to link insurgency theory and experience directly to air operations,” and 
it was done in 1967—no further examples would come until the 1980s.24 Then-Colonel Dale 
Smith reflected on education in the Air Force in correspondence with General Hubert Harmon, 
the “father of the Air Force Academy.” Smith stated: “Education is a lifetime proposition…. In 
the Air Force we can be assured that an enterprising officer is sent to schools progressively 
                                                 
22 Dennis M. Drew, “Air Theory, Air Force, and Low Intensity Conflict: A Short Journey 
to Confusion,” in Phillip S. Meilinger, ed., The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of 
Airpower Theory (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997), 346. 
23 Established in 1946. Field grade officers are majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels. 
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throughout his career. Thus we need not cram his lifetime education into his four years at the 
academy. Instead, we can teach him what he must know to best pursue his junior officer duties, 
and be sure that he has learned it. It seems to me that such a program should rightfully include 
flying.”25 
 Understanding the overall training and education processes required in officer production 
is central to discussion of the development of professional military education at the Air Force 
Academy. In his Harmon Memorial Lecture, a lecture series at the United States Air Force 
Academy going back to the year of its first graduating class, 1959, the eminent military historian 
Richard Preston posited that there were four significant aspects associated with effective officer 
development.26 He listed these as fostering the qualities of character and leadership, providing a 
strong general education, inculcating military training, and ensuring a solid professional 
education. Balancing these aspects has been challenging to all military academies, and the Air 
Force Academy continues to struggle with the most effective mix of coursework and training that 
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Harry R. Borowski, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, ed., The Harmon Memorial Lectures in 
Military History, 1959-1987: A Collection of the First Thirty Harmon Lectures Given at 
the United States Air Force Academy (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 
1988), 276. Lecture delivered in 1980. 
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sufficiently prepares its officer candidates to meet the challenges in this volatile, uncertain, 
complex, and ambiguous world. 
Some argue that the military professional should have a solid understanding of warfare. 
The sine qua non for military officership would actually be that he was prepared to operate in the 
chaotic, ambiguous, and enigmatic world of warfare. The military historian Williamson Murray 
offered three reasons why he returned to the academic realm—in 1969 at the age of 28 he 
enrolled in Yale’s graduate program—the final one being that he “hoped to use my study of 
history as a tool to help future military leaders avoid the costly, palpable mistakes that their 
predecessors had made in waging that dismal conflict known to Americans as the Vietnam War.” 
He added that it “has been the avowed purpose of much of my writing to help America’s military 
and political leaders perform more competently in the future.”27 In a similar vein, I.B. Holley, 
Jr., a renowned military historian and general officer, noted: “A service that does not develop 
rigorous thinkers among its leaders and decision makers is inviting friction, folly, and failure.” 
As Holley suggests, “When one attempts to grapple with the problem of how these thinkers 
especially officers in the different services at different times, have tried to integrate technological 
innovations effectively in their organizations, the crucial importance of professional military 
education becomes clear.”28 So the necessity to emphasize the study of warfare and to allow it to 
permeate the studies of officer candidates at a service academy seems common sense. 
                                                 
27 Williamson Murray, War, Strategy, and Military Effectiveness (Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 2. 
28 I.B. Holley, Jr., “Reflections on the Search for Airpower Theory,” in Phillip S. 
Meilinger, ed., The Paths of Heaven: The Evolution of Airpower Theory (Maxwell Air 
Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1997), 579. Holley was continuing the theme he 
developed on theory and doctrine in the early age of the airplane—through World War 
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Samuel P. Huntington introduced the reader to individuals who initiated and established 
military professionalism in the American military. This “creative core” ensured that the 
American military understood its role in society, specifically “to focus upon their ‘real 
business—war’,” and that the military “must always be ‘organized and governed on true military 
principles’ so as to preserve in peacetime the ‘habits and usages of war’.”29 The idea that the 
military professional must study those subjects to enhance and improve one’s ability to make war 
was integrated into the core military concept early in its existence. 
 In his tour de force, The Soldier and the State, Huntington wrote in his chapter on the 
“Rise of the Military Profession” that the early nineteenth century had witnessed “[t]he objective 
emergence of a complicated science of war and of professional institutions devoted to that 
science [that] rendered obsolete eighteenth-century conceptions of war as an ill-defined craft and 
of the general as a natural genius.”30 Huntington noted that Carl von Clausewitz’s On War, 
which was not published in English until 1879, offered an approach to fulfill this distinct concept 
of learning about war. Huntington is given great credit, especially by military historian Russell 
Weigley, as placing the rise of military professionalism in the state of Prussia, and later the 
Prussian-dominated German empire, when the origins of the professional officer corps began—
aside from the fact that this period also ushered in the term militarism to our vernacular in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
I—in his Ideas and Weapons (Yale University Press, 1953; repr., Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1997). 
29 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-
Military Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
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20th century. As Weigley credits Huntington with observing, this period is when the aristocracy’s 
dominance of the officer corps began to wane and the systematic study of the military profession 
arose.31 
Clausewitz understood the value of the study of war.  His thoughts developed gradually, 
concluding in his most enduring maxim—a mere slogan to some—that “war is merely the 
continuation of policy by other means.”  But what did Clausewitz contribute regarding 
professional military studies?  He stated clearly: “Theory should be study, not doctrine…. It is 
meant to educate the mind of the future commander, not to accompany him to the battlefield; just 
as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man’s intellectual development, but is careful 
not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life.”32 According to Clausewitz, then, one needs to 
study warfare for the intellectual benefits that may produce future fruits, not merely to define 
principles to stand as rules that may not work in future wars.  Similarly, education was to be a 
process beyond inculcating obedience.  It was to be “[t]he systemic instruction of individuals in 
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Colonel, USAF, ed., The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, 1959-1987: A 
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subjects that will enhance their knowledge of the science and art of war.”33  By contrast, military 
training, as suggested in Department of Defense documents, was: “1. The instruction of 
personnel to enhance their capacity to perform specific military functions and tasks. 2. The 
exercise of one or more military units conducted to enhance their combat readiness.”34  “Military 
science” was also often seen as “cut and dried.”  One collection of terms defined “military 
science”: “The study of the ways and means, as well as the hows and whys [sic], of military 
affairs. Dame Rebecca West (1892-1983), the English novelist and journalist, once wrote that: 
‘Before a war, military science seems a real science, like astronomy, but after a war it seems 
more like astrology.’ 2. The technology of war.”35  
Finally, Kelly C. Jordan has observed:  
Military science is defined as a systemized body of knowledge regarding and relating to 
the theory, application, and employment of military units and weapons in land 
warfare…and armed conflict encompassing issues related to the following areas: military 
leadership, military organization; military training and education; military history; 
military ethics; military doctrine; military tactics, operations, and strategy; military 
geography; and military technology and equipment…[It] has always had a narrow, 
limited, and technical connotation and is considered to be a subset of the larger body of 
knowledge known as the military art…Critics, however, see military science as simply a 
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vocational body of knowledge akin to plumbing, as opposed to promoting its utility to the 
public by studying conflict, war, and the organized application of coercive force in a 
world that has been characterized far more by conflict than by peace.36  
Johnson’s contribution concerning this term ends with mention of “recent developments,” which 
includes “cultural studies” and “officership.”  The author concludes: “These new concepts 
suggest the need for an expanded conception of the military science field of study, based solidly 
in the humanities and social sciences and perhaps dubbed military studies, which would be more 
in line with current academic practice and which would be a much more accurate 
characterization of this immensely interesting and far-ranging field of inquiry.”37 
 
General Arnold, in his final report to the Secretary of War on 12 November 1945, had stressed 
the significance of avoiding complacency, stating: “National safety would be endangered by an 
Air Force whose doctrines and techniques are tied solely to the equipment and processes of the 
moment. Present equipment is but a step in progress, and any Air Force which does not keep its 
doctrines ahead of its equipment, and its vision far into the future, can only delude the nation into 
a false sense of security…. The basic planning, development, organization, and training of the 
Air Force must be well rounded, covering every modern means of waging air war, and the 
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885. 
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techniques of employing such means must be continuously developed and kept up to date. The 
Air Force doctrines likewise must be flexible at all times and entirely uninhibited by tradition.”38 
At his 50-year reunion at West Point, General Dwight Eisenhower remarked to General 
Omar Bradley, “You know, Brad, this goddamn place hasn’t changed a friggin’ bit since we 
graduated in 1915.” Whatever accounted for this somewhat “ill-tempered” remark, Lance Betros 
suggests that Eisenhower was not only off the mark—things had changed a lot in the five 
decades—but also that they would change even more drastically in the subsequent five 
decades.39 However, academically, West Point had undergone some change since Brad and Ike’s 
graduation.  The changes at West Point have implications for the Air Force Academy as well, 
partly because many of the earliest leaders of the independent Air Force studied at the Army’s 
academy.  In the 1920s, Colonel Herman Beukema, who chaired a department of economics, 
government, and history, strove hard to change the curriculum toward a more general, or liberal, 
education.40 
The reason why a focus on the Academy and its development of an effective professional 
military studies program is so significant is, as sociologist Morris Janowitz noted in a ground-
breaking work, “Although attendance at a service academy is not universal for generals and 
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admirals, the academies set the standards of behavior for the whole military profession.”41 
Janowitz also presciently remarked that in the future “military leaders must be prepared to assist 
in accurately estimating the consequences of the threat or use of force against the potentials for 
persuasion and conflict resolution.”42 
In 1959 the Air Force Academy’s Department of History began the Harmon Memorial 
Lecture series on Military History, whose purpose was to enhance the cadets’ own sense of 
military identity and their ideas about military professionalism.  The series was named after the 
Academy’s first Superintendent, Lieutenant General Hubert R. Harmon. In 1988, Lieutenant 
Colonel Harry Borowski from the department compiled thirty of these lectures into a book, 
which he dedicated “To Those Who Study War, To Assure Freedom and Liberty.”43  The 
Harmon Lecture Series demonstrated the seriousness of the Academy, or at least of one 
department, in seeing the need for the officer candidate to understand his or her role, and to 
appreciate the significant impact, either negative or positive, that the service could have as an 
arm of national power. 
 A large swath of scholarship on the military emphasizes an inability of the institution to 
change from within. However, in the foreword to this collection of Harmon Lectures, released as 
The First Twenty-five Years, the editorial committee suggested: “Change, not stability and 
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tradition, has been a characteristic feature of cadet educational programs thus far in the 
Academy’s history; it appears that the willingness to modify, to innovate, to seek more effective 
educational combinations and techniques is likely to remain alive in the future.”44 This proved to 
be true of the professional military studies program at the Academy.  
 Since this work concentrates on professional military studies, or professional military 
education, development at the Air Force Academy, it is essential to offer some discussion of 
what is meant by these broad, sometimes seemingly all-encompassing terms. Specifically, it is 
crucial to grasp the difference between two terms frequently used in professional development: 
“training” and “education.”  A sweeping and original study on military education by John 
Masland and Laurence Radway presents an excellent discussion and succinct description of these 
terms. As they suggest, even though the two words are often used interchangeably—which by 
itself demonstrates misunderstanding—they really do mean different things.  They assert: 
“[T]raining identifies instruction that is oriented to a particular military specialty and that is 
designed to develop a technical skill….Education, on the other hand, implies instruction or 
individual study for the purpose of intellectual development and the cultivation of wisdom and 
judgment. It prepares a man to deal with novel situations….Training is job-oriented; education 
goes beyond the next assignment and seeks to prepare the officer for a lifetime career of service 
involving ultimately the greatest responsibility that can be imposed.”45 A simple example of how 
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the service and its academic professionals continued to blur this distinction can be found in a 
seminal work on the officer personnel system. In this solid work by Vance Mitchell, the index 
contains a listing for “Education, professional military,” but it includes guidance to “See also 
Flight Training; Training admission of blacks into training school.”46 Professional military 
studies and professional military education actually has more to do with the professional 
intellectual growth, specifically in officer development, while training is more task-specific and 
immediate. 
 The distinction between education and training is far from new.  Xenophon stated that 
Socrates interrogated a man who had attended military school and found that the course was 
limited to basic drill. Socrates criticized the man’s education by noting “that drill was only the 
smallest part of military command.”  He suggested that intelligence was a more significant factor 
than leadership or experience, and so studies in “supply, planning, and effective management” 
and other pursuits were necessary.47  Some modern writers have been influenced by classical 
thinkers as well as by more recent ones.  British Air Vice-Marshal R.A. Mason is among them.  
Mason makes clear what he thought to be necessary in professional military education, 
specifically at the academies. He emphasizes: “In the classrooms we need to reinforce 
professional awareness by emphasizing those subjects which distinguish the military studies here 
[at the Air Force Academy] from those anywhere else, including the evolution, potential, and 
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constraints of aerospace power: the military exploitation of the third dimension by man and 
woman, not necessarily with man and women. These should be studied in the context of the 
history of warfare, of the fluctuating impact of technology, of the interaction of war and politics, 
especially the often-uncomfortable subordination of the military method to the political 
objective. We need to expand still further the junior officer’s awareness of, and sensitivity to, 
cultural diversity.”48 Here Mason revealed the necessity of professional education—specifically 
how to implement air and space power—within the realm of a broader, more traditional, 
academic education. 
 In his essay “A U.S. Air Force Academy Dilemma: Professional Military Studies,” 
Brigadier General Philip Caine stated the problem as seen in his time: “Given the mission of the 
service academies, it follows that professional military studies should be the cornerstone of that 
portion of the core curriculum (the courses required of all cadets regardless of major) which sets 
these institutions apart from the normal college or university.” However, one can easily see the 
conundrum presented by military studies, according to Caine, since “many members of the staff 
and faculty at the Air Force Academy can neither define military studies nor explain the 
differences between it and military training, often using the two terms interchangeably.”  This 
issue has never been fully resolved.49  
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 Speaking to members of the cadet wing in 1996, Brigadier General John Flanagan said 
what had helped him in his time as a Forward Air Controller (FAC) in Vietnam three decades 
earlier. Most notably, he first cited his military training—“the assault course and physical 
conditioning, combat skills, rifles and bayonets, the things we went through as basic cadets”—as 
key to his success in theater. However, earlier he had recalled the confusion of most military 
officers in that conflict.  As he suggested, “we were thrust into a jungle environment [instead of 
the Fulda Gap], a guerilla war, something that was alien and that we did not understand.”50 Later 
he mentioned the value of some his academic coursework—possibly presented in the order of 
significance to him and his Vietnam experience.  He mentioned chemistry, aerodynamics, 
mathematics, physics, and astronautics before he mentioned history, political science, 
economics, foreign languages, and his geography and cartography coursework. Nowhere 
mentioned is any aspect of professional military studies—the closest reference was to the history 
he had studied that had specifically touched on coalition warfare.51 
 Flanagan had his opinions. But he seemed to miss the fact that many people already saw 
military studies as crucial—even the term itself suggests its importance–and this, many thought, 
should be the cornerstone of an academy education. Each officer candidate, some believe, should 
have at least a “Fox Conner” experience. This refers to the pivotal and instrumental experience 
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Elliot V. Converse, III, ed., Forging the Sword: Selecting, Educating, and Training 
Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern World (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1998), 
365. Adapted from remarks delivered at a luncheon on 20 November 1996 during the 
United States Air Force Academy’s 17th Military History Symposium. 
51 Flanagan, 368.  
14 
that Dwight Eisenhower had as a young officer during his time in Panama with Colonel Fox 
Conner. Eisenhower, later in life, argued that Conner was “the ablest man I ever knew.”52 
Eisenhower also stated: “In sheer ability and character, he was the outstanding soldier of my 
time…outside of my parents he had more influence on me and my outlook than any other 
individual, especially in regard to the military profession.”53 What is significant is that Conner 
fulfilled Eisenhower’s military studies, which actually should have occurred during his West 
Point education, while in Panama. 
 Civilians could also see importance in serious study of military affairs, making it all the 
more apparent that military officers should not slight the detailed study of warfare and strategy.  
Although not a military professional, to broaden the example, Nelson Mandela had his own Fox 
Connor moment. As he explained in his autobiography, central to his development as a leader in 
the South African movement was his study of warfare. Although he was never a soldier, he had 
the task of starting an army—the Umkhonto we Sizwe (“The Spear of the Nation”). His 
organization would “wage acts of violence against the state”—so he read and talked to experts. 
He studied general armed warfare, but concentrated on waging guerilla war—he read the report 
by Blas Roca on the organized fight against the Batista government, the tactics of the Boer 
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generals, Guevara, Mao (on whose work he took 65 pages of notes), Menachem Begin, the 
Ethiopians’ struggle against Mussolini, and the conflicts in Kenya, Algeria, and Cameroon. But 
most instrumental was the period he spent underground—in a white suburb in Berea—under the 
tutelage of Wolfie Kodesh. According to Mandela, Kodesh, a veteran of warfare in North Africa 
and Italy during the Second World War, not only had firsthand experience with warfare on the 
battlefield, but also was knowledgeable about warfare on all levels. He provided Mandela more 
reading on the subject, to include Clausewitz’s On War, which resonated with Mandela as he 
embraced one of the central themes—that warfare is an extension of politics. In most military 
officers’ cases, this quip is often reproduced without a strong understanding—Mandela’s “Fox 
Conner moment” with Kodesh provided him with all sorts of context—and so he was a true 
student of warfare.54 
 In his chapter “On Military Genius,” Carl von Clausewitz, after laying out the vast 
challenges of warfare in his first two chapters of book two, concludes: “No wonder, then, that 
war, though it may appear to be uncomplicated, cannot be waged with distinction except by men 
of outstanding intellect.”  He emphasizes: “Even junior positions of command require 
outstanding intellectual qualities for outstanding achievement . . . .  Such officers may appear to 
be rather simple compared to the polymath scholar, the far-ranging business executive, the 
statesman; but we should not dismiss the value of their practical intelligence.” Clausewitz extols 
the intellectual virtues of the “genius”—that commander-in-chief who has the deep 
understanding of national policy and can integrate a successful strategy to achieve it, thus being 
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“simultaneously a statesman.”55 He closes his chapter on the military genius with a question: 
“What sort of mind is likeliest to display the qualities of military genius”? Clausewitz answers: 
“Experience and observation will both tell us it is the inquiring rather than the creative mind, the 
comprehensive rather than the specialized approach, the calm rather than the excitable head to 
which in war we would choose to entrust the fate of our brothers and children, and the safety and 
honor of our country.”56 Clausewitz supports the broad-minded officer rather than the specialist, 
and recognized the requirement for not only professional military education, but also the more 
general academic education, as emphasized by the Academy’s founders. 
The concentration on the requirement for a broad education received support in the first 
decade after the founding of the Air Force Academy. This emphasis on the general academic 
studies, in both the sciences and humanities, left little time or thought for professional military 
education. In his forward to Major William Simons’ work Liberal Education in the Service 
Academies, Edward Katzenbach states: “It is also significant that [an academy graduate], such as 
the lieutenant general at present (1964-1965) Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, is able to take a master’s degree in engineering at Princeton University while working for 
his doctorate in political science.”57 Katzenbach noted that around “70%” of academy graduates 
could gain acceptance and perform well at the “most highly regarded universities.” The stress 
was always on an effective academic education, not so much a professional military education. 
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 Much of the historiography on the development and operation of the Air Force Academy 
has rather simply suggested that the influence of the existing military academies shaped the Air 
Force Academy. John Lovell remark: “The design that emerged from the long years of planning 
is remarkable, however, not for its novelty or inventiveness but, on the contrary, for its close 
resemblance to the traditional pattern of training and education at the older academies.”58 But 
what actually happened was different.  In an interview with the Air Force Academy historian in 
Washington, D.C., on 26 October 1956, Lieutenant General Idwal H. Edwards recalled: “It was a 
feeling in the service that the old Academies—the Naval Academy and the Military Academy at 
West Point—that a new look was needed, and that the four-year course as carried on for many 
years at the old service Academies did not fit, let’s say, modern day requirements.”  They 
considered a plan combining two years of “civilian” education with two years of military 
training.  Edward stated: “It might be interesting to note that the people who favored such a 
system as that [the 2-year/2-year proposal] were, in themselves, Service Academy graduates.” 
Father Guthrie, President of Georgetown University, was one who adamantly opposed any 
inventive plan, thinking that a four-year academy was a necessity to mold young men into 
leaders of character, as envisioned by the officer development program.  The desire for a broad 
understanding of military thinking and military experience persisted, yet it also left questions.  
Could one achieve a genuinely military education using a traditionally civilian academic 
structure and program.  Also, if the education of new officers was to be broad, how did 
something seemingly narrow such as “tactics” fit into it?  In fact, some leaders at the Academy 
were praised for broadening the available education rather than for fitting it specifically to 
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military needs.  As Lance Betros has noted in Carved in Granite, Lt. Gen. Garrison Davidson’s 
four years as superintendent (1956-1960) were “unusually productive” in introducing much 
needed change. Among the changes was the reform of academic programs, which, he 
“believed[,] had lagged behind the rapid advances of knowledge in the post-war era.” The 
reforms included his five main priorities: to establish an elective program, to allow advanced 
students more challenging courses, to offer more courses in the humanities and social sciences, 
to provide more instruction in nuclear science, and to put less emphasis on military training, 
especially during the school year, keeping it to the “minimum essential” required.59  
 Elting Morison has studied large-scale societal change that was brought on by technical 
innovation, and how societies adapt to that change, and, more important, how people work to 
control and manage society’s reaction to the change.  Morison suggests: “[T]he current problem 
is how to organize and manage the system of ideas, energies, and machinery so it will conform to 
all the human dimensions.”  In attempting to tackle this complexity, Morison offers three 
approaches that the human dimension should not take – offering ideas that can help in analyzing 
programmatic changes at the Air Force Academy.  The most significant approach is “to develop 
some grand synthesis to bring the whole system of ideas, energies, and machines under suitable 
control.”  But the attempt to do this—to offer these grand syntheses—does not usually move 
easily and well from theory into practice.  Morison’s caution comes from the idea that the move 
to synthesis discounts “too many variables in a situation where human beings enter in to be 
successfully comprehended in any fixed grand design.”60  Similarly, in his discussion of military 
                                                 
59 Betros, 53-54. 
60 Elting Morison, Men, Machines, and Modern Times (Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
London:  The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1966), 209-210. 
19 
reform, Peter Paret concluded in 1966: “No one will claim that our political and strategic 
competence even approaches the excellence and sophistication of our weapons system[s].”61 As 
he suggests with the European leadership from the end of the 19th century up to the First World 
War, “[t]he leaders of the warring nations possessed only very imperfect ability to use their 
military tools, and they no longer fully understood how to relate war to national policy….The 
technological complexities produced by the industrial revolution had led to greater emphasis on 
the technical training of officers and on the mastery of certain administration and organizational 
problems—for instance mobilization and supply.”62 Paret concluded: “What the soldier [and 
airman] of today must do is to step outside the very close circle of his duties and seek to 
understand what he and his country are involved in. Not only the techniques of your profession 
matter, but also their purposes. You may object that it is unrealistic to expect a serving officer to 
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be concerned with the implications of his work. But isn’t that the mark of the true 
professional?”63 
 Changes among the military services and changes within any one of them are always 
political acts as much as they are matters of military thinking and organizational theory and 
planning.  In a dissertation completed in 1969, called “The Founding of the Air Force Academy: 
An Administrative and Legislative History,” Edward Anthony Miller, Jr., reviews the events 
leading to establishment of the Academy in 1954. Besides showing the better organization and 
growing maturity of the Air Force staff system, this work shows the interaction of the defense 
organization with Congress. Miller examines the development of air doctrine, to include the 
concept of “`airpower,’ a term used to describe the evolution both of aircraft and employment 
concepts.” This work details the legislative process of even a “minor project” such as the 
establishment of a new academy, but it also shows the importance of the military service 
structure to sustaining such an effort. The struggle of the Air Force to gain its own academy “was 
finally carried, not necessarily on its merits, but because of the persistence of the Air Force and 
the coincidence of a new war which began the trend toward massive military expenditures.”64 
In the concluding chapter of his study of service academies, John Lovell states: “Change 
is inescapable.” He suggests that cries for the abolition of the academies—he was writing in 
1979—mainly to use more cost-effective alternative commissioning sources instead, had led to a 
number of proposals, generating more issues and questions rather than offering satisfying 
answers.  As he saw it, all that was proposed were rather improbable solutions. What he 
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concluded without reservation, however, was that the status quo was just as implausible.  He 
observed that the increasing ratio of women at the academies, among other pressing issues, 
would require some significant modifications in programs. “Similarly,” he asserted, “continuing 
changes in technology and in demands upon the military profession inescapably will lead to 
requirements for further modifications of academic coursework and military training.”65  
But Lovell concludes that the most probable kind of change that would occur at the 
academies, and one that did occur, was by means of “incrementalism.” In this prediction he was 
correct—even though he thought that this incremental change might be broadened or even 
replaced later with something more radical.66 Although not the radical change he envisioned, the 
move in the 1970s to establish professional military studies as an important focus in the 
academic curriculum proved this. 
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Chapter 2 - Foundations for an Air Force Academy 
 In October 1956 Lieutenant General David M. Schlatter had an interview with Air Force 
Academy historian Major Edgar Holt.  General Schlatter was then the commandant of the Armed 
Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, but earlier he had been a driving figure in the 
establishment of an air force academy when he was assigned immediately after the war as the 
commander of Maxwell Air Field and as the acting commandant of the Army Air Forces School.  
He became the Deputy Commanding General for Education at Air University when it was 
established a year later in 1946.  Major Holt queried if “the history of the Air Force Academy 
should be written…within a context of an evolving air doctrine and within a context of a growing 
demand for a new organization for the Air Force.” General Schlatter, who had also served on the 
Service Academy Board in 1950 (better known as the Stearns-Eisenhower Board), said that he 
“most certainly” agreed.  He added that the creation of a separate Air Force and the concurrent 
demand for an Air Force academy were “part and parcel of the whole dish…it became quite 
evident that the matter of functional type of organization and centralized command control [sic] 
were the only ways to get the most of [employing aircraft] and that has been the consistent stand 
of all airmen almost ever since.”67 Two ideas are clear in this conversation. First, along with 
almost three decades of pressing for their independence, Air Force officers also recognized the 
need to establish an academy to develop a significant portion of its future officer corps—an idea 
that took an additional decade to achieve. Also, Schlatter makes clear the importance of Air 
Force doctrine and how this might have played a central role in the creation of a service academy 
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dedicated to this specific service branch. Once the service was independent, the Air Force’s quest 
for its own academy occurred less from a desire to give the young officer corps an intellectual 
grasp of serious professional studies—since most leaders believed that would come later in an 
officer’s career—instead the founders were focused on gaining a dedicated corps of personnel 
ready to engage in a specialized training program that would further demonstrate the Air Force’s 
independence. 
 Since early in the development of aircraft and their integration into the military, air 
leaders recognized a need for training the air-focused officer corps in an academy that was a 
service-specific environment. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, given that the new 
technology had performed so well, calls went out not only for an independent Air Force, but also 
for an academy to train its officer corps.  As the Director of the Air Service concluded, only the 
Air Service could accomplish this effectively—the military academy at West Point was too 
restrictive in its education for it to be fully useful for airmen.68 For example, soon after the 
armistice in 1918, Air Service officers had discussed establishing an air academy at Camp 
Mabry, near Austin, Texas—at least as an interim site for an academy—that would be modeled 
on West Point and Annapolis.69 The main concept for this academy’s mission would be to train 
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an expected 300-400 officers per year in aviation and aeronautical sciences.70 The emphasis on 
specialized training dominated all discussions about creating a service academy devoted to this 
new branch of the Army, and not so much the need for professional military education of its 
officer corps. From the earliest inclination to develop an academy, then, the impetus was specific 
training and study in technology—the new aeronautics. 
The conversations about an air academy continued until, through, and after the next war, 
but they gained special momentum after the Air Force received its independence in September 
1947. Again, some of the first thrusts for an academy came from the state of Texas, as 
Representative Paul Kilday introduced H.R. 4547 in November 1947, which called for 
establishing an Air Force academy at Randolph Field, Texas—Senator Tom Connally introduced 
the resolution’s companion bill within a month after the House Resolution. Similar to previous 
discussions on an air academy, these resolutions dictated that this academy would function 
“under the regulations prescribed by the [Air Force] Secretary for the instruction of aviation 
cadets in aerodynamics flying, navigation, bombing, the use of atomic weapons and in such other 
technical aviation matters as might be deemed necessary by the Secretary of the Air Force 
(SECAF) ‘to be necessary to the maintenance of adequate trained officer personnel.’”71 
Although West Point and Annapolis did not engage in much specific technical training, this 
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proposed Air Force academy seemed prepared to focus entirely on aviation-specific training, 
with some leadership training and academic education in aeronautical engineering. The biggest 
omission in this education was the area of professional military studies, which, for example, 
would examine and assess the role of these airpower capabilities in future wars. 
Kilday’s bill was not the only proposed legislation advocating a separate academy for the 
Air Force, but it set the conditions for the Air Force to move quickly ahead on examining the 
concept of an air academy.  Besides setting the pace on studying why and how to establish this 
new academy, the various legislative proposals also made clear that the focus of the new 
academy should be on the technical and training aspects of the new service branch. Of course, 
the various Congressional representatives were not especially knowledgeable about what 
constituted the necessary professional military education requirements for effective officer 
training, as they were mainly interested in the practical consequences of having a federal service 
academy in their respective states. As an Academy historian noted: “The legislative floodgates 
were opened…scores of Air Force Academy bills were introduced…designed to locate the 
academy in a specific state or even in a specific Congressional district.”72 The legislative actions, 
however, did set the parameters on developing an air academy focused on specialized training 
and academic pursuits tied to technology while slighting professional military studies and a focus 
on the liberal arts. 
Even with this early legislative push by Congressmen in 1947, the Air Force had already 
taken the stance that an academy was not required at that time, which demonstrated that even 
some air leaders saw no special rationale for airpower-specific education for officer candidates in 
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theory and doctrine.  General Carl Spaatz, as the first Chief of Staff of the United States Air 
Force, believed that building a new academy was too costly and that the agreement of West Point 
and Annapolis to provide service academy graduates to the Air Force would be quite sufficient.73 
The first Secretary of the Air Force, W. Stuart Symington, responded to Representative Kilday 
that an air academy was not necessary at that time—this was late November 1947—as he 
reinforced the policy of his Chief that the agreement with the other two service academies would 
sufficiently provide service academy officers into the ranks.74 Symington even stated 
publically—possibly to put the other academies on notice—that the Air Force was happy gaining 
“its pilots from the service academies” in a demonstration of “true unification.”75 Even though 
                                                 
73 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 
174, “Department of the Army, The Adjutant General’s Office, Washington, D.C., File 
on the Air Academy, 12 March 1948.” This memorandum from General Spaatz to the 
Secretary of the Air Force, dated 8 October 1947, has the subject byline of “Procurement 
of Academy Trained Officers.” See John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers 
and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1957), 112. 
74 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 26-27. Spaatz’s memorandum on the “Procurement of 
Academy Trained Officers” was initially directed at the Secretary of the Air Force, but as 
with many papers of this nature, it became coordinated policy for the Air Force—
Symington pushed this memorandum up to Secretary of Defense Forrestal the next day. 
See Vance O. Mitchell, Air Force Officers: Personnel Policy Development, 1944-1974 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 60, 414n44. 
75 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 
176, “Symington Doesn’t Favor ‘Air Academy,’” Extract from USAF News Digest, 
Vol.1, No. 440, 16 December 1947.” The extract comes from the Baltimore Sun, same 
date, as the Secretary addressed the Maryland Historical Society the evening before 
(December 15). 
27 
air power had existed for nearly three decades and though there was now a newly established 
service, still the senior leaders did not believe the Air Force required its own institution – its own 
academy – to educate its officer corps.  
Especially as the service chief saw it, the Air Force officer required no special air service 
academy education on how to use airpower—never mind ensuring a healthy education about the 
nature and character of warfare in general—as West Point and Annapolis could properly and 
effectively provide this education. The USAF Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel and 
Administration, Lieutenant General Idwal Edwards, notified the Chief in a memorandum 
summarizing the Army-Air Force agreement on the Military Academy graduate quota to the Air 
Force: “There would be no distinction” in West Point’s course of instruction between cadets 
going into the Army and those going into the Air Force.76 The top Air Force leaders did not 
recognize the role of air-centric professional military education as integral to its culture—USMA 
graduates had always entered the air forces without this education.  As USAF Deputy Chief of 
Staff of Operations Major General Earle Partridge noted, the air academy, if the Air Force did 
develop an academy, should not resemble the sister service academies, but instead be a 
“finishing school” after the candidates completed some civilian university schooling—then these 
candidates “could be taught to fly, navigate, or become engineering officers” while in this 
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“finishing school” environment.77 The emphasis for this senior leader was an academy that 
concentrated on specialized training for pilots and navigators, and an academic program that 
focused on engineering. The lack of vision by service leaders existed because they did not 
recognize the value of air-specific professional military education—educating officer candidates 
on doctrine, theory, or application of airpower. Some could even argue that the study and 
understanding of warfare, in general, did not need special emphasis. This was essentially true at 
West Point, though that institution had already made changes in the post-war period when 
General Maxwell Taylor reigned as Superintendent, and began addressing the situation.78 The 
emphasis was on a technical academic degree and specialized military training—not professional 
military studies. 
The hesitation to create an academy to educate Air Force officer candidates in the final 
months of 1947, however, became a rush to action in the opening months of 1948. In a total 
reversal of his attitude from just months earlier, Secretary Symington agreed to the establishment 
of an Air Force academy by the end of March.79 This was an especially quick turnaround even 
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from his position at the beginning of the new year, when he argued with an Arizona senator that 
an Air Force academy, whose development the department was still investigating, was not a 
necessity given the agreements with the Army and Navy on providing enough service academy 
graduates to the Air Force. As with similar service issues in 1948, Secretary Symington had 
concentrated on service unification, and the creation of an Air Force academy seemingly went in 
the direction of service competition.80 As the future first Superintendent of the Academy later 
suggested, “Opposition [to an Air Force academy] seems to stem from the idea that a new 
academy for the Air Force spells Triplification rather than Unification.”81 The impetus for an Air 
Force academy did not hinge on proper and effective professional military education of the 
officer candidate. Instead, other factors really led to its establishment. 
Motivating the Secretary to work on establishing an air academy were two factors: There 
was continued Congressional pressure to establish an academy, and the Air Force was not 
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receiving its expected allocation of service academy graduates from West Point and Annapolis. 
First, Congress was making headway toward establishing an academy. The law organizing an 
independent Air Force—the National Security Act of 1947, passed in July of that year—guided 
them in the direction of creating an Air Force academy—a topic of discussion since the founding 
of the Air Service. As noted earlier, Kilday’s resolution in late 1947 “opened the floodgate.”  A 
workable formula emerged in early 1948. The series of measures in 1948 that were introduced to 
start the air academy began with Senator Homer E. Capehart’s Senate Resolution 1974 on 12 
January. Significant in his legislation was guidance that the Secretary of the Air Force would 
prescribe a curriculum “designed to provide a balanced and liberal education in the arts and 
sciences and a broad basic military education, and to develop special skills in the field of military 
aviation.”  This resolution recognized the need for service-specific military education. However, 
the Senator also recognized that a general education was a requirement for the proper 
development of officers. More importantly, his resolution recognized the requirement of a broad 
military education—not defined specifically in the bill, but still stated as a basic requirement so 
that the academy could ensure a strong basis for its military education. Another House 
resolution, accompanied in the Senate by an identical resolution, was advanced by a 
representative and a senator from Missouri in May 1948.  This included similar provisions 
regarding the liberal arts and military education.82 Getting an academy in their own backyard, 
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however, was the greater motivation for various Congressmen advancing this kind of legislation. 
Even so, most of the other Congressional proposals also included language stating a need to 
educate the proposed officer candidates in the liberal arts and sciences and also to provide a 
sound military education—not merely military training. The continuous pressure by 
Congressional authorities caused the Secretary to realize that the Air Force was behind the curve 
and that it needed to get out in front of Congress. 
The second event that motivated the Secretary to push for an air academy was the 
continued shortfall of service academy graduates inducted into the Air Force. Immediately after 
the creation of the Air Force, air leaders recognized that their service required a core 
constituency of service academy graduates to establish service-culture professionalism. The air 
leaders, however, were concerned that costs might prohibit establishing an air academy.  Thus 
the department had been conducting studies on how best to produce its officer corps, while still 
gaining accessions from the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program, Officer Candidate 
School (OCS) program, and the Aviation Cadet program. Included in this study was a radical 
proposal.  As General Spaatz put it to the “Secretary of National Defense” (later “Secretary of 
Defense”), they should consider “departing from the traditional four-year service academy 
concept and adopting a program which would require the trainee to study certain prescribed 
subjects at a civilian university prior to receiving specialized academy training.”83 Spaatz 
envisioned a program where the officer candidate might first spend two to three years at a 
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civilian university, directly followed by an intense two-year program at an academy campus for 
military indoctrination, as well as some form of military education. This period might include 
specialized training, such as in navigation or even aviation. Certainly this was a radical proposal 
compared with the West Point system, but others had been advocating a similar method of 
educating the service academy officer candidate for a decade.84 Until the Air Force completed its 
studies, however, General Spaatz agreed to the arrangement that the Air Force should receive a 
third of each academy’s graduating class—a number that would bring the Air Force about 500 
academy graduates annually.85  
Again, Spaatz felt no need to have his academy officer candidates educated in a 
professional military studies curriculum that emphasized airpower’s contribution to warfare. He 
may not have even seen the necessity of understanding the profession of warfare in its entirety—
at least not for officer candidates. All of that knowledge and investigation, in his estimation, 
might come later for these candidates during their careers. He did not deem this a necessity 
because he, along with many other senior Air Force general officers, was a West Point product 
who had gained whatever airpower knowledge he had—specifically of doctrine or theory—later 
in his service career.86 Instead, his concern grew mainly out of the reality that West Point and 
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John L. Frisbee, ed., Makers of the United States Air Force (1987; repr., Washington 
D.C.: GPO, 1996), 205-208.) This conclusion seems so at odds, however, with the Chief 
of Staff, who, in his final weeks of a 34-year career, would publish a two-part article in 
Life magazine convincingly articulating the need for a 70-group Air Force, since its role 
would be so significant and necessary in the new environment of the “Cold War.” See 
Carl Spaatz, “If We Should Have to Fight Again,” Life, July 5, 1948, 34-44, and a 
subsequent article in the August 16, 1948 publication, “Gen. Spaatz on Atomic Warfare,” 
90-104. Also, General Spaatz was the “air and military consultant” for Newsweek 
magazine from 1 August 1948 – 20 November 1961, when he was replaced by the 
recently retired Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Thomas White. General Spaatz 
offered his first contribution in the September 20, 1948 edition, titled “The Era of Air-
Power Diplomacy,” following that up with “Strategic Thinking and Western Civilization” 
in the October 18, 1948 edition. It is amazing that historians view Spaatz as no 
intellectual.  He had a keen sense of the unique perspective of the airman, one in which 
he labeled in his Life article “geography in time” – given that “this mobility of the 
airplane has revolutionized the whole methodology of war” – and in which he concluded 
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Annapolis could not, or would not, provide the new service with enough academy graduates. By 
the end of March 1948, the Secretary and the Chief, as well as the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, 
General Hoyt Vandenberg, concluded that the service’s personnel needs now dictated a separate 
service branch academy. Vandenberg was really leading this effort, as Spaatz’s declining health 
would lead to his retirement three months later, and Vandenberg would be sworn in as the new 
Air Force Chief of Staff at the end of April. Foremost in the new assessment was that the Army 
and especially the Navy were reneging on the October agreement to supply the Air Force the 
required service academy graduates. But what was clearly not among the concerns of these Air 
Force leaders was any sense of need for their own service academy for the purpose of inculcating 
their own service-specific doctrine and theory among those who would be joining the service as 
junior officers.  
At the beginning of March, General Vandenberg received an assessment on this 
personnel issue, an assessment that also included seven basic reasons for promptly establishing 
an academy. The Chief’s staff and others would eventually enhance this memorandum so it 
                                                                                                                                                             
that “The airman is something of a revolutionary.” The article justified the need for a 
larger strategic force—more planes and bases—but failed to directly address personnel or 
the education of those members. The follow-on article again focused on the technical 
aspects of airpower and of possible atomic warfare between the great superpowers, rather 
than on the education of the personnel who would employ that force, even though in the 
article Spaatz reversed Clemenceau’s quip by suggesting that airmen wonder if warfare 
was now too important to be left to the politicians. Parrish also comments (see above) 
that “General Spaatz did not consider scholastic achievement a major indicator of future 
performance” 206. A critical review of Spaatz’s articles, however, at least going into the 
mid-1950s, does seem to support that he was not an intellectual heavyweight. But he did 
contribute to the public conversation on airpower’s role—more so than today’s Air Force 
leaders tend to do. 
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could be made official policy. This justification, from the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Personnel and Administration, Brigadier General Robert W. Burns,87 underscored that the efforts 
to gain accessions into the Air Force officer corps from the two service academies had “met with 
failure.” Burns then summarized the seven reasons for pressing forward with an academy to the 
Vice Chief, after Burns again mentioned that the Air Force should receive 500 of its 1000 annual 
requirement of new officers from service academies.88 First, the Air Force recognized that the 
two existing academies seemed unlikely even to provide a combined total of 125 graduates to 
become Air Force officers—well below the requirement. Second, the curriculum at these two 
academies would never emphasize what the Air Force required. Among his examples were 
aeronautical engineering, navigation, and meteorology—there was no mention of the need for 
airpower-specific military education in theory and doctrine and so forth. Although he offered 
evidence of the need for education, Burns recognized only the technical subjects as well as 
specialized education and training, as evident with navigation and meteorology. Third, the Burns 
memorandum discussed the ground-centricity of military training – evidently, thinking more 
about West Point than Annapolis – and insufficient attention to those aspects of training that Air 
Force officer candidates should receive.  Burns mentioned such issues as squadron, group, and 
                                                 
87 Burns was born in 1916, and enlisted into the cadet aviation service in 1939—receiving 
his pilot wings and commission by November 1939.  He was a 32-year old brigadier 
general serving in Air Force Headquarters in 1948—later becoming a major general, 
retiring in 1970. See his Air Force biography at 
www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/107535/major-general-
robert-wiygul-burns.aspx. Burns was Lieutenant General Idwal Edwards’ number two. 
88 This number had remained constant throughout this period of 1947-1948—that the 
annual requirement of new Air Force officers was about 1000 and that at least half of 
these should be service-academy educated. 
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wing organization, air tactics, aerial gunnery, and air discipline, but again there was no 
discussion of the larger educational elements of airpower studies such as strategic imagination. 
Burns concluded this memorandum with four more paragraphs.  One focused on the cost of a 
new academy—the general had earlier noted that the other two academies could not produce 
more than 125 candidates combined “without expansion of existing facilities at a prohibitive 
cost.”  He claimed that there was a need for this new academy to supplement the officer 
candidate paths already in place, and it could at the same time be a source of physically qualified 
pilot candidates.  Finally, this new academy would complete the “educational system in the Air 
University…designed to give us leaders in Air Power.”89 None of the reasons addressed to the 
Vice Chief included the advantage of a service-specific academy to the specifically military 
dimensions of prospective cadets’ professional education. 
The Air Staff continued to refine the wording of this official memorandum giving the 
rationale for developing an air academy. Once completed and coordinated through the ranks, the 
memorandum became the outline for the official policy. In just over a week after Burns had 
submitted his draft version, the Chief’s staff, primarily Lieutenant General Edwards’ office, re-
worked the product and moved it on to the Secretary. This pressure to move immediately came 
from the Secretary. Symington was not even on board with the conclusion that it was time for a 
new academy in early March, but, with the pressure from various Congressmen and the 
continued bad news from the Navy that it would not provide any service academy graduates that 
year, he knew the time was right to grab the initiative. Major General William McKee, assistant 
                                                 
89 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 
175, “Memo for General Vandenberg, from R. W. Burns, Brigadier General, USAF, 
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel & Administration, Subj: Air Academy, 2 
March 1948.” 
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to General Vandenberg, sent the routing memorandum, along with the revised proposed policy 
paper, to Lieutenant General Edwards. The routing slip opened with the statement that “[t]he 
question of an Air Academy has not as yet been resolved” and with the direction to use Burns’ 
draft as well as a draft memorandum prepared by a Colonel Swofford, who had been working on 
the issue for two years, to complete the final policy memorandum with the Chief’s signature for 
the Secretary.  McKee emphasized the newfound urgency by writing in hand “Need by 
Saturday,” with bold underlining, after the final paragraph.90 The air service’s leaders recognized 
that it was time to press for their own academy, and they needed the civilian Secretary of the 
service on board. The Secretary really did not need convincing, but he required that the Air Force 
make its argument simple, clear, and solid before advocating it outside the Air Force—to the 
greater Department of Defense and Congress—so the draft went to the Secretary and then back 
down to the staff for refinement.91 The document that went from the Chief’s office to the 
                                                 
90 “Headquarters Army Air Forces “Routing and Record Sheet” from Major General 
William F. McKee, Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, United States Air Force to DC/S 
Personnel & Administration, Subj: “Air Academy,” 9 March 1948” in AFAHD, 1954-
1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 174, 
“Department of the Army, the Adjutant General’s Office, Washington, D.C., File on the 
Air Academy, 12 March 1948.” The 9th of March was a Tuesday; the staff would have a 
memo, with the date of 13 March, for the Chief’s signature on Friday, 12 March. See, 
Department of the Air Force, Air Staff Summary Sheet, 12 March 1948, with signed 
Signature Block by Lieutenant General I.H Edwards in AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, 
Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 174, “Department of the Army, 
the Adjutant General’s Office, Washington, D.C., File on the Air Academy, 12 March 
1948.” 
91 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 
172, “R&R to DCS/P and Chief of Staff from Plans and Policy Branch, Subj: Air 
38 
Secretary, with which the Secretary could relay the Air Force argument elsewhere, did not differ 
much from the document as it had gone earlier to the Vice Chief. 
The work on stating this new rationale for an air academy was finished within the month, 
and the Secretary signed the final version on March 25.  The push was on by the Air Force to get 
its own service academy. The Secretary’s assessment of the initial draft of the policy was that the 
“fundamental arguments” justifying the academy had to be “clearer and more succinct.”92 The 
final statement of policy failed to include as part of its rationale the need to invigorate a 
professional military studies program for cadet candidates, yet some ideas suggested and some 
terms used in the final memorandum could make it seem that professional military studies were 
to be considered—at least as a selling point. For example, in the initial draft, the Air Force staff 
honed in on the engineering curriculum, which, at the new air academy, would be different from 
what was in the programs at West Point and Annapolis.  The memorandum specifically 
discussed the need for aeronautical engineering instead of civil engineering. This initial draft also 
                                                                                                                                                             
Academy, 25 March 1948.” The “R&R” was a routing slip for coordination. The 
coordination of the official Air Force memo came from Lieutenant General Idwal 
Edwards, who would prove crucial in the upcoming planning on the Academy, and 
contained the March 13, 1948 refined memorandum that was forwarded with Assistant 
Vice Chief of Staff’s signature block, Major General William McKee.  This routing slip 
of 25 March had the re-written March 13 memorandum, which added thoughts from the 
Secretary. 
92 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 
172, “R&R to DCS/P and Chief of Staff from Plans and Policy Branch, Subj: Air 
Academy, 25 March 1948,” 1. This routing slip from Lieutenant General Idwal H. 
Edwards, the DCS/Personnel and Administration, was the cover letter for the package 
that had the final draft of the memo. The Secretary would use this memorandum as the 
talking point for those agencies outside of the Air Force.  
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stressed the differences in military instruction—but this paragraph focused merely on air tactics 
and on basic organizational structure—not on a greater concept of military studies.93 However, 
the final version signed by the Secretary, which again reflected his earlier criticism, left out these 
two paragraphs and instead emphasized the role academies have in producing career-minded 
officers. As explained in one paragraph, “[t]he control inherent in an academy permits the 
development of officers according to a pattern which conforms to the need of the Air Force.  The 
responsibility for the product of an Air Academy would rest squarely on the Air Force.”94 But it 
                                                 
93 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 
172, “R&R to DCS/P and Chief of Staff from Plans and Policy Branch, Subj: Air 
Academy, 25 March 1948,” 1. Of interest was the paragraph after this one, discussing the 
need for professional and academic education. This fourth paragraph in the rationale for 
an academy, out of eight, discussed how academies were a “democratic means” to gain 
officer candidates that are prepared personally and educationally to serve—that public 
education was sufficient to prepare the candidate for success at a military academy—as 
the Congressional appointment method leads to “a real opportunity for a small town boy 
in Abilene, Kansas to aspire to a service career as an officer.” This was an unmistakable 
reference to General Dwight Eisenhower, one of the more popular general officers in the 
nation, who had recently retired as the Chief of Staff of the Army and was then the 
President of Columbia University. 
94Memorandum for Secretary of the Air Force from General Carl Spaatz, Chief of Staff, 
United States Air Force, 26 March 1948 in AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, 
Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 174, “Department of the Army, the 
Adjutant General’s Office, Washington, D.C., File on the Air Academy, 12 March 1948.” 
This final draft, written on 24 March (see above document), included the Secretary’s 
comments as noted by General Edwards’ R&R in previous citation. See, AFAHD, 1954-
1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 172, “R&R to 
DCS/P and Chief of Staff from Plans and Policy Branch, Subj: Air Academy, 25 March 
1948,” 1. The Secretary initially drafted that paragraph to read: “A cadet is under the 
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was the opening paragraph of this policy paper that covered the necessity of the Air Force’s 
academy.  This paragraph stated: “The need for an Air Academy is clearly evidenced by those 
same sound arguments which prompted Congress to establish academies for the Army and the 
Navy.”95 The Chief’s final draft to the Secretary, which Symington would use to influence those 
in Congress and the greater National Military Establishment, included this flimsy rationale for an 
academy but left out much regarding the actual education of these officer candidates. The Air 
Force would now be engaged in trying to establish its academy, and it had the policy paper to 
circulate. 
By the end of March 1948 the Air Force was equipped to establish its academy. The main 
rationale was the inability of West Point or Annapolis to provide the agreed-upon contingent of 
officers for the Air Force. This entire March event—of preparing the official talking points for an 
academy and, even more, coming to complete agreement that an academy was needed—
essentially ended with a March 30 notification to Representative Kilday and a March 31 letter 
from Secretary Symington to the Honorable W.G. Andrews, Chairman of the House Armed 
Services Committee. The Secretary informed Kilday that the Air Force would now support his 
                                                                                                                                                             
complete control of academy authorities during his formative years; his military and 
physical training and his character building go hand in hand with his professional and 
academic education.”  
95Memorandum for Secretary of the Air Force from General Carl Spaatz, Chief of Staff, 
United States Air Force, 26 March 1948 in AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, 
Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 174, “Department of the Army, the 
Adjutant General’s Office, Washington, D.C., File on the Air Academy, 12 March 1948.” 
See paragraph 2.a. of this document. 
41 
bill, given a few modifications—a reversal from its November 1947 position.96 As the office 
chosen to respond to Representative Andrews—the Congressman had sent a letter to the 
Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, who requested that the Air Force act as the office of 
primary responsibility (OPR) to answer—the SECAF informed the Chairman that the pending 
two resolutions: H.R. 4547 (Kilday’s bill) and H.R. 4912 (the companion bill in the House to 
Senator Capehart’s bill in the Senate from January 12, introduced by Representative George 
Landis, to establish the Air Force Academy).  Symington said that both were sufficient for the 
Air Force’s needs.97 Recognizing that establishing a new academy would seem counter to the 
press towards unification of the services, the Secretary emphasized the way in which the Air 
Academy would complement the existing professional development system of Air University, as 
well as Air Force ROTC, Officer Candidate School (OCS), and the aviation cadet programs that 
would provide the education for future Air Force officers and leaders.98 These two communiqués 
now set the Air Force on course to plan effectively and develop its academy.  
                                                 
96AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), No. 22, 
“Chronological Summary of Actions Affecting the Air Force Academy Project,” circa 
mid-1951, 2. 
97 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 
170, “Letter, W. Stuart Symington to W. G. Andrews, Chairman Committee on Armed 
Services, 31 March 1948,” 1. Representative Landis, R-IN, was not a relation to the 
Kenesaw Mountain Landis family—the famous baseball commissioner had two brothers 
(Charles and Frederick) who were both Indiana politicians. 
98 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), Number 
170, “Letter, W. Stuart Symington to W. G. Andrews, Chairman Committee on Armed 
Services, 31 March 1948,” 2. 
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Before commissioning a plan for the academy’s development, the first action was to 
ensure that all Air Force leaders were properly informed on the way ahead, which again revealed 
the issues of greatest importance for the Air Force. Specific attention to professional military 
studies was not a significant issue. Educating the greater Air Force about the way ahead, as well 
as receiving further support for an academy, began with informing a majority of Air Force 
leaders. The planners did this by briefing the Air Board. Established by General Spaatz in 1946, 
the Air Board then consisted of the “commanding general, the deputy commanding general, the 
secretary-general [Major General Hugh J. Knerr was the first], the commanders of major AAF 
[Army Air Force] commands, and such other retired officers, civilians, and Air National Guard 
and Air Reserve officers as the commanding general of the Army Air Forces might care to 
appoint.”99 In the newly independent Air Force, the Air Board offered General Spaatz an 
organization “similar to the board of directors in a business organization.”100 This group of 
senior-level general officers did the final groundwork necessary before any official planning for 
an academy began, such as investigating what curriculum would be effective—that is, how 
cadets would best receive their professional military education. 
                                                 
99 Robert Frank Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, vol.1, Basic Thinking in the United 
States Air Force, 1907-1960 (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1989), 209. 
100 “Report of the Secretary of the Air Force to the Secretary of Defense for Fiscal Year 
1948, (1 July 1947-30 June 1948)” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Officer, 
1948), 23. Spaatz established this “new” Air Board on 5 March 1946. This definition is in 
the Chief of Staff’s section of the report. See ibid., 213. Futrell states that by the 
beginning of 1948, the Air Board, which evolved for Spaatz from the Air Corps Board 
(see p. 95), had already begun to lose its influence—first by the LeMay-inspired Aircraft 
and Weapons Board and then by the USAF Senior Officers Board. The Air Board was 
inactive by the fall of 1949. 
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For the May Air Board meeting, the Air Staff prepared the proposed discussion points, 
which noticeably excluded any serious discussion about the role of professional military studies. 
The staff used the talking points in the final version of the March memorandum as the basis to 
construct a presentation for the Board members.  Besides the talking points, the staff also 
incorporated aspects of the only two “plans” that had already been produced that argued for an 
air academy: a large draft study by Air Training Command and a smaller study by an Air 
University directorate, neither of which had actually been approved by the Air Staff leadership 
and neither of whose results had been approved as well.101  These two studies focused more on 
the role of flight training at a proposed Air Force academy and the essential requirements of a 
general education program, rather than demonstrating a focus on professional military studies. 
The pressure on the Air Force to develop a more educated officer corps in the post-war 
period influenced these studies, which went beyond merely creating a separate academy. The Air 
Force lagged behind the other two services in the educational level of its officer corps—a result 
of wartime necessity. A general sense of uneasiness existed in the Air Force as leaders realized 
that it was made up mainly of technicians—aviators—rather than professional officers.102 An Air 
Force survey showed that just over 40 percent of regular Air Force officers had a college degree, 
a number that was nearly half the percentage of Army and Navy officers with a baccalaureate 
                                                 
101 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), 
Number 171, “Memorandum for [Maj] General [Samuel E.] Anderson [DCS Operations], 
from Robert S. Israel, Jr., Chief, Policy Division, Plans and Operations, Subject: Air 
Academy, 26 April 1948.” Both of these studies would be used in future discussions on 
the Air Force Academy. 
102 T.R. Milton, General (retired), USAF, “The Air Force Academy: A Fine Twenty-five 
Years,” Air Force Magazine, April 1979, 35. 
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degree.103 In addition to those with college degrees, another 40 percent of the regular Air Force 
officer corps had at least some college study.104 Also, only 10 percent of the regular Air Force 
officers had received their commission from one of the two academies—by contrast, the Army 
and Navy drew 30.2 percent and 38 percent of their officer corps from academy graduates, 
respectively.105 This information greatly concerned Air Force leaders, who recognized that 
relying on the two existing academies as sources for their own officer corps might mean even 
lower numbers.  Moreover, the officers they did receive did not come with the technical 
education demanded by the Air Force. Both studies recognized a need for the air officer corps to 
have a general college education. 
 The March 1948 draft study by Air Training Command (ATC) concentrated on what 
specialized training was required for future Air Force officers. The main proposal was laid out in 
a 90-page document (excluding an appendix that discussed the existing and proposed facilities at 
Randolph Air Force Base, the recommended site for the academy) detailing the organizational 
structure, cadet admission eligibility and requirements, religious activities and social life, 
discipline system, honor system, and the course curriculum. This vision of an academy included 
an outline for an enhanced flying program, which had been a serious topic of conversation from 
the beginning. This flying program was the sixth point among the “General Concepts and 
                                                 
103 AFAHD, 1954-56, Vol. 1, 369. The Air Force number of Bachelor degrees was given 
as 41 percent. The Army and Navy surveys showed those services had 72.4 percent and 
75.4 percent of their officer corps with college degrees, respectively. 
104 AFAHD, 1954-56, Vol. 1, see table 369. This came from a 30 June 1948 study, but 
would have been general knowledge understood by those accomplishing the two studies 
in the winter 1947 or spring 1948. 
105 AFAHD, 1954-56, Vol. 1, 369. 
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Assumptions” that opened the plan.  It asserted: “Air Cadets will receive pilot training during the 
four year course at the Air Academy, and…the successful completion of pilot training will result 
in the awarding of a pilot rating upon graduation from the Air Academy.”106 The plan envisioned 
amassing 270 flying hours within the final 23 months of the academy program.107 ATC planners 
naturally wanted to generate pilots specifically—more so than merely officers. An assumption 
stated early in the work was that the academy would conduct pilot training during the four-year 
period, with graduates earning their aeronautical ratings.108 As one might expect, the training 
command, whose most significant responsibility was to provide specialized training to the 
                                                 
106 USAFA Special Collections, United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air 
Training Command, Barksdale AFB, LA, 26 April 1948, Foreword, 3, 13. This opening 
section of the plan, “General Concepts and Assumptions,” has seven major topics, each 
given between a few sentences and a solid paragraph of explanation. The section 
includes, “Legislation,” “Mission of the Air Academy,” “Status of Trainees,” “Length of 
Training and Status Thereafter,” “Numbers Involved” [how many cadets to start and per 
class], “Pilot Training,” and “Installation and Facilities.” The final section had five 
points—all related to airfield operations and necessary weather patterns and terrain to 
assist with flying training. The Special Collections copy of the plan has “26 April 1948” 
written in pen on the top right of the opening page, and on the opening pages of each 
section/tab. However, the AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1 refers to this plan a number of 
times, and always states that its publication was March 1948—for example see footnotes 
on page 443, which suggests “26 Mar 48”—probably the first draft that the Air Staff 
members reviewed in their preparation for the Air Board meeting. 
107 United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, Barksdale 
AFB, LA, 26 April 1948, Foreword, 3, 13.  As a point of comparison, when this author 
went to pilot training in 1989-90, the flying program was approximately 12 months, full 
time, logging just over 200 hours—about 110 in the T-37 and around 90 in the T-38.  
108 United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, 1-3. 
46 
aviators and navigators in the greater Air Force, focused its efforts on training rather than 
educating this proposed officer force.   
 The form, organization, and layout of the plan itself best demonstrate the fact that this 
specialized training was the main feature of the document, much to the detriment of serious 
education in military studies. The nine-page section called “Training Plan,” for example, devotes 
four pages just to the flying program, yet only a total of four pages to all the remaining academic 
curriculum. In addition, the six tabs at the back of the report include one with a 16-page entry on 
the “Flying Course Curricula”—the comments at the tab on the academic curriculum run to just 
five pages, and nothing similar exists for a military studies curriculum.109 The document details 
the flying training requirements—to include even the maneuvers required (such as “Lazy 
Eights,” “Chandelles,” instrument flying requirements). The planners categorized the curriculum 
by course requirements, and also devoted a page of the cadets’ proposed academic schedule for 
each of the four years. However, the document does not discuss professional military studies or 
specific military education for the air cadet.110 The report, instead, specifically concentrated on 
                                                 
109 United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, 13-21, Tab 
C, Tab D. Page 20 of this document includes a section on “Elimination Criteria” that 
states: “An Air Cadet found for academic deficiency only, will not be considered 
ineligible for subsequent appointment as Aviation Cadet, if qualified under Aviation 
Cadet entrance criteria.” These dismissed cadets could eventually receive their U.S. Air 
Force commissions, but only two years after their former Academy class’s graduation 
date.  
110 Under the curriculum tab, the planners further break down the hours for programs in 
the Social-Humanistic, Science-Engineering, Professional, and Military Instruction. The 
professional section includes, Ordnance and Armament, Military Hygiene, Military Law, 
Weather, Air Installations, Navigation, Practical Maintenance, and Theory of Flight. The 
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the role of flying training.  This was so much the case that, when the Academy Superintendent, 
under various pressures, decided to integrate more flight training into the Academy program in 
1956, this report was once again used to explain what would be involved.111  
 Air Training Command planners who focused on a new academy recognized the 
influence of the other services’ academies. They viewed the Military and Naval academies as 
“both of the type and quality that we wish to create. For this reason, the Air Academy portrayed 
herein will resemble the existing Service Academies in character, and yet have Air Force 
complexion.”112 Significant in this short, but detailed proposal, though, was that more effort 
went towards the development of a flying program than to discussion of the academy’s 
curriculum—especially since the contributors recognized that the air academy would be modeled 
after the other service academies and “civilian educational institutions,” and would lead to the air 
cadets having the Bachelor of Science degree conferred upon them at graduation.113 So the plan 
did seemingly take seriously the development of a liberal arts and sciences general education 
                                                                                                                                                             
military instruction section includes Basic Training, Ceremonies and Inspection, Physical 
Training, Practical Training Instruction Underclass, Training Trips to Other Stations, 
Maneuvers, Flying Training, Administration Training [for those who will not fly or 
cannot complete the flying curriculum], Psychology of Military Leadership, Tactics and 
Techniques, Reception Processing. Some of these programs could bleed into what one 
would deem professional military studies, but the document leans towards merely 
training. See United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, 
Tab C, 1. 
111 AFAHD, 1954-56, Vol. 1, 25. 
112 United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, Foreword.  
113 United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, Foreword, 
21. Although hinted at in the Foreword, the actual statement about the degree is not until 
page 21. 
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program, but with a heavy emphasis on sciences and engineering, particularly mechanics and 
aeronautics.114 The new academy would continue the engineering emphasis of the other two 
academies, with even more specialized education in newer engineering disciplines and in 
specialized flight training. 
 The plan did account for a modicum of instruction in professional military education. It 
discussed the necessity of inculcating “a military understanding of the Armed Forces that is 
necessary to cope with the responsibility which devolves upon the career officer,” so seemingly 
it contained at least a modicum of professional studies—beyond some of the academic 
coursework. In the section of the “Training Plan” called “Fundamental Course Curriculum,” one 
could deduce that the professional military education showed up in four specific areas: political 
and military history, government, and economics; ordnance and armament; military hygiene; and 
tactics.115 Besides the academic coursework, which would provide the cadet with a broad 
                                                 
114 United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, 14-18 and 
Tab C, 1. The course work in Mechanics included “Fundamentals of Mechanics, Strength 
of Materials, Thermodynamics, Fluid Mechanics, Aero-dynamics, and Aeronautical 
Engineering,” see page 15. 
115 United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, 14-18 and 
Tab C, 16-18. The “Fundamental Course Curriculum” included fourteen subsections, “a” 
through “n.” These subsections were: a. mathematics; b. drawing; c. physics; d. modern 
languages; e. English; f. chemistry; g. mechanics; h. political and military history, 
government, and economics; i. electricity, communications, and radar; j. law; k. civil 
engineering, air installations; l. ordnance and armament; m. military hygiene; and, n. The 
Department of Tactics.  The planners provided specific objectives in the paragraph that 
supported each course description. Law, for example, was all about “fundamental legal 
principles…related to the operation of, and administration of, justice within the military 
establishment.” So one could discuss this under the realm of professional military studies. 
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education and strong foundation on which to build a structure of military studies, one can easily 
see that the other areas were more relevant to military training rather than to more fundamental 
education. 
 Although many of these courses contribute to one’s professional study of warfare, Air 
Training Command’s curriculum emphasized the technical aspects of education rather than the 
liberal arts or military studies, and it also focused mainly on military training. The planners 
included an appendix that provided a breakdown of studies based on the “nature of 
instruction”—whether social-humanistic, scientific-engineering, professional, or military 
instruction. Social studies and humanities (English, languages, political and military history, 
government, economics and “internal” [sic] relations, and basic law) received 703 hours of 
instruction. Scientific- and engineering-oriented courses (mathematics, drawing, physics, 
chemistry, electricity, communications, and radar, mechanics and aeronautics) included 1,612 
hours. “Professional” coursework (ordnance and armament, military hygiene, military law, 
weather, air installations, navigation, practical maintenance, and theory of flight) consumed 524 
hours. Finally, military instruction (basic training, ceremonies and inspection, physical training, 
practical training instructing underclass, training trip to other stations, maneuvers, flying 
training, administration training, psychology of military leadership, tactics and techniques, and 
reception processing) was given a significant portion—2,401 contact hours—but most of it was 
training (basic training [511], flying training [652], and physical training [419] took well over 
                                                                                                                                                             
However, this does not suggest a discussion of military ethics or just war doctrine, which 
may be even more directed at study of warfare. 
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half of those hours).116 This military instruction was actually “military training,” rather than 
“education,” for the most part. Again, the objective for ATC was producing officers ready to fly 
in a technical service, so the importance of flying training and technical studies overshadowed an 
officer candidate’s quest to study and understand his service’s role as an element of national 
power and in warfare. 
 In organizing their evidence for the necessity of an Air Force academy, the Air Staff also 
mentioned an Air University study that also emphasized the required general education required 
of future officers. These planners envisioned a five-year program—one that drastically differed 
from those of the two existing academies. Officer candidates would attend a civilian institution 
for two years for a more general, core education. These two years would then be followed by 
three years at the military academy, which would complete their undergraduate program.117  
These two studies had influenced the Air Staff to conclude that there were only three 
main unresolved issues among all the documents to this point: how long the program would be; 
what role, if any, flying training would have at this new academy; and whether all graduates 
                                                 
116 United States Air Academy Plan, Headquarters, Air Training Command, Tab C, 1. 
The total course that these planners envisioned was 5,240 hours. Note, AFAHD, 1954-
1956, Vol. 1, 443 incorrectly has the total coursework as 5,421, adding 744, 2,131, 1,726, 
and 640, which the sum is actually 5,241. Paul Ringenbach (page 32) and William 
Woodyard (page 39) use these numbers. I am not sure where Major Edgar Holt, the 
Academy historian who produced this volume, got his numbers—maybe an earlier or 
later copy of the ATC plan. 
117 AFAHD, 1954-56, Vol. 1, 441-442. This Air University staff study, accomplished in 
late 1947, believed that the two years at the civilian institution would also be “buttressed 
by a common military education.” This was because all officer candidates from all 
services would take this common program. After the two years, the candidates would 
then go to their respective service branch academy for the completion of the program. 
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would matriculate in a rated field (mainly pilot or navigator) or, instead, whether there should be 
an even number of rated and non-rated personnel.118 These interests offer some strong insight on 
what concerned at least mid-level leadership in the Air Force. The emphasis was on specialized 
training—flying training—and on the broader academic course load. A significant element 
missing from the staff’s discussion was a focus on professional military studies—especially the 
need for some type of air-centric course requirement. 
The Air Board met on May 5 to discuss the establishment of an Air Force academy. The 
objective was to address “the present plans, [an academy’s] location and organization.”119 The 
Air Staff’s presentation to the Air Board covered eleven main areas. The first two statements 
mentioned, first, the failure of the two existing academies to provide the agreed number of cadet 
graduates, 500 of a total 1,000 officers brought into the Air Force annually, and, second, the 
restrictive costs of any proposed expansion of the two existing academies in order to meet an 
agreement that would give the Air Force the number of service academy officers it required. The 
cost of the new air academy was another topic, and there were two lengthy sections discussing 
legislative issues. Lt. Col. Abbey, the representative from the Air Staff’s Operations and Plans 
Directorate who briefed the Board, addressing the need to commission a planning group for the 
                                                 
118 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), 
Number 171, “Memorandum for General Anderson, from Robert S. Israel, Jr., Chief, 
Policy Division, Plans and Operations, 26 April 1948.” 
119 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), 
Number 171, “Memorandum for General Anderson, from Robert S. Israel, Jr., Chief, 
Policy Division, Plans and Operations, 26 April 1948.” 
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academy to cover the remaining issues—including four key matters ranging from location to 
curriculum.120 
Besides those topics, the Board also heard about two other significant issues that related 
directly to the education of the officer candidate that the Board believed could justify the new 
academy. First, the Air Staff claimed that the new academy would be a substantive addition to 
the “educational system of the Air Force”—allowing at the earliest opportunity the ability to 
“produce the Air Force officer fundamentally trained for duty within the Air Force.”121 As this 
statement suggests, the vision of the new academy was to train the cadets so that they were 
prepared to assume the technical, specialized duties required of them. The statement ignored, as 
did the other topics in the presentation, the effective professional military education required of 
the cadets—the role of airpower, doctrine, and other air-centric course studies. This statement 
directly connected with the second issue—the general design and direction of the academy. The 
staff had distilled from the talking points and other plans what the academy would emphasize, 
and this revealed the role—or lack of role—that professional military studies would have in its 
curriculum.  
The presentation to the Board began to solidify what became the major reason why 
professional military studies would take, and would long continue to take, a position subordinate 
to other areas of emphasis. The spokesmen from the Air Staff offered six discussion points that 
underscored the Air Force’s vision of their proposed academy. First, like the existing academies, 
                                                 
120 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), 
Number 169, “Presentation to the Air Board on the Air Academy,” 5-6. 
121 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), 
Number 169, “Presentation to Air Board on the Air Academy, 5 May 1948,” 1. Emphasis 
within the quotation is mine. 
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the air academy would have a four-year program that would confer a Bachelor of Science 
degree—already suggesting the favoring of technical studies that existed at the other academies. 
Second, flight training would be required as an essential part of the curriculum—this would 
continue to be a matter of significant debate. Third, it would graduate at least 500 officers a 
year—the incoming classes would have to account for attrition during the four years, so the 
academy would admit more than 500 candidates. Fourth, continuing to emphasize technical 
education, the curriculum would be “primarily engineering adapted to those phases of science 
which best prepare the graduate for a position within the Air Force Officer Corps.” This meant 
that aeronautical engineering would be the major focus—within a more general emphasis on all 
kinds of engineering and on science-related coursework since “the ever growing technological 
aspects of the Air Force” required “more and more specialization.” Fifth, the staff offered, 
almost as a side note, that the “curriculum will include cultural subjects and military training 
(italics added) in order to produce a well-rounded educational background for the graduate.”  
Finally, all cadets at the proposed academy would take the same academic program.122 It is 
significant that, even at this relatively early stage in discussion of a new academy, the debate and 
struggle had begun over two charged issues: one, the tension between military training and 
military education, and, two, the relative importance of technical and non-technical studies in 
general education. The debates surrounding these two issues were passionate, and they would 
continue not only at the time the academy was founded but also throughout its whole history. 
The founders would contest what type of education would help produce the strongest officer 
                                                 
122 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), 
Number 169, “Presentation to Air Board on the Air Academy, 5 May 1948,” 1-3.  
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corps. The debate between the focus on STEM123 courses and an emphasis on the social sciences 
and humanities had begun. Noticeably missing from the discussion, even this early on, was 
discussion of a professional military studies curriculum—even though this was a military 
academy. 
 With the Air Board informed and committed, the Air Staff was now tasked to formulate a 
solid plan for the future academy, to include all the specific details regarding location, role and 
functions, assigned personnel, and, most significantly, the curriculum creation and composition 
of the academy. On June 24, 1948 the Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget, Frank Pace, 
Jr., wrote a letter addressed to the Secretary of the Air Force that further motivated this effort.  
Pace informed the Secretary that he had received a letter from the Under Secretary of the Air 
Force, Mr. Arthur Barrows, which included copies of the proposed report for the Senate Armed 
Services Committee discussing the Senate and House Resolutions on establishing an academy. 
Offering his frank advice, the Director set the Secretary, the Air Staff, and its planners straight. 
The Director advised the Air Force that it had a lot of work to do before petitioning the executive 
branch. Pace said that, before submitting any legislation, “it is believed essential that a thorough 
study be made of the functions which such an Academy is expected to perform in the training 
program of the Air Force and of the organization, size, and type of training required in the light 
of those functions.”124 Along with more study of roles and training programs of a proposed 
                                                 
123 The modern acronym for “Science, Technology, Engineering, Mathematics.” 
124 Air Force Academy Planning Board Study, Vol. 1, “A Plan for an Air Force 
Academy” (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Headquarters, The Air University, January 1949), 
vii. Pace’s letter is included in the first volume of the Air Force Academy Planning Board 
Study, which shows its significance. Only three letters are included: Pace’s letter; a letter 
from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of Air University, dated 1 September 
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academy, it was necessary for the Air Force to “review existing legislation pertaining to the 
Military and Naval Academies to assure that parallel or consistent provisions, so far as 
applicable, are drafted for the proposed Air Academy.” Then the elements comprising the 
National Military Establishment could coordinate on a draft bill. Only this attention to 
comparable form and function for the new academy would ensure Congressional and Executive 
Branch support.125 Air Force leaders had to ensure that they had a well-crafted plan that could 
enjoy wide supported before revealing it outside the Air Force itself. Even in his report for the 
fiscal year ending in June 1948, Secretary Symington reported that the answer to the “question of 
an Air Academy” did not have a foregone conclusion—if the Army and Navy were to allow 
adequate accessions into the Air Force from their academies, the next steps could be different.126  
                                                                                                                                                             
1948; and, a letter from the Vice Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of Air 
University, dated 16 August 1948. The second two letters are discussed below, but all 
were significant to initiating the first comprehensive study on an Air Force academy. 
Barrows, who sent Pace the letter, was the first Under Secretary of the Air Force. 
125 Air Force Academy Planning Board Study, Vol. 1, “A Plan for an Air Force 
Academy” (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Headquarters, The Air University, January 1949), 
vii. This advice, which emphasized a coordinate report on all service academies, 
influenced not only the Air Force to establish its Air Force Academy Planning Board, but 
also the Secretary of Defense to establish the Service Academy Board by spring 1948. 
Emphasis in the original. 
126 “Report of the Secretary of the Air Force to the Secretary of Defense for Fiscal Year 
1948, (1 July 1947-30 June 1948)” (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Officer, 
1948), 15. Symington noted that, in the promotion of true unification, the Army and Navy 
should give the Air Force a third of their commissioned classes. The Secretary did not 
submit this report to the Secretary of Defense until 31 December 1948. See this report, 
page v. 
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 So to safeguard appropriate planning, the Air Force looked to those elements that had 
previously done some work on this matter, as much of this prior planning had been accomplished 
in a manner that was sometimes almost clandestine and surely was not altogether openly 
circulated. For example, in late 1947, soon after the Air Force gained its independence, General 
Spaatz had charged Lieutenant General Muir Fairchild, who was then the commandant of Air 
University—the commanding general of this operational unit—with preparing plans for an 
academy. Those plans, which were never officially approved by the Air Force, were mentioned 
in those earlier discussions in March through May 1948 about a possible way ahead for an 
academy and they included an outline of the curriculum. However, now the Air Force needed a 
better organized and officially sanctioned approach, and Air University took the lead. The Air 
Staff’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Administration, Lieutenant General Idwal 
Edwards, provided that direction in the summer of 1948. His office had an Academy Planning 
Group, but now with a formidable workload, Edwards again passed the charge to Air University, 
giving it responsibility to move ahead with formalizing plans.127 The thought was that Air 
University would be in a better position to recommend a program for the proposed academy, 
since it was responsible for Air Force officers service schools and many believed it would also 
provide the oversight for an academy. 
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With responsibility for planning, Air University’s commander, Major General Robert 
Harper, now looked to a directorate within his organization. In 1947, while he was the Air 
University commander, General Fairchild formed an initial academy planning directorate on 
General Spaatz’s instruction. Harper had appointed Colonel Delmar Spivey to head the 
directorate, and now Spivey convened a meeting in late July with the goal of organizing a 
conference of “Air Force officers and distinguished civilians” whose focus would be to discuss 
the mission and structure of the new academy.128  
The meeting of distinguished officers and civilians that occurred on 9 August really 
tackled what sort of academy the Air Force would create. This was the first official, systematic 
study addressing the establishment of an Air Force Academy and the legislation required to 
accomplish this objective.129 The meeting addressed two significant questions regarding the new 
academy.  First, would the academy seemingly mimic the two established academies—a four-
year institution with general academic and military training and education? And, since this was 
an Air Force academy, would flight training be an integral part of the overall education—or 
training—process? Known as the “Fairchild Board,” this group had as its focus the general 
educational structure of the Academy and the role of flight training for the cadets.  
                                                 
128 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), 
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The fifteen board members included some heavy-hitters in the realm of the military and 
higher education.  Besides General Fairchild, the board included Major General Maxwell Taylor, 
West Point’s superintendent; Lieutenant General Idwal Edwards, the deputy chief of staff for 
Personnel and Administration; Lieutenant General John Cannon, commanding general of 
Training Command; and Major General Orvil Anderson, commanding general of the Air War 
College. The civilian representation consisted of Dr. Raymond Paty, the chancellor for the 
University of Georgia; Dr. Harry Rodgers, the president of the Brooklyn Institute of Technology; 
Dr. John Tigert, President Emeritus of the University of Florida; and Father Hunter Guthrie, then 
a professor of foreign relations at Georgetown University, who would become the school’s 
president the following year.130 The decision of this board would shape the argument on the roles 
and functions that the academy would have in developing officers. 
                                                 
130 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), 
Number 162, “Summary of Arguments Presented at Air Force Academy Conference, 
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama – 9 August 1948,” 1.  The other fifteen members of 
the Fairchild Board included: Dr. Kenneth Williams, Director of Educational Advisory of 
the Air University; Lt. Gen. Barton Yount, retired commanding general of Training 
Command; Maj. Gen. John McIntyre, Legislative Liaison, Headquarters Air Force; Maj. 
Gen. Harper, Commanding General, The Air University; Brig. Gen. Kenneth 
McNaughton, Training Division, Plans and Operations, Headquarters Air Force; and, 
Colonel Delmar T. Spivey, Deputy Commander for Education, the Air University. 
Certainly this was an impressive ad hoc board to address the establishment of the 
Academy, but two of the military men, other than Maxwell Taylor, are quite impressive, 
especially regarding the role of professional military education: Idwal Edwards and Orvil 
Anderson. Edwards, besides his impact before and during the Second World War, had 
even more impact in the forward-looking Air Force. Faced with a chaotic personnel 
situation because of the quick drawdown, and influenced by Benjamin O. Davis, Edwards 
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Each invitee had received a letter from General Vandenberg, suggesting the importance 
of convening this board, which set some guidelines. In the letter, Vandenberg said that the Air 
Force needed to get ahead of the legislative process to ensure that the academy would meet the 
service’s expectations—the Chief noted that Congress had already scuffled over three bills 
meaning to establish the academy.131 Central among the discussion points at the conference, the 
letter noted, was this question: “How many years…should be devoted to the education of an Air 
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131 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Background and Legislation, Number 25, 
“Ltr, from Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force to Brigadier 
General Kenneth P. McNaughton, Chief of Training Division, Officer of the Deputy 
Chief of Staff, Operations, Headquarters USAF, Washington 25, D.C., n.d.” 
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Force officer?”132 However, one could wonder why the course of studies and what was included 
within it was not considered more important to discuss than just the length of a program. 
Under the original Air University (AU) educational plan for an academy, from 1947, the 
new academy would have embraced a five-year program—two at an accredited civilian 
university followed by three at the service academy. This AU plan notably stipulated that the two 
years at a civilian university offered the officer candidate a general education—which would still 
require planning for some form of standardized coursework for all officer candidates.  This 
would then be “buttressed by a common military education” at the service academy. 133 What the 
AU group meant by “military education” is not defined in the study, but it could reasonably 
mean continued coursework in general education—not necessarily centered on the study of war 
or military professionalism, but more focused towards the sciences and engineering. More likely, 
this additional education that officer candidates would receive in their three years at the new 
service academy would be focused toward military training—drill and order and flight training, 
to be more specific—and not truly military “education” or military studies. Nevertheless, as the 
summer closed in 1948 the AU directorate put in motion what everyone involved believed would 
be the final push for an Air Force Academy. 
 Regarding the type of general educational program to be established, the Fairchild Board 
reflected on two approaches. The original AU plan from 1947 embodied one of the approaches. 
This approach, referred to as the “composite plan,” envisioned a five-year program—two years 
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of subsidized attendance at a civilian institution followed by the three years at the new academy. 
The group also considered a more traditional approach, known to the board as the “conventional 
plan,” which followed the arrangement of the other two academies (and most colleges and 
universities) as a four-year program, all accomplished at the new academy. The discussion listed 
the pros and cons of each approach.  
 The idea of requiring just three years at a military academy was partly a result of the 
recently concluded war. The demanding situation in World War II had created a precedent that 
had the potential to affect the academies far beyond the war years. For example, in order to gain 
trained officers for combat units, West Point and Annapolis shortened their programs from four 
to three years, with the Coast Guard Academy making “sharp cuts…in so-called general subjects 
(principally English, history, and social studies).” This move to a “three-year program reflected 
not merely the elimination or shortening of activities previously included, but also a shift in the 
direction of even greater emphasis than before on immediately utilizable skills, especially those 
applicable to combat.” The Naval Academy cut academic course work that included English, 
social sciences, military history, and civil engineering.134 This change in the length of the 
program and in what courses were required during the war would continue to influence the 
curriculum of the Air Force Academy in the near future, as the competition between the liberal 
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arts and the seemingly more utilitarian courses, such as engineering and sciences, as well as 
specific military training, became more pronounced. 
After reflecting on the plans for the day, the Board voted on the two main questions at 
hand. The consensus was that fight training should not be incorporated into the new academy’s 
program—that would come after graduation. This contradicted the proposed direction in April 
1948, when Secretary Symington concluded in a letter to the commander of Air Training 
Command that flight training would be an “integral part” of any Air Force academy.135 This 
would remain a sensitive topic. The majority also voted in favor of the composite plan. The 
structure that this astute board selected reveals what they wanted the program at the academy to 
emphasize.  All board members supported a broad education, and the majority believed that 
civilian colleges would better prepare “a broader and more flexible officer graduate,” as well as 
offer a “better view” in courses in the humanities and the social sciences. The military academy 
would be more focused, then, on the technical subjects and training.136  
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Significant in this vote is which of the two plans the various members favored. Four of 
the military members and four of the civilian members favored the composite plan—and service 
academy graduates were among those in favor of this plan.137 The other four military members 
and one civilian, Father Guthrie, supported the conventional plan.  The two remaining members 
abstained from a vote. Guthrie discussed his disapproval with General Idwal Edwards, who also 
opposed the composite plan, offering his concern that leaning on the civilian universities and 
taking a year from the military academy experience would be detrimental to the development of 
the military culture of the officer candidate—not so much his military education, but his training 
and character. General Edwards agreed, and he discussed this with the Chief, General 
Vandenberg.138 
With the decision made by the board, the Air University commander, Major General Harper, 
who had taken part in the discussions, addressed a letter on August 21 to the Chief of Staff 
recommending that the Board’s majority opinion be approved.139 
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 In response to the Fairchild Board’s recommendations and to the pressure exerted by 
Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget Frank Pace, the Chief of Staff moved forward to 
translate the Board’s findings into a detailed academy plan. On August 16, 1948, he directed his 
Vice Chief, General Fairchild, to officially notify Air University of its designation as the central 
“Air Force agency responsible for the preparation of plans for the establishment of an Air Force 
Academy.”140 Vandenberg had responded to General Harper’s letter by first agreeing with the 
Board’s recommendation that pilot training should not be accomplished as part of the Academy 
program. He responded to the recommendation that the new academy be part of a five-year 
program, with the officer candidates first attending two years at a civilian institution, with a note 
that it was “not favorably considered”—the Chief directed a four-year program “generally along 
the lines of the present service Academies.”141 
 The Air Force had moved forward toward establishing its academy. Although many 
advocates of air power had wanted their own academy – in fact, this had been a desire of the 
various air force organizations from the time of its origins as a branch within a larger service – 
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the newly independent Air Force often found itself “behind the curve” as some Congressmen 
moved quickly to seize the opportunity to benefit on their own terms from a new academy. In the 
end, the persistent reason for a service-specific academy was so that such an academy could be 
used to firm up the service’s own distinct culture. But the practical need of an academy, if the 
service was to be able to perform its mission, was to train future officers not only in the culture 
but also in technical areas that the service employed. The desire to educate those officer 
candidates more broadly and perhaps more deeply went only so far as ensuring that they received 
a form of college education—without much regard for the need for a strong military studies 
program. That could come later in an officer’s career—or so most leaders believed. The work 
accomplished in the year since the Air Force had been established as an independent service 
resulted, then, in the two studies that would now set the standard and the focus for how to 
educate the officer candidates.  
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Chapter 3 - The Studies that Shaped the Academy 
  The discussions that took place during the August 1948 meeting with General Fairchild 
and his group, and the agreements that came out of them, led to the first concentrated, 
comprehensive, service-backed study toward an air academy. However, the decision to better 
organize the planning for an Air Force academy did not result only from the August meeting but 
also from pressure by the Air Staff in Washington DC—who were themselves being pressed by 
members of Congress.142 The issue of an academy was so important and so demanding for the 
Air Force that the Director of Personnel Planning at the Pentagon could not keep up with all the 
extra demands put upon him to develop a way ahead for an academy, along with the “normal” 
duties that occupied his directorate.143 Assistance came quickly to the Pentagon personnel in two 
main forms: First, the Air Force immediately assigned a lead Air Force-level command to 
perform the necessary study.  Specifically, the Air Force Chief of Staff now subordinated all 
previous studies and concurrent working groups dealing with establishing an air academy to Air 
                                                 
142 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 29-30; pages 25-141 of this volume traces the legislative 
evolution to establish the Academy, to include the main hearings and discussion of the 
bill signed 1 April 1954 by President Eisenhower. 
143 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Background and Legislation, Number 3, 
“Record of Interview of Lieutenant General Idwal H. Edwards by Air Force Academy 
Historian in Washington, D.C. on 26 October 1956,” 5. The Director was Major General 
Richard Nugent, who worked for Lieutenant General Idwal Edwards, the Deputy Chief of 
Staff of Personnel. Nugent confessed to Edwards that late summer season that he just 
could not keep up with everything, and that some other office needed to be the OPR—
Office of Primary Responsibility—for all Academy-related issues. Nugent would replace 
Edwards in 1950. 
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University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.144 Second, just over a year after the Chief 
picked Air University to form a study group, the Air Force organized an office in the Pentagon 
responsible for coordinating all studies and plans about an academy and nominated an individual 
to head it—to centralize efforts in Washington DC.  Both moves furthered the establishment of 
the academy and influenced the direction that it would take including how it might aim to 
accomplish an officer candidate’s professional military education. 
As the leaders of the Air Force pressed the service to move vigorously to plan an 
academy in the autumn of 1948, their focus on professional military education also influenced 
the Secretary of Defense to review the entire military academy structure. The review board that 
he composed examined the existing academies, and entertained the support for an additional 
academy. General Vandenberg’s order to Air University, which made it the lead command on 
planning for an air academy, also supported this planning group. This group, formed in 1949, 
was known as the Service Academy Board and more popularly as the “Stearns-Eisenhower” 
Board—for the chairman and vice chairman of the group.145 The study that this group submitted, 
“A Report and Recommendation to the Secretary of Defense by the Service Academy Board,” 
                                                 
144 Letter from Muir S. Fairchild, General, US Air Force, Vice Chief of Staff, to the 
Commanding General, Air University, Subject: “Establishment of an Air Force 
Academy,” 16 August 1948 in Air Force Academy Planning Board Study, Vol. 1, “A 
Plan for an Air Force Academy” (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Headquarters, The Air 
University, January 1949), v, USAFA Special Collections. (The study will now be 
referred to as “AFAPBS”). The signature block was Fairchild’s, however, prior to the 
signature block was the emphasized order and authority “BY COMMAND OF THE 
CHIEF OF STAFF.” 
145 Dr. Robert L. Stearns, President of the University of Colorado, and Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, President of Columbia University. 
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also proposed what it saw as the most effective way to educate an officer candidate—primarily 
an academic education focused on scientific fields and liberal arts.  
These two studies—the study that came out of the Fairchild group meeting and the one 
directed by the Secretary of Defense—outlined a solid philosophy and curriculum that would 
eventually be seen in the Air Force Academy when it appeared a half decade later.146 The 
personnel involved in these two studies included individuals who, in some cases, became even 
more instrumental at the time of the founding in 1954—as they created the initial structure and 
developed the curriculum. The founding fathers of the Air Force Academy concentrated their 
efforts on creating a solid, broad academic experience, one they thought would be effective in 
developing officers and in motivating the new cadets to a full career of service to the Air Force. 
Professional military studies held a second-class position to the broad academic curriculum. 
Also, this education would encompass a fairly broad range of course work, but, after an emphasis 
on the social sciences and humanities early in a cadet’s time at the proposed academy, it would 
                                                 
146 On recognizing the role and influence these two studies had on the Academy’s early 
years, see AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Background and Legislation, Number 
1, “Interview with Colonel Arthur E. Boudreau by the Air Force Academy Historian, 
Major Edgar A. Holt, 10-11 October 1956,” 9, and “U.S. Air Force Academy Oral 
History Interview #227, Robert Stillman, 3 April 1979,” conducted by Major Russell W. 
Mank and Captain Phillip S. Meilinger, Department of History, USAF Academy, 
Colorado, USAFA Special Collections, 2-3. See also, Phillip S. Meilinger, Hubert R. 
Harmon: Airman, Officer, Father of the Air Force Academy (Golden, Colorado: Fulcrum 
Group, 2009), 181-182, and Paul T. Ringenbach, Battling Tradition: Robert F. 
McDermott and Shaping the U.S. Air Force Academy (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 
2006), 39-40, 156-157. Also, General Harmon reviewed the AFAPBS in December 1955 
to better understand their interpretation of a balanced curriculum—between the sciences 
and humanities—see, AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 2, 732. 
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shift and become a more technical curriculum.  This was no accident – the founders focused on 
the new institution as supporting an advanced technical service.  
 
Air Force Academy Planning Board Study 
The immediate response to the Fairchild Board’s deliberations in August 1948 and to the 
call of the Air Force Chief of Staff to create an academy was the decision to produce a 
comprehensive study that the planners believed would be the blueprint for the new institution. 
The Fairchild Board had provided some basic structure and objectives for an academy, but it had 
not, for example, set out a specific curriculum.147 General Vandenberg had selected Air 
University as the single point of contact on this issue because of his Vice Chief of Staff, Muir 
Fairchild. That Vandenberg relied on his assistant was prescient.  Prior to becoming the Vice 
Chief of Staff of the Air Force in May 1948, Fairchild had been the acting commander of the 
newly organized Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base.148 Although the concept of Maxwell 
housing an air university might have seemed original to uninitiated observers, the base had a 
history of accommodating officers developing air doctrine and advancing professional studies 
going back to the Air Corps Tactical School of the 1930s, with Fairchild as one of the school’s 
graduates. Thus programs at Maxwell had been focused very much on doctrine and professional 
                                                 
147 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), 
Number 162, “Summary of Arguments Presented at Air Force Academy Conference, 
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama – 9 August 1948,” 2-4. See also, Chapter 2. 
148 Although the location of Maxwell Field (later, Air Force Base) had housed various air 
service-related schools, the re-designation of Air University occurred in March 1946—
Fairchild was the first Commandant of this school. See 
www.au.af.mil/au/audocs/AU_Maxwell_Heritage_Pamphlet_2014.pdf. 
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military studies, but, after the Air Force had its independence, those responsible for the study 
aimed toward an academy that would put comprehensive military studies in second-tier status 
while elevating the place of a broad, general academic education for the officer candidate.  
Whether this would be achieved was another matter. 
The study that Air University produced was the Air Force Academy Planning Board 
Study (AFAPBS). The group responsible for the study produced three volumes in their nine 
months of work—about 650 pages—under the titles of “A Plan for the Academy” (published 
January 1949), “The Curriculum” (May 1949), and “Site Survey at Randolph Field, Texas” 
(January 1949)—the final volume inspired by legislative pressure from Representative Kilday 
and others to house the school at the established base in San Antonio. Essential to this study was 
the central question, “What did [the Air Force organization] want a young Air Force officer to 
be?”149 This question inspired all individuals involved and the various assembled working 
groups that were charged with assisting the effort.  
The first two volumes are of main interest to this work, since they provide the thinking of 
the Academy’s planners on an overall direction for the program of study—to include their view 
of professional military education. The first volume summarizes the curriculum, so 
understanding it gives a sense of the context planners envisioned for professional military 
studies. As the study’s project director later stated, planners and higher education consultants 
                                                 
149 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Background and Legislation, Number 1, 
“Interview with Colonel Arthur E. Boudreau by the Air Force Academy Historian, Major 
Edgar A. Holt, 10-11 October 1956,” 4. The first volume is 170 pages; the second 433; 
and the site survey is 39 pages, with a number of additional pages housing some field 
diagrams. The third volume was also classified “Restricted,” mainly since Congress had 
given no authorization on location. 
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developed the first volume as the basic outline of the curriculum, while the hired academic 
specialists took this basic outline as the basis for developing a more extensive and much more 
detailed program in the second volume.150 The board concentrated on the general academic 
curriculum for developing an officer candidate who would “represent the Air Force 
advantageously in any educated group, at home or abroad, socially or officially.”151 The 
emphasis would be on the academic curriculum without a heavy focus on specifically military 
studies. The Planning Board, however, was still central in formulating the curriculum for 
professional military studies at the new academy, however lacking the curriculum may have 
been. As wanting as the military studies course work would be, the Board’s proposal did set the 
precedent for the actual curriculum used when the new Academy opened in 1955.152 
                                                 
150 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Background and Legislation, Number 1, 
“Interview with Colonel Arthur E. Boudreau by the Air Force Academy Historian, Major 
Edgar A. Holt, 10-11 October 1956,” 6. Again, realize that the first volume is 170 pages, 
while the second volume is 433 pages—both projects are solid work. See also, Jay D. 
Miller, Ted Ownby, Jr., and Charles W. Walters, “USAF Academy Military Training 
History” (research report, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, May 1978), 
30. 
151 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, “A Plan for the Air Force Academy”, 113. This was included in the 
opening paragraph of Chapter 10, “Introduction to the Curriculum”—Volume 2 expands 
the discussion and laboriously outlines the proposed curriculum. 
152 “Program of Instruction, 4 January 1954,” in Colonel Arthur Boudreau’s Files, 1954, 
Special Collections, USAFA. Document’s author unknown, but presumed to be 
Boudreau. As stated in the document, “The ground work was laid at the Air University in 
1948 and 1949 by a group which included a number of Air Force officers and some sixty 
selected civilian educators,” 1-2.  
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Besides providing the study group with their overt support, Air Force senior leaders also 
had presented the AFAPBS personnel with some specific guidance that would ultimately affect 
the Board’s conclusions. In the first directive, the Air Force Chief stipulated that the Air Force’s 
academy would be aligned with the other academies—a four-year course of instruction.  The 
second directive was that the focus would not be on flight training—this specialized training 
should not even be part of the program.153 Although the first directive provided a sound 
framework for developing the Academy, the one on flight training proved contentious—and the 
debate over this issue later distracted and distorted the focus of professional military studies at 
the institution. 
 General Vandenberg did not want any pilot training done at the new academy, because he 
believed that it would be in tension with education at the academy. He recognized the difference 
between education and training, and he had confidence in, as the Fairchild Board members 
agreed, that all more specialized training should be accomplished after the commissioning of the 
                                                 
153 Letter from Hoyt S. Vandenberg, General, US Air Force, Chief of Staff, to the 
Commanding General, Air University, Subject: “Establishment of an Air Force 
Academy,” 1 September 1948 in Air Force Academy Planning Board Study, Vol. 1, “A 
Plan for an Air Force Academy” (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Headquarters, The Air 
University, January 1949), iii. See also Chapter 2, where, among other issues, the debate 
was about whether an officer candidate would go to a university for a couple of years, 
followed by a 2-3 year academy education. This discussion on length of civilian versus 
academy education falls into the realm of service unification—which was a post-war 
push by many in the establishment. On the extent of consensus for no flight training in 
the program, see Edward Anthony Miller, Jr., “The Founding of the Air Force Academy: 
An Administrative and Legislative History” (Ph.D. diss., University of Denver, August 
1969), 232. 
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officer candidate.154 He believed that the focus should be on education. Also, Vandenberg had 
history as his guide concerning pilot training while a cadet was at an academy.155 During World 
War II, West Point instituted a program that trained and prepared the officer candidates for their 
flying career, since pilots were at a premium.156 Cadets actually earned their pilot’s certification. 
Although the War Department authorized 60 percent of each West Point class to take the training 
and join the Army Air Forces, only about 40 percent actually completed the training.  This focus 
                                                 
154 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Background and Legislation (Cont’d), 
Number 162, “Summary of Arguments Presented at Air Force Academy Conference, 
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama – 9 August 1948,” 5.  
155 For a different interpretation of why flying training failed during this time at West 
Point, see, AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Background and Legislation, Number 
12, “Interview with General Dale O. Smith, Planning for the Establishment of the Air 
Force Academy, Washington, D.C. 18 April 1956,” 1-2. Smith, an advocate for a strong 
professional military studies program at the new academy, also believed that “flying 
training should constitute the central core of studies for the professional education of 
potential Air Force officer in the Air Force Academy,” 2.  
156 General George Marshall provided the final direction. See, AFAHD, 1954-1956, 
Appendix, Vol. 3, Background and Legislation, Number 3, “Record of Interview of 
Lieutenant General Idwal H. Edwards by Air Force Academy Historian in Washington, 
D.C. on 26 October 1956,” 7. General Edwards was the General Staff’s G-3—in charge 
of Operations. He recommended that pilot training while a cadet at West Point not be 
done. West Point graduates, specifically Hap Arnold, overruled him. Edwards believed 
that if you had some cadets doing the flying program, and the others performing 
“‘onerous’ drills”—this would create a rift. Those flying cadets “would pile in their 
trucks and drive out to Stewart Air Field with their flying clothes on while the other 
fellows were marching down some hall to do some drill that nobody cared about.” For the 
flying program at West Point, see M. Hamlin Cannon, Flying Training at West Point 
(U.S Air Force Academy, 1970) in the USAFA Special Collections. 
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on flight training while those taking the training were still cadets was a departure, because it 
veered away from West Point’s tradition of more drill and ceremony training as well as their 
standard practice of keeping studies broader and more general.  In fact, the Academic Board at 
West Point had to alter the curriculum for “air cadets” to accommodate the flight training, since 
it was being conducted during the regular academic year. This affected the first class that 
graduated with wings in January 1943. West Point’s wartime Superintendent, Major General 
Francis B. Wilby, directed a review of the curriculum by the Academic Board in 1943, preparing 
for post-war normalcy for West Point. The Academic Board used this opportunity to bring back 
its traditional focus in favor of more generalized training and studies—and this would mean 
eliminating pilot training while cadets were at the Academy. The Board believed that the 
specialized flight training “had caused class distinctions, branch jealousies, and claims of 
discrimination among the cadets.” The last class that had pilot training while at the Academy was 
the class of 1946.157 Those who opposed flight training at West Point had eventually won out. 
Lieutenant General Idwal Edwards, one of those opponents and one who also opposed having 
flight training at a new Air Force Academy, later suggested: “The purpose of [an Air Academy] 
was not to turn out aviators—it was to turn out officers who were basically educated in the 
                                                 
157 Lance Betros, Carved in Granite: West Point since 1902 (College Station, TX: Texas 
A&M University Press, 2012), 225-226. For the information of that first January 1943 
graduating class, Betros credits West Point’s Annual Report to the Superintendent (1943), 
see Betros, 403n72 and 403n73, and notes that the first class had 245 initial participants 
of the program—39 failed to graduate and “four died trying.” 
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military profession—officers who could be trained to fly later.”158 Even though this decision in 
1948 would affect the curriculum of the AFAPBS, flight training at the Academy was not laid to 
rest. 
 Although the Chief’s directive gave Commanding General of Air University Major 
General Robert Harper overall responsibility for the program, the actual practical work in 
conducting the Planning Board’s study rested on the shoulders of the project officer, Lieutenant 
Colonel Arthur E. Boudreau. Colonel Boudreau would have a lasting impact on and association 
with the Academy, eventually becoming its Assistant Dean.  When General Harper recalled him 
back to the service in August 1948, Boudreau was serving as the Executive Vice President and 
Dean of the Inter-American College at Coral Gables, Florida. He was a traditional civilian 
educator—a fact that affected his outlook on what really constituted professional military 
studies. He was more interested in developing the broad-based education that he believed was 
necessary for the education of an officer.159 Boudreau had worked for Harper during the war 
when Harper was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Training and Boudreau oversaw the “wartime 
civilian pilot training contracts in colleges and contract schools.” He also organized the Air 
Force College Training Program in approximately 150 colleges and universities.160 Boudreau’s 
                                                 
158 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Background and Legislation, Number 3, 
“Record of Interview of Lieutenant General Idwal H. Edwards by Air Force Academy 
Historian in Washington, D.C., 26 October 1956,” 6. Author’s emphasis. 
159 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Background and Legislation, Number 1, 
“Interview with Colonel Arthur E. Boudreau by the Air Force Academy Historian, Major 
Edgar A. Holt, 10-11 October 1956,” 4-5. 
160 Ringenbach, Battling Tradition, 30; AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, 
Background and Legislation, Number 1, “Interview with Colonel Arthur E. Boudreau by 
the Air Force Academy Historian, Major Edgar A. Holt, 10-11 October 1956,” 2. 
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influence on the direction of the new academy’s curriculum cannot be overstated, since he was 
an organizer and participant for the AFAPBS, was centrally involved in the Secretary of 
Defense’s study of all service academies, and played an integral part in actually establishing the 
Academy’s academic curriculum in his role as the Assistant Dean upon the Academy’s 
founding.161 
 One of Boudreau’s first acts upon accepting his duties shows the direction the new 
academy would ultimately take in the education of the officer candidate. Boudreau was not only 
the overall project officer for the study, but he also assumed the duty of directing the Curriculum 
Group—one of four groups comprising the whole study team. On October 1, 1948, Lieutenant 
Colonel Boudreau assigned the officers under him in the group on curriculum development into 
three committees: One team was responsible for the technical field subjects, another for the 
humanities and social sciences, and the third for the areas of physical and military training.162 
These committees were comprised of the planners for the curriculum, as stated above, that would 
set the course for the curriculum that the specialists would then provide more specific direction 
                                                 
161 Lieutenant General David M. Schlatter, who was also involved in the Service 
Academy Board study in 1949-1950, as well as directly involved with the post-war 
organization of the service school system of the Army Air Force/Air Force, suggests that 
Boudreau was the “main full-time contact man” of the Service Academy Board, and “had 
the longest continuity [on planning for the Air Force Academy]…of any man I know.” 
See AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 10, “Record of Interview with 
Lieutenant General David M. Schlatter by Air Force Academy Historian [Major Holt] in 
Norfolk, Virginia on 24 October 1956,” 6-7. 
162 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 446. He did this through an official memo, see ibid., 
446n14. 
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for the program. The listing of “military training”—rather than “education”—in the third and 
final grouping reveals the role, or lack of role, that military studies would have in the curriculum.  
 Apart from Colonel Boudreau’s group was another one that became subordinate to the 
planning team was the Educational Advisory Staff to Air University. This was an already 
established division within Air University that now was attached to the overall planning study, as 
directed by the Air Force Chief—his message was for any group working on any plan for an 
academy were now subordinated to General Harmon’s work. This group’s primary goal upon its 
founding in 1946 was to improve “the educational process for the training of professional Air 
Force officers, rather than to determine the content specific courses,” since these were civilians 
who held terminal degrees in various disciplines.163 The team advised the Planning Board on 
how to achieve the broad, general education of the officer candidate that would also motivate the 
candidate to a lifetime of service, rather than to put the focus on specifically military studies.164 
The emphasis of this group of educators to avoid specific military studies, then, resembled the 
                                                 
163AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, “Background and Legislation,” Number 11, 
“Memorandum of Conference Interview with Dr. James C. Shelburne, Reference Air 
University Planner for the Establishment of an Air Force Academy, 24 April 1956,” 1, 2. 
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“Memorandum of Conference Interview with Dr. James C. Shelburne, Reference Air 
University Planner for the Establishment of an Air Force Academy, 24 April 1956,” 2; 
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Boudreau by the Air Force Academy Historian, Major Edgar A. Holt, 10 and 11 October 
1956,” 3. 
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view expressed by many others working to establish the new academy’s curriculum that military 
studies should not have an influential position at this military academy.  
Time was now of the essence, as the voices to establish the new academy grew stronger, 
including those in Congress, and this predicament would affect the study.  The goal became 
promptly providing the information needed to assist the legislative effort, and a perfect 
curriculum was not really a part of the required solution.165 Even though it would not be the 
perfect solution, then, what this study developed did become the blueprint for the future 
discussion about establishing the academy. Given the time pressure, the planners had to do the 
best they could without the time needed for full reflection—a faultless result was thus an extreme 
challenge. As Colonel Boudreau stated in a later interview:  
One factor to consider was that we started working “all out” on Academy 
planning in September, which was a bad time for educators…. The period from 
September 1948 to June of 1949 was our great period of production. The planning 
and development of the plan of the establishment of the Air Force Academy, as 
well as the curriculum was done between September 1948 and June 1949, 
and…there was no chance to do long-range planning…. We had to locate the best 
men that we could find who could give us the time…. We brought in a group of 
educators on a high administrative level. They were not teachers or professors; 
instead they were deans and presidents of colleges…. We picked those people 
first because of their successful administrative experience in high level positions, 
                                                 
165 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, “Background and Legislation,” Number 1, “Interview 
with Colonel Arthur E. Boudreau by the Air Force Academy Historian, Major Edgar A. Holt, 10 
and 11 October 1956,” 3, 8; AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 29-30. 
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and second, we tried to pick those who would be conversant with the changing 
aspects of education in the scientific and technical areas in social-humanistic 
areas….166  
Although the study, according to Boudreau, might not have had the assistance of the most perfect 
contingent of collegiate educators, the consultants that did participate still were of solid 
pedigree.167 
 The first accomplishment of the group was to establish what it believed a young officer 
should be, and this led to the study’s statement of the twelve objectives in the development of the 
cadets.  First among these were that the officer candidate, through this program, would be “well-
grounded in Air Force principles, practices and procedures,” as well as educated in military 
studies.168 This emphasis, as its first objective, seemed to align with the requirement of a strong 
professional military studies program. These objectives matched nicely with the group’s 
conclusion why an Air Force Academy was so necessary. In this section, titled “The Necessity 
for the United States Air Force Academy,” the study’s members, specifically the full-time 
members of the AFAPBS (see “members” in the Appendix), recognized: “The disposition of the 
people of the United States is historically so unwarlike that to the vast majority it seems unusual 
                                                 
166 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Volume 3, “Background and Legislation,” Number 1, 
“Interview with Colonel Arthur E. Boudreau by the Air Force Academy Historian, Major 
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168 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 7. 
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for a person to seek a career in the profession of arms.”169 Therefore, this new academy would 
provide an officer candidate a robust program of instruction in professional military studies.  
 Since this study would provide future Air Force leaders and the academy’s founders with 
a vision of a professional airman who would win a commission through the Air Force Academy, 
its specifications merit attention – they were not only the elements of this one group’s study but 
became the premises for future studies and discussions on about the role of the new academy.  
The specifications were stated clearly and simply:  
The aim of the Air Force Academy will be to produce an officer who will be: 
a. Well-grounded in Air Force principles, practices and procedures. 
b. Broadly and soundly educated in the humanities, sciences, and military 
studies. 
c. Conscious of the mission and responsibilities of the profession of arms. 
d. Devoted to his career and sensible of his obligation to his country and service. 
e. Motivated to work for the preservation of peace and willing to fight for its 
effective accomplishment. 
f. Instilled with a high sense of loyalty, duty and the subordination of his 
individual desires for the common good. 
g. Skilled in human relations and possessed of a knowledge of the world and its 
peoples. 
h. Respectful of the rights and liberties of individuals, institutions and nations. 
i. A calm, effective, resourceful leader. 
j. Receptive of new ideas and learning. 
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k. A man who knows how to “win,” and how to take his place on a winning 
team. 
l. An honored representative of the Air Force.170 
With these stated objectives to fulfill, the curriculum would seemingly need a strong focus on 
military studies. The first four requirements on the list aligned directly with the need for 
professional military studies and provided an indisputable basis for the new institution.171 
Toward the end of the opening chapter of the work, under the subheading “Urgency,” the 
planners connected the founding of West Point—which came about because “Washington, Knox, 
Hamilton, Jefferson, and Monroe” were men who “knew from bitter experience the need of a 
school for the professional training of officers”—to the pressing requirement for an academy to 
serve the newly independent service. The planners emphasized: “It can hardly be disputed that 
maintaining national security or, in the last extremity, the conduct of war, is such a serious 
business that it should be entrusted only to the most carefully trained and highly qualified 
men.”172 Colonel Boudreau recognized: “The AFAPB decided…that they were not going to 
consider the point of articulation between the Academy and civilian institutions in any specific 
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degree. Civilian colleges have specific objectives; the Air Force Academy would have the 
primary objective of starting professional airmen on their careers.... A young graduate of the 
academy would receive the professional education of an airman in the same manner as a man 
going to law school comes out a lawyer.”173 So the AFAPBS proposed that the academy would 
be the central mechanism for producing the country’s Air Force professional core. The planners 
seemingly stressed the need for this particular service school to properly and effectively educate 
its future officers in thoroughly understanding the “conduct of war”—especially as it pertains to 
the service proper.  
 Instead of emphasizing professional military studies at the heart of the curriculum, 
however, those shaping it pushed instead into the broader area of general education. After all, 
some thought, the Air Force had already been struggling with its status as the service with the 
smallest share of its officers who had had college educations, and this was something that the 
founders of the new academy needed to address.174 Again, in the opening chapter of the plan, 
under the subheading “Educational Status,” the document noted: “Among the serious problems 
facing the United States Air Force is that of establishing a system of undergraduate education 
which will prepare officers for careers in its service…. The Air Force needs a system of 
procurement that will provide an adequate number of college-educated, uniformly trained 
officers with the character and personal attributes desired—a system that will give stability to the 
                                                 
173 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Background and Legislation, Number 1, 
“Interview with Colonel Arthur E. Boudreau by the Air Force Academy Historian, Major 
Edgar A. Holt, 10-11 October 1956,” 4. 
174 See, Chapter 2 of this work. Also, see, AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, 
Background and Legislation (cont.), Number 88, “‘Air Force Renews Pleas for Own 
Service Academy,’ Army, Navy, Air Force Journal, 3 November 1951,” 1. 
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officer corps and unity to the objectives and ideals of its members.”175 The new academy would 
solve the problem by offering a “broad general education as well as a sound background in 
aeronautical science and tactics, a requirement unique to the Air Force,” conferring a Bachelor of 
Science degree on the graduate. The planners suggested that, although various civilian colleges 
and universities could offer an effective and economical education, these institutions did not 
offer a degree that would include all the courses that Air Force officers needed.  Moreover, they 
claimed, “civilian colleges are unprepared to accept the responsibility of weeding out the 
students lacking the traits of character, qualities of leadership, and amenability to discipline that 
are essential to an efficient officer corps.”176 Discipline and training, as well as motivating the 
officer candidates for service, were more important than specifically military education. Again, 
Boudreau’s organization of the curriculum emphasized the general education in the humanities 
and the sciences over military education—which he had already pigeonholed into the more 
technical, more limiting, and less “academic” term “military training.”  
 The organizational structure proposed in the plan, however, seemed to emphasize, once 
again, the role that military studies would have in the overall program. In Chapter 4, 
“Organization of the United States Air Force Academy,” a chart depicts the three main 
organizations under the Superintendent—the general officer overseeing the entire command.177 
The three organizations were under the Dean of Faculty, the Commandant of Cadets, and the 
Deputy for Administration—this final organization was responsible for ensuring the base and 
logistical support for the academy. The organizational chart for the Dean of Faculty is further 
                                                 
175 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 4. 
176 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 5. 
177 By law, this position was initially a Major General (2-star) and subsequently became a 
Lieutenant General (3-star) position. See also, AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 31. 
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delineated to show three constituent divisions, which included the Chairman, Division of 
Humanities; Chairman, Division of Science; Chairman, Division of Military Studies.178 Later in 
the chapter, placed after the organizational charts, the respective roles and responsibilities of the 
various organizations and divisions are given. The basic separation of responsibilities seems 
rather clear as the Dean’s office was to head “all organized instruction,” and the Commandant 
was to be “directly responsible for military training, administration, personnel services, and 
discipline of Air Cadets.”179 The structured program seemed to offer a solid division of labor—
with a division under the Dean organizing the academic approach to military studies and the 
Commandant implementing the appropriate military training. 
 However, besides overseeing the military training of the officer candidates, the 
Commandant shouldered an additional responsibility as the Chairman of the Division of Military 
Studies. Although the study’s planners seemingly differentiated in the program’s structure 
between academic work in military studies and other kinds of work in military training, this 
arrangement actually blurred demarcation, even though it was intended to “complete 
coordination in the daily routine of each Air Cadet,”180 by placing some of the academic 
responsibility in the commandant’s realm. While also the division’s Chairman, the Commandant 
would then be responsible to provide “personnel to the Division of Military Studies for 
                                                 
178 The school’s library was the fourth division under the responsibility of the Dean. See, 
AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 25. 
179 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 33, 34. Both the Dean and Commandant are Brigadier Generals—
one-star generals, subordinated to the Superintendent. To assist civilian educators, the 
Commandant is often compared to a Dean of Students. Author’s emphasis. 
180 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 33. 
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instruction in military subjects,”181 which added a layer of confusion. This mingling of tasks 
across levels and types of responsibility would be noticeable and problematic upon the founding 
of the Academy, specifically involving the personalities of the first commandant and the second 
dean, as discussed below. So the Commandant’s office, recognized to be the administrative, 
training, and disciplinary branch, was expected also to have a significant role in the development 
of the academic work in military studies.  
 Before investigating the specific courses proposed for the Division of Military Studies to 
gauge the rigor expected in a cadet’s military education, it is useful to review the emphasis each 
division received under the Dean in the plan. In the first volume, written by those planning teams 
that developed the broader outline of a curriculum, the third section summarized the goals 
embodied in the curriculum, while briefing describing courses and supporting course material.182 
The section opens with a disclaimer that the anticipated second volume (completed some four 
months after this first volume and running to 433 pages) might include updated information on 
the proposed courses, since the second volume would incorporate the results of further study and 
deliberation by subject matter experts.183 But the first and second volumes assigned similar 
distributions of course hours to the three divisions.184 The breakdown, as depicted in the chart 
                                                 
181 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 42-43. In the plan’s delineation of each area’s responsibilities, the 
commandant is given fourteen, labeled “a” – “n.” The responsibility as chairman of the 
division, and his role to provide the instructors and instruction are “k” and “l” 
respectively. 
182 This third part of the plan is titled “Summary of the Curriculum with Brief Course 
Descriptions,” AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 111. 
183 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 111. 
184 Comparing the two “Master Program” charts in the respective volumes shows the 
same total credit hours—195—with the humanities and the sciences the same devised 
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“Master Program” in the first volume, allots 33.8 percent for the humanities, 39 percent for the 
sciences, and 27.2 percent for military studies. The planners determined this distribution by 
mapping out the proposed four-year curriculum with its supporting credit hours—66 hours in the 
humanities, 76 in the sciences, and 53 in military studies, for a total of 195 credit hours for the 
candidates to receive the bachelor’s degree.185 The planning team acknowledged that this total 
number of credit hours was extremely high compared with the requirements at civilian colleges 
and universities. However, as the academy’s planners discovered, the quest to “do all” and “be 
all” was a difficult one to navigate, and the high demands of the program became a persistent 
                                                                                                                                                             
program. The only minor change is in the military studies program between the two 
volumes—two of the proposed credit hours are moved from the summer to the academic 
year between volumes. See AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 115 and, AFAPBS, Vol. 2, vii. Look at the 
final three rows and columns for the comparison. 
185 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 115. Refer to the final two rows of the chart. As a point of 
comparison, the Air Training Command plan from 1948, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, had a total of 5,240 contact hours planned, with 13 percent (703 hours) dedicated 
to the humanities/social sciences, 31 percent (1,612) for sciences/engineering, 10 percent 
(524) for professional education (primarily training coursework, but with military 
education interspersed), and 46 percent (2,401) for flying training and physical 
education—this training organization concentrated on specialized training, which was 
rejected by all other plans. See “United States Air Academy Plan,” Headquarters, Air 
Training Command, Barksdale AFB, LA, 26 April 1948, 16-17. A committee of civilian 
consultants met with Academy planners in October 1948 and reported a month later that 
the three divisions seemed “logical and desirable” and that having the cadets take 23 
courses (69 semester hours) “should accomplish as adequately as possible, considering 
the professional demands inherent in the nature and function of the Air Force Academy, 
the objective of a broad general education.” Quoted in AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 447, from 
“Memo for Lt Col Boudreau, unsigned, subj: Report of Curriculum Planners, 11 Nov 
48,” 447n16; original document not found. 
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issue at the academy. Nevertheless, the fact that the Division of Military Studies received 
somewhat lower hours for its coursework affords some early hint of the lower level of emphasis 
on military studies among the planners.  
 But the difference in the total hours devoted to Military Studies compared with the other 
divisions was less significant than the level of rigor in the courses the division offered. Again, 
what the planners proposed would have cadets to take around 200 credit hours—requiring a 
cadet to take between 20 and 23 hours per semester (the program included some credit hours, 
primarily in military studies—or training—during the summer semesters). The planners of the 
curriculum recognized that this was an “inordinately high” number of hours—compared with the 
18-20 hours per semester deemed normal at West Point, Annapolis, and civilian universities—
but acknowledged that some subjects would require little or no outside preparation by the 
cadet.186 Specifically, no homework would be needed in “the tactics, air science and physical 
education courses”—all within the Military Studies Division.  So, they concluded: “When this is 
taken into consideration the academic load is not appreciably higher than is carried by good 
students in civilian universities.”187 Also, the Curriculum Planning Group suggested: “The ratio 
of academic credit to hours or periods of instruction is one to one for classroom courses, one to 
three for tactics and field courses and one to two for laboratory courses and physical 
education.”188 This seemed to give the appearance of a lack of rigor in the military studies 
program. 
                                                 
186 Betros, 140. West Point was evaluating its curriculum, also, in the late-1950s. Their 
total was 19-21 hours a semester. 
187 “Introduction to the Curriculum” in the AFAPBS, Vol. 2, vi. Emphasis in the original. 
188 AFAPBS, Vol. 2, vi. 
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 The vision the planners had for the military studies program was rather rudimentary. The 
division’s responsibility “[was] the preparation of the Air Cadet mentally, psychologically, and 
physically for exercise of command and fulfillment of the responsibilities and duties which must 
be assumed upon graduation,” with a focus on “command and leadership.”189 The organizational 
chart in the first volume, for example, shows two departments housed in the Division of Military 
Studies: the Department of Air Science and Tactics Instruction and the Department of Health and 
Physical Education Instruction. In the third part of this first volume are four chapters that better 
outline the curriculum that the planners proposed—the final chapter of this section more clearly 
discusses the Division of Military Studies and its block of courses amounting to 53 credit 
hours.190 In investigating these two departments, one can easily conclude that they embraced 
much that was not consistent with an academic approach in professional military studies.  
 In the second department, for example, the program of courses designed by the planners 
included physical education and basic military hygiene. The three-credit course in Military 
Hygiene, a junior-level course, was intended to investigate basic “health and disease to the 
personnel of the Air Force in both war and peace,” along with understanding the necessary 
defenses against nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare.191 Although this was a necessary 
                                                 
189 AFAPBS, Vol. 2, 216. 
190 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 133. The planners’ volume, Volume 2, seemingly maintains this 
same structure as its organizational chart continues to show two departments, but the 
third part of this second volume, pages 215-433, devoted to the Division of Military 
Studies, discusses three “stems” within the division—Air Science, Tactics, and Health 
and Physical Education. See AFAPBS, Vol. 2, viii, 216-217. 
191 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 133. The listing of the expanded course work demonstrates that the 
discussion on nuclear, biological, and chemical (“NBC”) warfare does not include any 
intellectual classroom discussions, merely the training and preparation of such warfare. 
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component of military training, serious proponents of military education would not have 
considered the various courses developed within these two categories as more broadly 
meaningful in an officer’s military education. Instead, these courses more likely revealed a bias 
favoring military training rather than a broader kind of military education and learning. In 
addition, the fifteen credits in physical education courses, spanning four years, were to provide 
the cadet with instruction and training in various athletic activities.192 So even though this 
department was within a division included within the Dean’s accountability, these “studies” align 
more with training than with than education. 
 The Department of Air Science and Tactics Instruction, the other department in the 
Division of Military Studies, offered courses that seemed more closely aligned with course work 
in military studies. This department, as defined in the section’s summary, was responsible for 
                                                                                                                                                             
The specialists did not include these topics in their proposal. See AFAPBS, Vol. 2, 384-
395. The course plan opens with a period offering an historical discussion on the 
necessity for hygiene in warfare, as the discussion includes reviewing how good health 
was necessary in over 18 conflicts from the Peloponnesian War through World War II—
the Korean War is somehow omitted—see page 385. 
192 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 138-140. The 15 credit hours for physical education break down as 6 during 
the freshman year, 5 for the sophomore year, and 2 each offered in the junior and senior year. 
Besides basic sports, some delved more into Boy Scouting activity—camping and “campcraft,” 
canoeing, fishing, hiking, etc.—such as PE 200, which Air Cadet took during his summer after 
the freshman year. See ibid., 139. Noteworthy is the effort put forth by the civilian consultants on 
the physical education course work. For example, the physical education plan included three 
years of Tennis—20 periods in PE 100; 14 in PE 101; 17 in PE 102; none in PE 200, but had to 
accomplish an “activity card” demonstrating at least 12 sets of tennis; 17 in PE 201; 17 in PE 
202; 12 in PE 301; and 8 in PE 302. Other sports required a similar amount of attention. This 
emphasis on PE—one course—was as much as the emphasis on pure military studies 
coursework. See AFAPBS, Vol. 2, 307, 313-315, 325, 345, 359, 368, 373, 375, 401. 
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courses in “Tactics, Orientation, National Military Establishment, Military Law and 
Administration.”193 The planning specialists’ volume, the second and more comprehensive 
volume on the curriculum, appears to maintain this same structure as the plan envisioned above, 
as it continues to show two departments in the Division of Military Studies.194 However, the 
third part of the second volume, which is devoted to the Division of Military Studies, discusses 
three “stems” within the division— Health and Physical Education, Air Force Tactics, and Air 
Science.195 With this structure in mind, a more thorough review of what comprises this 
department’s coursework—the remaining 35 of 53 total hours for the Division of Military 
Studies—provides a better understanding that the focus was, again, more on training than on 
education.  
 The “Air Force Tactics” courses—20 credit hours dispersed throughout the academic 
year and summer—were primarily drill and ceremony courses. Similar to the physical education 
courses, the tactics courses were “non-classroom courses.”196 As the cadet advanced, he assumed 
leadership roles in this training, but the cadet received little academic education on leadership, or 
other aspects of military studies, in these courses. However, Tactics 400, the summer course 
                                                 
193 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 65. 
194 AFAPBS, Vol. 2, vii-viii. Compare with, AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 115-116. 
195 AFAPBS, Vol. 2, 216-217. The third part of volume 2 is the Division of Military 
Studies—Part 1 and 2 explored the humanities and sciences—encompasses the pages 
215-433 of the volume, a majority of which discusses the Health and Physical Education 
program (307-433). There is no discussion that these three stems would comprise three 
departments. 
196 AFAPBS, Vol. 2, 217. Reviewing the expanded proposed curriculum in this volume, 
found in chapter 11, pages 269-305, reveals why no outside class preparation is needed 
for this coursework, since it is so concentrated on drill and ceremony. 
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provided to those cadets matriculating into their senior year, did include field trips to Air Force 
bases, so that the cadet would receive an education on “phases of the national economy related to 
national defense” and interaction in the joint military community.197 Some of this coursework 
may have been relevant to effective military education. However, almost two-thirds of the course 
work in this department, 20 of the remaining 35 hours,198 was actually training rather than 
education. 
 The final stem within the Division of Military Studies, the “Air Science” course work, 
did have some significant relevance to the cadet’s military education. This is apparent in the 
second volume, since the specialists who tackled this area formulated some changes to the 
proposed curriculum put forth by the planners in the first volume. The main change between the 
planners’ volume and the later specialists’ volume revealed itself in the introduction of course 
work called “Orientation.” This change between the two volumes demonstrates that the 
specialists recognized that the weak military studies program, as outlined in the first volume, 
required some strengthening.199 Although a single credit hour seems like a minor change, the 
structure into which it fit showed more important implications. As discussed in the first volume, 
the “Orientation” course is the basic training that the cadets receive upon arriving at the academy 
in the summer before their freshman year—“Orientation 100.” This period focuses on drill and 
ceremony, proper dress and bearing, basic heritage of the service, and the like—merely military 
                                                 
197 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 135-138. Author’s emphasis. 
198 As discussed in the next paragraph, the Master Program plan differs slightly, but 
significantly, between volume one and two. In volume one, the Tactics courses comprise 
21 credit hours. This figure of 20 comes from volume two. 
199 The documentation does not provide who instituted the change, or the specific 
rationale for the change. 
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training.200 However, when the specialists constructed their program, they took two summer 
credit hours—one from the “Orientation 100” program and one from the “Tactics 100” 
program—and invented two new “Orientation” courses (given the numbers 101 and 102), which 
were to be taken during the fall and spring terms of the freshman year—each at one credit hour. 
Although they amounted to just two credit hours in two semesters, what these two courses 
involved was significant.   
 The proposed freshman year “Orientation” course work concentrated specifically on 
military studies. As discussed in the expanded explanation, the specialists proposed: “The 
purpose of [these courses] is to provide a general military background that will make the service 
career more meaningful.”201 Although the focus remained on “the lives of great military leaders 
over the centuries and the characteristics of leadership displayed by these leaders,” the courses 
offered the cadet some understanding of the “evolution of warfare,” “foundations of national 
power,” “military problems of the United States,” and “military policy of the United States.”202 
The expanded bibliography included work from major contributors to the general field of 
military studies and in the more specific field of air power, to include Clausewitz, Jomini, Foch, 
Fuller, Creasy, Earle, Douhet, de Seversky, Slessor, and Arnold, among others.203 These were 
serious works in military theory and history, and it was a significant change for the officer 
                                                 
200 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 134. The planners did include, in their vision of this program, 
instruction in the “Articles of War,” which would be difficult to instruct without some 
education on warfare and conduct of airpower in conflict, which would be solid military 
studies. However, this was a minor portion of the 8-week course. 
201 AFAPBS, Vol. 2, 227. 
202 AFAPBS, Vol. 2, 227-230.  
203 AFAPBS, Vol. 2, 232-233. Note that the study pertaining to Clausewitz is not from 
his On War, but Principles of War. 
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candidates at the Academy to be given this healthy challenge to enhance their professional 
education. 
 Besides the Orientation classes, the Air Science department oversaw other course work 
that had relevance to the cadet’s military education. The junior-level “Military Law” course 
focused on the military courts-martial system and included an introduction to basic law. But the 
expanded description makes clear that the material did not really address topics that represent a 
fuller or broader military education. Material in military studies, however, did touch on 
constitutional law and the place of military authority within the system.204 This was certainly in 
line with military education. The senior-level course “Administration” was a two-semester 
course to investigate “Air Force administrative procedures and policies, military management 
and personal responsibilities…proper understanding of the officers personal affairs, as well as 
personal affairs of airmen who will later be under his command.”205 Like other courses, this one 
may have provided useful knowledge, but most would fall under training and not military 
education.  
Finally, however, is the sophomore-level, two-semester course in “The National Military 
Establishment.” Although the planners wanted the cadets to understand the air base 
organizational structure and duties, the evident focus of the course was on studying the greater 
military established as well as the other services’ roles and responsibilities in the joint warfare 
environment, and the Air Force’s specific contribution to national defense.206 These courses 
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incorporated what little military education there was at the academy—at least those courses to be 
housed in the Division of Military Studies. Although the courses in the Air Science “stem” 
contributed to a cadet’s military education, much of this proposed coursework in the division 
was to be focused on training rather than on education.  
 The proposed Division of Military Studies was not the only unit with responsibility in 
various aspects of professional military education. The planners believed that all aspects of the 
curriculum taken together would effectively educate and prepare the officer candidate for 
professional service in the Air Force. Contributions to the cadet’s military education came in 
work in other academic departments, too, beyond what was offered in the Military Studies 
Division. The general curriculum met the planners’ broad approach for the intellectual 
development of the air cadet, while at the same time this program was also expected to be central 
to the cadet’s professional military education. As the planners recognized, “The program of the 
Military Studies Division has been developed in cooperation with and to coordinate with the 
other divisions of instruction…in order that the entire program of instruction…will represent an 
integrated whole without unnecessary duplication.”207 The general academic program included 
various courses, or certainly lessons, that substantially contributed to the military 
professionalism of the officer candidate.208 As the Curriculum Planning Group constructed the 
                                                 
207 AFAPBS, Vol. 2, 216. 
208 AFAPBS, Vol. 2, vii. The “Master Program” listing includes History, psychology 
(leadership), English (communication/speech), aerodynamics, and a “Great Issues” 
course, which all contribute to the “professional core” of course work. See Philip D. 
Caine, “A U.S. Air Force Academy Dilemma: Professional Military Studies,” in Elliot V. 
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program of studies for the academy, its main aim remained ensuring that the Air Force gained 
officers who “will always be culturally up-to-date and ever on the frontiers of knowledge and 
thought, thereby providing far-sighted leadership in the furtherance of our national security.” To 
do this, the group reflected, although insight from other higher education programs was 
necessary (to include, specifically, ideas from the other service academies), this new program 
would be unique – one in which “the emphasis has been given to the humanities and ethical 
values of the spirit, purposes, methods, and implementation of democracy, as well as 
aeronautical and military indoctrination.”209 Emphasizing the broad, general education for the 
cadet, the planners believed that this kind of curriculum—especially with regard to the 
humanities—would give the cadet not only the knowledge but also a way of viewing the world 
that would inform his professionalism. 
 Also, although the AFAPBS wanted a curriculum (including professional military 
studies) that fostered the intellectual development of cadets, it did not assume that perfection was 
the goal. In a sense, the ultimate underlying goal of the Board at this time was not to investigate 
the role of professional military studies in the curriculum, or even to examine the proper balance 
of course work in the overall education of the officer candidate.  Instead, their aim was to 
facilitate and justify the proposed legislation to establish the academy.210 Many airmen believed 
the time was right for the service to have its own academy and commissioning source.  In this 
context, it was important to envision a solid and plausible curriculum, so that one possible barrier 
to winning legislative approval for the academy could be removed. 
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“Interview with Colonel Arthur E. Boudreau by the Air Force Academy Historian, Major 
Edgar A. Holt, 10-11 October 1956,” 3. 
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 Even so, the sciences did predominate in the course work, but the concentration on the 
social sciences and humanities was significant – it was believed necessary as a means by which a 
new officer could understand and communicate in the global environment.  The planners viewed 
their approach as visionary. This would be a radical departure from the other two academies—
yielding a difference that would continue to gain shape with the founding of the Air Force 
Academy and in its early years.211 Given that the Air Force would be assigning officers all over 
the world, the officer candidate must learn how to readily and easily operate anywhere and how 
to relate to different peoples and cultures. He should “have enough knowledge of the affairs of 
the world and its people to be an ambassador of good will where-ever he goes. It is a well 
established fact that to get along with people and to like people is to know them. Such 
knowledge should include those things about each country that affect their civilization, their 
development, their economic resources as compared to our own economic resources….” The 
planners and consultants developed the curriculum in accordance this thinking.212 Moreover, 
unlike what the Air Training Command had proposed in March 1948, where those planners had 
assigned only 766 contact hours from a total 5,241-hour program to humanities and the social 
sciences, the Planning Board Study asserted that a more satisfactory program rested on a 
balanced approach, giving more emphasis to the social sciences and the humanities.213 For 
example, as a group of civilian consultants to the study stated: “We support the idea of integrated 
courses in the junior and senior classes, such as [the courses] Comparative Government and 
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Economic Systems, History of the Americas, and in International Relations which includes 
international law and American foreign policy, and we feel that such course might develop into 
something original, valuable, and educationally sound” for officer professional development.214 
This offers some insight that the general academic course work was aligned to educate the 
professional officer. Even though West Point had been a strong influence for many who now 
sought to establish a new air academy, this curricular proposal was an example of a clear 
departure from what was done at the other two sister service academies. 
 One area of emphasis in the AFAPBS’s curriculum that supported professional military 
education, according to the planners, was study in foreign languages. The foreign language 
department’s stated objective was to include “wide and significant coverage,” for example, in a 
host of languages.  This was to cultivate in the officer candidate “an understanding of the salient 
features of foreign civilizations by integration with courses in world history, economics, 
government and geography,” as well as offer “familiarization with current political problems” 
and an opportunity to engage with people who speak the language.215 The planners responsible 
for the department’s course work saw as their responsibility the education of the cadet in 
preparation for duties around the world. 
 Another strong example of the focus on general academics, particularly within the social 
sciences and humanities, as strong support in developing military studies was the capstone class 
for senior cadets. The planners developed the interdisciplinary course, “Great Issues 402.” The 
                                                 
214 Quoted in AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 447. This was from an unsigned memo, with 
the subject: “Report of Curriculum Planners,” dated 11 November 1948. See ibid., 
447n16. Emphasis in the original. 
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of the Part One, “Division of Humanities.” 
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purpose of this course was to help the cadet “in interrelating and integrating his previous 
education and experience through the process of seeking to identify what are the most 
fundamental issues of our time.” The course was supposed to use an interdisciplinary approach 
to discuss the issues and strengthen the critical thinking process among the cadets. Among the 
topics included, however, was “Atomic Energy, Atomic Technology, and World Strategy,” 
offered in the introductory section on great issues.  There was also to be a lecture by Lewis 
Mumford; and there was an entire section, composed of nine class lectures and discussions, on 
“American Diplomatic and Military Responsibilities in the Modern World.” One should note the 
ambitious reach to bring outstanding speakers to the new academy, such as Paul Hoffman and 
Thomas Finletter to lecture on “The Marshall Plan” and George Kennan to speak about “Basic 
Factors in American Policy.”216 So the planners had confidence that their approach to the general 
academic course work would greatly contribute to the cadet’s professional military studies. 
 In its study, the Planning Board attempted to build a proper relationship among the 
various disciplines and courses had a direct impact on the development of professional military 
studies. Whereas the AFAPBS could use the expertise of the civilian consultants to assist in 
developing a curriculum, to include the various disciplines and courses that would effectively 
                                                 
216 AFAPBS, Vol. 2, “The Curriculum,” 130, 134. Hoffman was the director of the 
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educate an officer candidate, there really was no similar design to follow in establishing an Air 
Force professional military education program. Since the Air Force had been part of the Army 
until just the previous year, the only service-related training that seemed relevant was a newly 
established Air Force ROTC curriculum. Some of the Planning Board members visited West 
Point and determined that “little was known [among the Army officers] about Air Force training 
[needs].”217 With the focus on general academics, the planners established the precedent that 
gave professional military education a back seat. In exploring the extent to which military studies 
were being considered as planning for the new academy proceeded, the Academy historian later 
asked Colonel Art Boudreau, who was one of the major organizers and planners of the report: 
“To what extent were your plans for military studies in the Air Force Academy influenced by 
West Point and Annapolis experience? To what extent by the experience of civilian military 
colleges and universities?”  Boudreau answered: “We were in a very difficult situation on this 
area…and all the military sciences taught were Army programs. There was only a beginning of 
Air Force ROTC in the offing…[so] the military science program within the Air Force Academy 
Planning Board is not so much more than Army ROTC. It was not satisfactory in a sense of the 
word.”218 The planners realized that this was a shortcoming of the overall curriculum. 
Unfortunately, the failure to seriously consider the central role professional military studies, at 
                                                 
217 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Background and Legislation, Number 1, 
“Interview with Colonel Arthur E. Boudreau by the Air Force Academy Historian, Major 
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218 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Background and Legislation, Number 1, 
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Edgar A. Holt, 10-11 October 1956,” 7. 
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least as it pertained to understanding airpower’s role in warfare, ensured that this vital potential 
element of an officer candidate’s education would receive no more than cursory attention in the 
final curriculum. 
 Nevertheless, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force was pleased with the work 
of the Planning Board. General Fairchild notified General George Kenney, the new Air 
University Commanding General, that the plans—set out in three volumes—“reflect a great deal 
of serious thought, diligent effort and conscientious objectivity in fulfilling the mission which 
was assigned.”  He added that the plan would be “accepted as a working plan for implementing 
the proposed Air Force Academy.”219 The planners working on the study had set out the 
blueprint for the new academy’s curriculum, one that would be adopted by those who continued 
to carry the torch to establish and academy for the Air Force. The main outcome of the first 
curriculum plan, which was to concentrate on a broad, general academic education, included 
frustrating the efforts toward establishing a solid professional military education program.  
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Service Academy Board Report 
The work of the Air Force Academy Planning Board was hastened by the momentum felt 
widely in the defense community after passage of the National Security Act of 1947.  As 1948 
continued, and certainly as discussions accelerated for the Air Force during that summer, the 
larger defense community also began to organize a more detailed investigation of the service 
academies in general, especially centered on proper officer accessions for each of the services. 
This investigation included discussions about the possible need for an air academy. The situation 
peaked when on November 9 Secretary of Defense James Forrestal wrote to the three service 
secretaries requesting their comments on the composition of a proposed committee that “might 
study the overall question of requirements of all Services for Academy graduates, the desirable 
proportion of such graduates in each of the regular establishments, the annual quotas required to 
maintain such proportions, and related problems”—which included the topic of forming a third 
academy.220 The main problem, as everyone recognized from the previous year, was how the Air 
Force was to receive its “share” of service academy-educated officers given the challenges posed 
by the two established academies and their respective services and whether the creation of an Air 
Force Academy was the long-range solution to this problem? Forrestal’s memorandum, which 
revealed the continuing conflict over officer procurement, would lead to a report recommending 
a new service academy to support the Air Force. But besides determining that another academy 
was warranted, the ad hoc group evaluated the undergraduate education system that developed 
the officer candidate, to include ROTC at civilian universities. Concluding that the Air Force 
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needed its own academy also undercut the thought that some had had to use sharing of the 
academies by more than one service as a means of encouraging “unification.” More important, 
this team, the Service Academy Board, would influence the professional military education at the 
academies, specifically regarding the proposed Air Force Academy, by highlighting the need for 
a broad, general education program with some clear emphasis on technical studies as well, which 
had the consequence of lessening the emphasis on professional military studies. 
Motivating Secretary Forrestal was information coming out of a committee that cast light 
on the shortcomings of military education in the United States. The Commission on the 
Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, also known as the Hoover Commission 
after its chairman, former President Herbert Hoover, released information from its first 
committee in November 1948, which informed Secretary Forrestal’s urgency. Although the 
Hoover Commission’s main goal was to ensure effective organization of the Executive branch, 
the Committee on National Security Organization, under its chairman, Ferdinand Eberstadt, 
focused its attention on the National Military Establishment.  The Committee gave attention to 
military education, concluding that “efforts be made throughout the entire educational process to 
instill a stronger sense of interservice unity”—in fact, it reviewed the entire National Military 
Establishment’s educational system.221 One of Forrestal’s advisors, General Dwight Eisenhower, 
believed that the academies instilled early in the officer candidate a sense of rivalry rather than 
                                                 
221 Quoted in John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military 
Education and National Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), 117. The 
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unity among the services, a view also held by President Truman.  Eisenhower thought that the 
defense community did not need a new academy, which might cause still more disunity among 
the services.  His views were shaped in part by his experience in World War II, where there had 
been such clear need for strong cooperation between the services.222 This most influential 
military officer of the period stated before the Eberstadt Committee in June 1948: “We should 
not have another academy for the air service.”223 As the Eberstadt Committee determined, the 
“establishment of an air academy would mark a fork in the educational road of the services [from 
which] there can be no turning back,” and so it recommended a larger study focused on the 
undergraduate education of officer candidates.224 The Air Force recognized the momentum 
building against an air academy, especially from civilian leaders who pressed for more steps 
toward unification, and realized that the institution needed a concerted public relations campaign 
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States: A Historical Dictionary (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 
2000), 291. 
104 
to change the course.225 In addition, Forrestal needed to reconcile the push-back from West Point 
and Annapolis on officer accessions into the Air Force with the impetus within the National 
Military Establishment to integrate the military academies within one academy, or at least make 
each academy generic and not service-specific.  
Forrestal also sent the service secretaries a more detailed attachment that offers insight 
into his thinking about the role of professional military education within the structure of the 
curriculum. In this attachment, which focused on accessions of officer candidates from the two 
established academies into the regular Air Force, the Secretary of Defense suggested that the 
“Course of Instruction” for those officer candidates be the same for all cadets, regardless of the 
service into which they would be commissioned.226 That is, for those West Point and Naval 
Academy cadets who would end up in the regular Air Force, their instruction would remain the 
same as for the other cadets, who would eventually go into the Army and Navy. There was no 
sense that academy cadets going into the Air Force needed service-specific education before 
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their commissioning.227 Clearly, then, service-related professional military studies were not a 
dominant factor in the Secretary’s calculus. 
Again, the debate whether to make the service academies generic and not service-specific 
was a serious topic in this post-war environment. The more generic approach was sometimes 
thought to be one step toward achieving unification among the services, and it would inform the 
Air Force Academy’s approach to academically strong military studies – namely, their generally 
secondary status. As Chief of Staff of the Army and now advisor to Secretary of Defense 
Forrestal, General Eisenhower had discussed a “United Services Academy” that would make the 
academies already in existence “provide graduates to all three services on a substantially 
proportional basis.” He believed that “[u]nification must start simultaneously from the top and 
bottom,” and he advocated coordinating course work in the middle of years of each service 
academy (so cadets were studying largely the same things) along with encouraging major student 
exchanges.228 In January and February, Forrestal sent follow-up memoranda to the Joint Chiefs 
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of Staff stating that in order to increase sufficiently the total numbers of cadets at service 
academies a third academy probably would be necessary.  The logistics of expanding the existing 
two were already deemed too difficult. However, even though he referred to an “Air Academy,” 
Forrestal did not firmly establish that the intent of this academy was to provide commissioned 
officers only to the Air Force. He, too, considered alternatives for the academy structure, to 
include “a single ‘university’ of which each of the three academies will become an integral part 
and which would supply the needs of all three Services for academy officers.”229 The 
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requirement for service-related professional military education did not seem a priority to senior 
leaders, since an integrated approach seemed legitimate, with the main goal being simply that the 
officer candidates receive their undergraduate diploma. 
Even though he was one of the civilians initially against a third academy, Secretary 
Forrestal now recognized need for one, if merely to boost the total number of academy 
graduates. Now he created a commission to determine the best service academy structure. After 
discussions with some of his advisors, most significantly General Eisenhower, the Secretary 
decided to establish a board to find the best structure for undergraduate military education in the 
post-war environment.230 He wanted the committee to recommend how these service academies 
should educate the cadets as well as how and where the future officers would enter into specific 
service branches. In a detailed memorandum, Forrestal provided his “Terms of Reference” for 
the board on March 14. He first emphasized that leadership training was necessary for the future 
officer candidates, but he also noted that they should learn “basic knowledge of the techniques of 
modern warfare”—which he suggested had always been part of the service academy tradition. 
Forrestal demanded that future officers educated at service academies would “have a background 
of general knowledge similar to that possessed by the graduates of our leading universities.” 
After a few paragraphs outlining his vision, Forrestal provided the details in the memo for this 
                                                                                                                                                             
memo for the Joint Chiefs discussed this Board, and requested their input on his terms of 
reference, or commission.  
230 Besides agreeing with the concept of a Board, see again, Galambos, ed., The Papers of 
Dwight David Eisenhower, Vol. X, Columbia University, 373-374, Eisenhower provided 
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Galambos, 422-426. This memorandum to Forrestal, at the Secretary’s request, provided 
the example draft of a memo that would go to participating members. Eisenhower even 
named some possible civilian participants. 
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group—to include the make-up of the board. Most significantly, Forrestal stated that the purpose 
of the board was “to recommend that general system of basic education which [the Board] 
believes is best adapted to provide all three Services with a sufficient number of young men 
qualified to meet the needs of the regular armed services.” This included considering the 
“general fields of academic instruction” required of all career officers and what, if any, 
“specialized military instruction” might be needed either in service-specific training or in a joint 
environment.231 Although Forrestal did give some specific instructions, the Board most 
definitely had the experience to go in any direction it wanted, freely looking for the best path that 
all service academies should take to produce the core of the nation’s military officers, especially, 
prospectively, at the newest academy. 
The end result was the establishment of the Service Academy Board. Comprised of 
influential civilian and military leaders, the Board was of the utmost importance to the 
establishment of the Air Force Academy. The “Stearns-Eisenhower Report,” named after the 
board chairman, Dr. Robert L. Stearns, president of the University of Colorado (Boulder), and 
vice chairman, General Dwight Eisenhower, then president of Columbia University, was 
chartered to offer a significant discussion of professional military education. Although much is 
known about Eisenhower, the president of the Board, Robert Stearns, was widely appreciated as 
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an excellent choice to lead a highly prestigious group in a significant task. He was a lawyer and 
historian who had served during World War II in the Operations Analysis Division of Twentieth 
Air Force. He was held in such esteem that in the autumn of 1950, as the Service Academy 
Board was nearing its completion, Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter sent him to Korea 
to evaluate the Air Force’s performance.232 Besides the two leads, the Board had seven other 
members: James P. Baxter, president of Williams College; Frederick A. Middlebush, president of 
the University of Missouri; George D. Stoddard, president of the University of Illinois; Edward 
L. Moreland, executive vice president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Major 
General Bryant E. Moore, superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy; Rear Admiral James L. 
Holloway, superintendent of the US Naval Academy; and Major General David M. Schlatter, 
who was one of the early post-war reformers of Air University, later serving as its deputy 
commander for education, a post which he left in July 1948. Serving as the executive secretary 
for the group was John L. Hoen, who acted as the tenth member of the team.233 The Board was a 
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relevant contributor to the Air Force Academy’s development and to the understanding of 
professional military education at all academies.   
On March 30, 1949, still within its first month of operation, the Board offered its first 
report. Secretary Forrestal had provided the group a short deadline for the Board’s view on the 
requirement for a new academy, as he wanted to push forward with the proposed legislation; 
however, he recognized that some of his other fundamental questions required further study and 
additional time.234 An exhausted Forrestal had resigned just two weeks after establishing the 
Service Academy Board, and his replacement, Louis Johnson, received this first submission on 
April 4 from Hoen, the executive secretary. The report “[u]nanimously recommended that an Air 
Force Academy should be established without delay,” and Johnson directed the Air Force to lead 
the legislative effort.235 Important in this report is that the Board recognized that “[a] separate 
academy…would increase the Air Force’s sense of autonomy and would provide officers with 
the specialized knowledge currently imparted only by the Air Force’s institutions of advanced 
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education.”236 The Board’s members, both civilian and military, reasonably recognized that 
officer candidates needed military education—in this case, a more service-specific military 
education curriculum. 
On 21 December 1949, Hoen submitted the final report to Secretary Johnson.  It 
contained the recommendations agreed upon by the nine board members, which supported the 
Service Academy Board’s charter to recommend “the manner in which officer candidates should 
receive their basic education for a career in the armed services.”237  Specifically affirming that an 
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Air Force academy should be established, the Board not only called for a new academy to be 
developed in the near future, but it also established the basic framework of the professional 
military education for the new academy’s future officer candidates. These findings of December 
1949 became public in February 1950.238 The report was a dense sixteen-page, single-spaced 
product that offered discussions and observations relevant to service academy education.  It 
included the many diverse ideas and plans that the defense community had entertained in this 
post-war period, such as that there be just one service academy preparing officer candidates for 
all the services. The final eight pages of the report provided forty recommendations, each with a 
small explanatory paragraph.239 Besides this sixteen-page report, the document contains another 
sixty-five pages of appendices—eleven separate appendices labeled “A” through “K.” Six panels 
of both military and civilian experts had assisted the Board members to reach their conclusions 
and had helped to construct some of the appendices 240 
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 The Board supported the service academy structure in place, a service academy dedicated 
to a specific branch, and thus the requirement for an air service-specific academy. The report 
stated as its fifth main point, dealing with “The Need for Service Academies”: 
The American people have traditionally depended upon armed forces composed 
of citizens as the final bulwark in any crisis threatening the existence of the 
Nation. They have insisted upon the maintenance in times of peace of armed 
forces trained to high professional standards and fully competent to train and 
condition the expanded forces of citizens required for war. It is recognized that 
the competence of a military establishment depends in great measure upon the 
character and professional ability of its military leaders; that there must be 
maintained, therefore, at all times a nucleus of Regular officers educated and 
trained from youth in the principles of leadership and in the art of war and 
dedicated to a lifetime of service to the Nation. The maintenance of Service 
Academies has long been a recognized means of accomplishing this purpose.241 
The education of this “nucleus” of defense-minded individuals was focused on leadership and 
the art of war, according to the Board. The Board clearly intended that preparation at the 
academies would include demanding study of warfare and, more specifically, of the need for 
officers in all services to understand their service’s role in any unified effort. Again, it seemed 
that there would be an important emphasis in the program on military studies. 
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 The Board followed its discussion of the “Need for Service Academies” with remarks on 
the “Mission of the Service Academies,” which included this among its seven points: 
The Service Academies should develop in the student a high degree of mental 
alertness—the capacity for clear analytical thought and of carrying it to a logical 
conclusion. The need is for initiative and, above all, for judgment and common 
sense. The complexity of the arts and techniques of modern war and the degree to 
which the conditions to be met are unforeseeable all emphasize the necessity for 
such qualities in a leader.242 
However, the Board defended its emphasis on a broad education, even if it came at some 
expense to coverage of professional military studies. The opening paragraph recognizes the 
rightness of studying leadership and warfare, as does the next paragraph, which focuses on the 
type of education that will prepare the academy graduate to operate in a complex and ambiguous 
world of warfare.  But just paragraphs later as the Board undercut this commitment:  
Professional military knowledge alone will not suffice to solve the problems of 
modern war. In the last war officers of the Armed Services often became engaged 
in pursuits other than purely military which required a general education 
background. Graduates of the Service Academies as they progress to positions of 
high responsibility in the military establishment will have an increasing range of 
contacts among leaders in civilian life, both at home and abroad. The complexities 
of modern war require large numbers of officers to undertake postgraduate 
studies. The board, therefore, considers it essential that a graduate of a Service 
Academy should have a background of knowledge comparable to that possessed 
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by graduates of our leading universities. His field of knowledge, therefore, should 
include the arts and sciences in addition to professional military subjects.243  
The role of general education would be significant in the program. Additionally, already in the 
minds of military leadership was the role of post-graduate education in effective officer 
development, so much so that the emphasis on general academics trumped concentration on 
military studies—the officer had to be prepared to move on to graduate work. 
 Certainly, the Board’s vice chairman fostered the emphasis on a broad, liberal education. 
Eisenhower updated Secretary of Defense Johnson after a two-day meeting of the Board in 
Denver in August 1949. The meeting reaffirmed the basic direction set at the previous meetings 
in March, April, and June, which supported a strong emphasis on broad education. As he came to 
embrace the need for a third academy, General Eisenhower remained firm and influential in 
defending the traditional four-year program, and the Board as a whole agreed. Pressing the need 
for a broad education, Eisenhower declared at the August 8 meeting: “Well, if life hasn’t become 
more complicated, if the impact isn’t felt more directly by most of us, if it doesn’t take more 
brains today to comprehend this world, more training, then I think something’s wrong.”  He 
argued that even four years of education and training of officers for modern warfare might not be 
sufficient.244 Eisenhower, who had experienced his own conversion about the need for 
                                                 
243 Stearns-Eisenhower Report, 3. This paragraph received emphasis by the second Dean 
at the Air Force Academy. See, Brigadier General Robert F. McDermott, USAF (Ret), 
“The USAF Academy Academic Program,” in Air University Review Vol. XX, No. 1 
(GPO: Washington, D.C., November-December 1968), 13-14. 
244 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Number 133, “Letter from Dwight D. 
Eisenhower for Honorable Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense, 10 August 1949.” In this 
letter, Eisenhower notes of his vice-chairmanship of the Board, “This is one of the finest 
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professional studies, which he now accepted, had an equal affinity for a broader education. Later 
in his career, and certainly while at Columbia University, Eisenhower came to value higher 
education and to appreciate its broadening effects. He was most certainly impressed by the role 
of education for the democratic masses, and he believed the academies had a special role in 
offering opportunity to a broad span of citizens.245 The decision to emphasize a broad academic 
education would contribute to the relative lack of emphasis on purely professional military 
studies. 
Besides the Vice Chairman’s influence, two Air Force officers swayed the Board. Major 
General David Schlatter, who was a contributing member of the Board as the Air Force 
representative, and Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Boudreau, who worked as General Schlatter’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
Boards upon which it has been my privilege to serve. Each man is definitely a friend of 
the Armed Services and everyone is earnestly seeking to do his part in producing sound 
unification and not merely lip service to the idea”; quoted in Galambos, ed., The Papers 
of Dwight David Eisenhower, Vol. X, Columbia University, 694n4. Giving the context, 
and as discussed, how “training” and “education” often get muddied, this author believes 
Eisenhower really meant “education”—to include military education—to be comfortable 
with this modern environment. Only the chair of the Military Education panel did not 
agree with the four-year education format; instead, he had supported “a common course 
of instruction at a single institution for one or two years for all students prior to their 
entry into the Military, Naval, or Air Force Academy to undertake a three or four year 
course of instruction.” See Galambos, 715-716n2. 
245 Carl Reddel, Brigadier General, USAF (Retired), “Ike Changes His Mind: Creation of 
the United States Air Force Academy,” in Edward Kaplan, ed., High Flight: History of 
the U.S. Air Force Academy (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2011), 21-22. General 
Reddel highlights Eisenhower’s own conversion on the necessity of professional studies, 
and his role in supporting beefed up “civilian” studies at the service schools, especially 
the National War College and the Armed Forces Industrial College. See again page 22. 
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“Air Force Academy Specialist,” both had also been prominent participants in the Air Force 
Academy Planning Board Study.  They now took lessons that they had learned from the earlier 
study and influenced this larger defense-level study.246 The plan for a separate air academy and 
the curriculum proposed for it in the earlier Planning Board Study heavily swayed the members 
of this Board.247 Regarding the curriculum, the senior Air Force officer of the Board recognized 
that one issue that swayed members of the Board—especially civilian members—was the “very 
liberal quantity” of humanities and social science courses, as well as the inclusion of scientific 
                                                 
246 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 1, “Record of Interview of Colonel 
Arthur E. Boudreau by Air Force Academy Historian at Headquarters United States Air 
Force Academy in Denver, Colorado on 10 and 11 October 1956,” 8; Stearns-Eisenhower 
Report, 73. General Schlatter was then the Commanding General of the Air Research and 
Development Command, but had been Deputy Commanding General for Education at the 
Air University Command. His inclusion on this Board presumably was because he was 
seen as likely to be names to the post of Superintendent. See Edward Anthony Miller, Jr., 
“The Founding of the Air Force Academy: An Administrative and Legislative History” 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Denver, August 1969), 296, USAFA Special Collections. 
Similar to General Eisenhower’s remarks on the Board, Lt. Gen. Schlatter would look 
back on his career and note: “I must say that in all of my many years of service I’ve never 
had a more rewarding or satisfying job to do than being a member of that Board. It was 
one of the finest things that I think has ever happened to me.” See  AFAHD, 1954-1956, 
Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 10, “Record of Interview of Lieutenant General David M. 
Schlatter by Air Force Academy Historian in Norfolk, Virginia on 24 October 1956,” 3. 
247 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 3, “Record of Interview of Lt General 
Idwal H. Edwards by Air Force Academy Historian in Washington, D.C., 26 October 
1956,” 10; Ringenbach, 34. 
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courses, over those that one would consider “strictly military courses.”248 As the General noted, 
it was not necessarily the lack of military-specific courses, but rather the strong balance between 
scientific and the humanities and social science courses that influenced Board members. The 
strong academic curriculum, an emphasis first established, once again, by the AFA Planning 
Board, seemed in line with the thinking of the Board members that the officer candidates who 
would graduate from the proposed Air Force Academy would have that “firm basic education of 
the coming soldier-statesman.” The young officers would likely face ever greater demands as 
they achieved the higher ranks, and they would be called upon to fulfill the role of soldier-
statesman that the new world required.249 The Board members were in step with the findings of 
the AFAPBS on requiring a broad education rather than one focused strictly on military studies 
or military training. 
                                                 
248 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 10, “Record of Interview of 
Lieutenant General David M. Schlatter by Air Force Academy Historian in Norfolk, 
Virginia on 24 October 1956,” 4. The comment on “strictly military courses” was part of 
the question of the interviewer, Major Holt, not of the General. Even though the Board 
members were intrigued by the seemingly heavy inclusion of humanities and social 
sciences—as compared with the curricula at the other two service academies—the 
emphasis remained on technical studies. As the Curriculum Group of the AFAPBS went 
through its iterations of the program of instruction, the drafts “were sent to the other 
service academies and outstanding engineering schools throughout the country for 
analysis and critical comment”—not liberal arts colleges. See AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 
1, 448. 
249AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 10, “Record of Interview of 
Lieutenant General David M. Schlatter by Air Force Academy Historian in Norfolk, 
Virginia on 24 October 1956,” 4. This would be the topic of Masland and Radway’s 
classic work, Soldiers and Scholars: Military Education and National Policy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1957). 
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 The Board made a concerted effort to highlight the technical aspects of education. The 
tenth recommendation of the Board was “[t]hat in the teaching of sciences at the academies 
emphasis should be placed on individual problems and the initiative of the student in 
approaching these problems.”250 The rationale was that increasing laboratory time for science 
classes “develops in the student inquisitiveness and a deeper understanding of the principles.” 
The report did not mention any other discipline in this way. There was a sense that the sciences 
developed the critical thinking skills required of future military officers. On the other hand, as 
Masland and Radway note:  
The other observation is that method is heavily influenced by curriculum. In 
introductory mathematics, natural science, and engineering courses there is often 
a greater presumption that questions can have a single determinate answer. Such 
answers cannot be argued about; they can only be found…A revealing incident 
occurred when the Service Academy Board’s social science panel noted that to 
develop a skeptical, inquiring mind in future officers might breed indecision. In a 
superintendent’s copy this passage was underlined in red and the word “yes” 
written in the margin. Scientific and military studies occupy a prominent place in 
all the curricula. Methods thought to be appropriate to them have spilled over into 
the humanities and social sciences, whose problems are somewhat different and 
whose instructors are only now beginning to evolve techniques better suited to 
their needs.251 
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In addition, the twenty-sixth recommendation underscores the need for the academies to improve 
scientific research capabilities.252 These two recommendations focused on technical subjects 
within a proposed curriculum.  No other recommendation singled out, in a similar way, a 
requirement for some course or method specific for the social sciences or humanities.  
 The Board’s justification for an Air Force Academy leaned on the technical nature of the 
new service. The new autonomy of the Air Force itself made an air academy seem sensible.  
Beyond that, though, the Board implied that the needs of air officers were different from those of 
other services. “The basic academic work in the Air Force Academy should furnish an excellent 
foundation for officers entering [the Air Institute of Technology and the Air University] . . . .” 
The Board then noted that Air University “maintains a complex pattern of advanced and 
specialized education” emphasizing technological studies, especially at the former institute.253 
Air Force leaders had voiced concerns that an undergraduate education at their academy should 
prepare the future officer so that there were qualified by the four years of undergraduate study as 
not to need any remedial work to pursue advanced degrees.254 Although the report mentioned in 
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254 For example, AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, Number 24, “Basic Assumptions 
Utilized in the Formation of the Air University Plan for the Establishment of an Air 
Academy, n.d.,” (likely early-1949), which the first assumption declared the awarding of 
the Bachelor of Science degree, and, ibid., Number 28, “Memorandum for General 
McNaughton re Determination of a Mission for USAFIT, n.d.,” likely post-February 
1949, which includes the recommendation from the Institute that it “be the responsible 
agency for postgraduate (“after Air Academy” or equivalent) education of Air Force 
officers in the technological field,” 5. Then- Brigadier General, later Major General, 
McNaughton was chief of the Directorate of Training, Office of DCS/P, under General 
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general terms the technical aspects of modern warfare, it discussed this special consideration 
only with respect to the proposed Air Force Academy. 
Although the study included a Military Education Panel, other panels provided their own 
input on the curriculum in military education. For example, the panel on “Instruction in Science 
and Engineering” commented on the proposed Air Force Academy curriculum noting that there 
seemed to be balance between the scientific and engineering, humanistic-social, and military 
course requirements, recognizing “the clear-cut objectives, for military officers, of the 
humanistic-social portion of the curriculum.” Even so, the panel observed that, although “we are 
in agreement with the inclusion of a suitable proportion of humanistic-social studies in all the 
academy curricula, we believe an unduly large proportion of time has been devoted to such 
studies in the curriculum of the Air Force Academy.”  Their concern was that “subjects have 
been omitted from the very heart of the aeronautical portion of the curriculum” – namely, those 
on structures and propulsion – and that a four-credit course was needed.  Moreover, this “should 
be done without decreasing the time devoted to other courses in science and engineering.” Thus 
the tension began between the technical studies, on the one hand, and the humanities and social 
sciences, on the other. This panel offered one major recommendation regarding military 
education for all academy programs, “namely, that a strong course on the National Military 
                                                                                                                                                             
Idwal Edwards. The USAF Institute of Technology was now concentrating towards more 
graduate-level work, see “USAF Education Board: Discussion and Proposals of the 
USAF Educational System for Officers, 1950,” USAFA Special Collections. This board, 
also called the “Fairchild Board,” met in late-January 1950. See the “Principal 
Recommendations” regarding the USAF Institute of Technology; AFAPBS, Vol. 2, “The 
Curriculum, 142”; finally, AFAPBS, Vol. 1, “A Plan for the Academy,” 5, envisioned the 
awarding of a Bachelor of Science. 
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Establishment be included (one is proposed for the Air Force Academy). This course should deal 
primarily with the national and international economic, social, and political significance” of the 
establishment “and not merely with matters of military organization and procedures.”255 So the 
panel was mirroring the service leaders who had already pointed out this requirement. 
 One of the final recommendations from the Board again emphasized technical studies 
within this broad education. This recommendation, the 37th of 40, envisioned a “consulting 
board, with rotating membership” that would focus on the schools’ educational requirements and 
would ensure “the promotion of the concept of unification at the academies.”  Three civilians 
were to serve on the consulting board—“at least one of whom shall be a scientist or engineer”—
as well as the three Superintendents of the major academies.256 Although designed as a watchdog 
partly to ensure “unification,” this Board would also protect the scientific and technical emphasis 
of the program of instruction.  
 The final committee that offered insight to the Board was the “Military Education Panel,” 
chaired by Admiral (Retired) Raymond Spruance. The six-man panel reviewed the existing 
academies’ military education, took information from the Air Force Academy Planning Board 
Study, and heard from, as well as visited, various Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) 
                                                 
255 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 3, “Background and Legislation (Cont’d),” No. 
27, “Report to the Service Academy Board by the Panel on Instruction in Science and 
Engineering at the United States Military Academy and the United States Naval 
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AFAHD, 1954-1956. The panel’s insights are included in the appendices—Appendix D—
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256 Stearns-Eisenhower Report, 15. 
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programs.257 Demonstrating the military’s conservative habits, the panel affirmed the traditional 
structure of one academy for each major service and “concluded that it would be inadvisable to 
discard the present system of proven value for a new untried system.”258 Recognizing the “broad 
subject of military education,” the panel distilled its thoughts about “Military Education at 
Service Academies” in one concluding paragraph: 
The primary objective of the military education program at a service academy 
should be the preparation of the student mentally, psychologically and physically 
for the fulfillment of the responsibilities and duties which must be assumed by an 
officer of the Armed Forces in the service of his country. The guiding principle of 
the program should be to further the all-round development of the student and to 
provide knowledge and understanding with direct carry-over value to future duty 
                                                 
257 Stearns-Eisenhower Report, Index, 73. The military education panel’s report was the 
final panel in the annex—even behind physical education. The opening paragraph of the 
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situations. No attempt should be made to train the student in a particular specialty, 
but rather, emphasis should be directed continually toward broad knowledge and 
understanding and the development of characteristics necessary to leadership and 
command. Occupational specialty training should be limited to that which is 
necessary to produce a sound, energetic, responsible junior officer. The panel 
considers the curricula of existing academies as adequate in respect to military 
education.259  
The panel endorsed the “general education” path over something narrower that would 
concentrate on specialized training to cadets—specialized training would make it more of a trade 
school than a college program, although maintaining some specialized training would remain a 
thread in the discussion of military education throughout the Air Force Academy’s planning and 
operation stages. The panel offered no ideas about how to strengthen the academies’ military 
studies program. 
 In concert with the emphasis among all senior leaders for “unification” of the services, 
the panel informed the Board about its recommendations for “Cross-Education and 
Indoctrination in Unification in the System of Military Education.”  It recommended a program 
of instruction at all service academies, 
  Will increase the understanding of the undergraduate officer candidate with respect to:  
 (1) An awareness of the major problems affecting the security of the Nation. 
                                                 
259 Stearns-Eisenhower Report, Appendix I, 74-75.  Besides reviewing the military 
education curricula at the academies, the panel also had the charge to review “modifying 
the present ‘academy system’,” appointment process, entrance requirements, post-
graduate educational program of the Department of Defense and ROTC, as well as 
“procurement of regular [versus reserve] officers.” 
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 (2) An understanding of the relation between the military and all other elements 
such as labor, industry, management and agriculture, which combine to maintain a 
total national security. 
 (3) A consciousness of the crucial significance in terms of security of a healthy 
national economy upon which modern defense measures impose a heavy burden. 
 (4) An understanding of the role of the Department of Defense in our Government.260 
So the Board, at the advice and assistance of the panel, provided what it envisioned as the 
absolute minimum of military studies course work. 
 The Board’s recommendations became the guideline for securing the new academy and 
safeguarding the traditional structure of the existing two academies, with some minor 
adjustments within the realm of military studies that were a nod toward unification. The Board 
recognized the need for a broad, academic education. Although influenced and intrigued by the 
AFAPBS’s greater emphasis on liberal arts in the curriculum, the Board embraced a substantial 
emphasis on the more technical course work within the program of instruction. However, even 
with the strong recommendations of the Board, the Secretary of Defense did not approve the 
report until the summer 1950. This delay was due initially to the Secretary’s concern over service 
unification—and the creation of a new academy seemed to undercut that aim.261 Even so, both 
civilian and military members recognized the need for a service-specific academy for the Air 
Force. 
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Special Assistant for Air Force Academy Matters 
While the Service Academy Board was wrapping up its report and submitting its 
recommendations, Air Force leaders decided that the work toward establishing the Air Force 
Academy had to be centralized. Currently under the Deputy Chief of Staff of Personnel office, 
the effort of coordinating and overseeing all the work toward an academy needed more time and 
attention than it was getting. As Lt. Gen. Idwal Edwards and one of his deputies were getting 
overwhelmed with various projects, including the Hook Committee, which was investigating an 
updated Pay Act, Lieutenant General Hubert Harmon stepped into his office. Then the Air Force 
military representative on the United Nations Military Air Staff Committee, Harmon was bored.  
The committee’s only achievement from meeting to meeting was to agree on scheduling the next 
meeting. Edwards acknowledged that Harmon was “very much of a forward thinker” and that 
Harmon would be effective organizing and heading an office on the Air Staff to plan for an air 
academy. After talking with the Chief of Staff, Edwards secured Harmon’s selection to work Air 
Force Academy issues.262 Having completed its study of a curriculum for the Academy, Air 
Force leaders would now concentrate on the legislative effort, and this needed the right kind of 
attention. In a memorandum for record on 19 December 1949, General Fairchild established the 
Office of Special Assistant for Air Force Academy Matters.  This position would “have complete 
responsibility and authority within the Air Staff for all matters concerning the establishment of 
plans and policies pertaining to the proposed Air Force Academy.  [The Special Assistant] is 
further given direct access to all echelons of the Air Staff in all matters concerning the 
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“Record of Interview of Lieutenant General Idwal H. Edwards by Air Force Academy 
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establishment, organization, and operation of the proposed Air Force Academy.” By virtue of 
this memorandum, the office fell under the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, and the Special 
Assistant enjoyed the staff jurisdiction of the Air Force Academy Planning Group Field 
Extension, originally at Air University, that would now come under his office’s purview.263 This 
initiative was intended to allow for a more organized, concerted effort to establish the Air Force 
Academy and the program of instruction developed for the future officer candidates. 
The choice to head this position would profoundly influence the direction of the new 
academy. Serendipity had helped Harmon gain the position, but he was prepared for such service 
and the right person for the job. When he was the Army Air Forces personnel chief, Harmon 
oversaw a study on an air academy, and he offered his vision for an academy to General Edwards 
in August 1948. As Harmon’s most prominent biographer would suggest, what he sent Edwards 
“was a remarkable letter” that “had presaged their [AFAPBS and Service Academy Board 
Report] findings in most areas.”264 Harmon was more than prepared for the assignment. When 
asked about the future Academy’s curriculum, General Spaatz answered: “General Harmon was 
the inspiration of curriculum planning more than anyone else. I think he felt, and I am sure a lot 
of us agreed with him, that there should be a little more emphasis on the liberal arts in the Air 
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Academy than had been the case at West Point or Annapolis.”265 Although General Harmon had 
the planning studies to assist him, he had to work some corrections soon after the release of the 
Stearns-Eisenhower report because of Congressional pressure to now include flight training in 
the cadet program. 
 The completion of the AFAPBS and the support it received through the Service Academy 
Board ensured that the new academy seemingly had a solid plan for its curriculum—one that 
departed from the main path of West Point and Annapolis. However, the situation still remained 
fluid. The pressure on the planners, now housed in General Harmon’s office, to include flight 
training in the curriculum grew stronger. By April 1950, this pressure had become too great to 
ignore. The Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, Representative Carl Vinson, 
whose support was necessary to introduce any bill advocating for an academy, advised the 
Secretary of the Air Force that he believed the curriculum needed to include comprehensive 
flight training—or at least to the extent of what the Naval Academy was providing.266 Secretary 
Symington directed the head of the Site Selection Board to consider basic flight training 
requirements when examining proposed sites—and the planners recognized the need to 
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incorporate significant flight training in the curriculum, which required revising the 
curriculum.267 The challenge was to now integrate a flight training program and still keep a solid 
undergraduate education while allowing a portion of the available time to remain specific to an 
academic approach toward military studies. 
 The development of professional military education at a new Air Force academy had a 
blueprint. The work accomplished by the AFAPBS and the Stearns-Eisenhower Report offered 
some solid material but at the same time showed little sophistication. After years in which 
advocates had pushed for an Air Force academy, events during the spring 1950 conspired to 
delay the creation of the institution for almost another half-decade, which allowed still more 
opportunity for further revision of the military studies program. The report of the Service 
Academy Board that was submitted to the Secretary of Defense was forwarded to the President 
on January 13, 1950.  The next day, the Secretary of Defense informed Dr. Stearns of everyone’s 
solidarity with the Board’s recommendations—the chief recommendation being the 
establishment of the Air Force’s own academy.268 With the work that was being completed on 
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Secretary Symington understood that in order to get the Academy, everyone would have 
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site selection and on the drafting of legislation, many people believed that, if things were not 
completed for the 1950-1951 academic year, then certainly all things would be set—at least at an 
interim site for the academy—for the 1951-1952 year. But then significant matters would 
continue to postpone the necessary decision-making for the academy, most notably the North’s 
invasion of South Korea. In addition, the costs surrounding a new academy, the “lingering 
controversy” of the B-36 bomber between the Air Force and Navy, and a West Point cheating 
scandal propagated by the football team all contributed to growing concerns about a new 
academy.269 The events in Korea, however, delayed the momentum for an academy more than 
anything, as the Air Chief stated in a meeting on 22 July 1950, that “we would not be ‘playing 
the game’ to take advantage of the situation and start beating the bushes re the Air Academy.”270 
The postponement allowed for continuous fiddling with the curriculum for the future cadets, 
which continued to see the broad academic program as more significant than more military 
studies course work. 
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269 Masland and Radway, 123. It is interesting to note that, when the Senate debated the 
Air Force Academy legislation in 1954, only Senator Al Gore, Sr. (D-TN) spoke in 
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Chapter 4 - Inception of the Curriculum 
 By 1950, the Air Force and the Department of Defense had established the necessity for a 
new academy. The organizations had validated the requirement for an academy through both the 
Air Force Academy Planning Board Study (AFAPBS) and the work of the Service Academy 
Board. The AFAPBS even had developed a template for use as draft legislation to support an Air 
Force academy through Congress. The Service Academy Board produced the Stearns-
Eisenhower Report that also had provided the required justification for a new academy. More 
important, both studies, though primarily the AFAPBS, included a sound framework for the new 
academy’s curriculum necessary to educate and to develop the ideal officer candidate. Within 
this curriculum the planners had included a foundation for course work specific in military 
studies, as distinguished from general academic course work or functions related to military 
training. Even though the proposed military studies course work, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, was relatively minimal, the AFAPBS plan included a Division of Military Studies 
within the Dean of Faculty’s purview, one of three divisions under the eye of the Dean, but with 
responsibility to the Commandant and the military studies program.271 However, within weeks of 
disseminating the Stearns-Eisenhower Report in the winter and early spring 1950, a report that 
also had agreed in spirit with the curriculum proposed within the AFAPBS, objections to the 
planned program materialized. The most influential voice came from Congressman Carl Vinson, 
who threw a wrench in the plan by demanding that a significant pilot training program be 
included in the overall curriculum for the cadets. Others followed suit, significantly the Secretary 
of the Air Force, and many agreed that an Air Force academy required flight training for 
motivation, as a minimum. The Air Force Academy planners, now organized within the Office of 
                                                 
271 The other two divisions were the Division of Science and the Division of Humanities. 
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the Special Assistant (OSA) for Air Force Academy Matters, led by Lieutenant General Hubert 
Harmon, continued to revise the already packed, proposed curriculum to now include some type 
of specialized flight training program. The planning for an air academy during this formative 
period, as well as the curriculum implemented during the initial years of the Air Force Academy, 
relegated professional military studies to a second-tier position as the emphasis was on the need 
to incorporate fight training and to remain focused on the general academic education of the 
officer candidates, specifically to ensure accreditation of the entire institution. 
 With the completion of two major studies that proposed an Air Force academy, and with 
the office organized around General Harmon as the Special Assistant for Air Force Academy 
Matters to promote the Academy’s establishment, the planners continued to refine the proposed 
curriculum. The main effort was still under the leadership of General Harmon, but it took place 
at Bolling Field—across the Potomac River from the Pentagon—where a planning group had 
been validating and revising the projected curriculum for the Academy since the Air Force 
released the AFAPBS.272 Prior to the reorganization under General Harmon’s office, this group 
was referred to as the Air Force Academy Planning Group Field Extension, and included those 
officers who the Air Force expected to be among the academy’s first faculty members. With the 
realization that Congress, and some in the Air Force, demanded some form of flight training in 
the Academy curriculum, this group now concentrated on integrating this specialized training 
into an already crowded and demanding proposed curriculum. To assist with the justification of 
their own academy, these Air Force planners recognized that they needed to demonstrate to 
                                                 
272 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Number 126, “Memo from General Muir S. 
Fairchild, Vice Chief of Staff, for DCS/C, DCS/P, DCS/O, DCS/M, Secretary of the Air 
Force, Subj: Special Assistant for Air Force Academy Matters, 19 December 1949.” 
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Congress that the new academy would do things differently. So, while this group envisioned a 
curriculum with increased emphasis on the humanities and social sciences, it also fostered “a 
professional sense of ‘airmanship’ and to make the potential officer air-minded.” The latter 
objective provided the necessity of the air academy—as different from the other two primary 
academies. The inclusion of fight training contributed to this support of an air-minded officer 
candidate. However, specialized training of the officer candidate already was receiving more 
support than general military education.273 Due to a number of factors, to include the stress of the 
Korean War, as well as budget battles and a cheating scandal at West Point in 1951, the Air 
Force disbanded the group of planners at Bolling. Now planning was left to General Harmon and 
the three remaining officers in his office.274 The result of this effort by the Bolling group, which 
                                                 
273 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 97. A significant voice in the pressing Congress for the 
Air Force Academy, and then criticizing the original curriculum because it did not 
include flight training and it was too liberal arts-oriented, was Deputy Secretary of the 
Air Force Roger M. Kyes. As quoted in the official history, his testimony to Congress on 
13 January 1954, states: “Air power is the keystone to our military strength. We are 
spending billions of dollars on aircraft and related equipment…[The best] professional 
training can best be accomplished by…an Air Force Academy whose curricula would be 
specifically tailored to the training of air-minded young men in the art of aerial warfare.” 
Kyes really was focused on training, not educating the officer candidate, as were many 
proponents of the Academy. 
274 John W. Masland and Lawrence I. Radway, Soldiers and Scholars: Military 
Education and National Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1957), 122. Besides General Harmon, the three remaining officers were Lt. Col. Art 
Boudreau, Lt. Col. Gilbert Cooke, and Major Thomas Sheldrake. Lt. Col. Arthur Easton 
also assisted from the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel’s office. All had done work on 
the Academy planning since the 1948 Fairchild Board at Air University, Maxwell, AFB, 
as discussed in the previous chapter. See Paul T. Ringenbach, Battling Tradition: Robert 
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was a direction in which many Air Force officers believed the new academy should head, was to 
shy away from a proposed broad-based curriculum to get to something more air-centric and more 
technically oriented—incorporating flight training assisted with this vision. Also, now the duties 
to revise curriculum as well as to lead the legislative and bureaucratic efforts for getting the Air 
Force academy were on the shoulders of a few individuals. 
 The attention in Congress and from civilian leadership to include flight training in the 
curriculum planning now pressured General Harmon and his Academy planners to make major 
revisions. Within the month of April 1950, after Congressman Vinson had relayed his 
disapproval of an air academy with no flight training, an initial plan came out of the Air Staff’s 
Individual Training Division. The division chief, Colonel G. P. Disosway, had constructed a 
program for a cadet’s final three years that focused on navigational training with some flight 
orientation, which did not necessarily mean that the cadets earned any pilot credentials, such as 
Air Force pilot wings, or even a civilian pilot’s license. Even so, the colonel’s minimal plan 
“greatly depended upon certain parts of the academic curriculum” to integrate some specialized 
flight training classes in their overall course work—he suggested incorporating such course work 
within the Division of Science and the Division of Military Studies—“for the development of 
basic concepts and a foundation of scientific knowledge” required for flight training.275 The 
limited proposal demonstrates that the introduction of flight training into the already crowded 
curriculum affected any possible proposed academic course work that could focus on military 
studies. Instead, the military studies program, as envisioned by this curt report, focused primarily 
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275 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 474-475. 
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on the specialized training of flight, versus a more academic approach to topics in military 
studies.  
 General Harmon agreed to include a limited flight training program. However, as he 
weighed the pros and cons of such a training program, he recognized that any pilot training went 
against the AFAPBS and the Service Academy Board, both of which rejected any form of 
specialized training in this academic environment. General Harmon believed that incorporating 
30 hours of flight training was economically feasible, both in money and in time, and that this 
limited amount of training would not drastically affect the planned curriculum, even though it 
required 136 total training hours, which included the ground training and the pre-flight and post-
flight time. Even more significant, 30 hours of flight training was what an Air Force ROTC cadet 
received during summer training. Nevertheless, Harmon did conclude that integrating flight 
training “would not be in the best interests of the academic program”—which included any 
military studies content.276 In March 1951, General Harmon presented this plan to the Secretary 
                                                 
276 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Vol. 1, 477-478. See previous chapter on this discussion from 
the AFAPBS and the Stearns-Eisenhower Report. In his discussion of Harmon’s 
dilemma, Holt references a document, “Tab I, ‘Advantages and Disadvantages of Flying 
Training at the Air Force Academy,’ R&R to Dir/Fly Tng for coordination and C/S, 
USAF, for approval fr Spec Asst for AFA Matters, subj: Flying Training at the Air Force 
Academy, 4 June 50.” The original document was not located. Harmon’s biographer 
emphasizes the General’s enthusiasm towards general education. See Meilinger, 45, 204. 
In an interview, Harmon’s daughter remarked, in response to a question on curriculum 
and flight training: “The only comment I have on that is that he was terribly impressed 
with the liberal education that the young British officers had that he met opposite him 
when he was the air attaché to the Court of Saint James.”  She added: “My dad did make 
it quite clear that he did not want kids being diverted by flying training. He didn’t want to 
take their concentration away from academics. My dad was purely concerned about 
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of the Air Force, Thomas K. Finletter, to demonstrate the impact that the program could have on 
the academic plan for an academy, but he noted that it might still be necessary to accept it in 
order to allay Congressional concerns.277 General Harmon recognized that the obvious effect of 
adding more work and objectives to an already demanding program was to the detriment of the 
academic program as a whole. 
 When the critics began to hound him about his readiness to modify the academic program 
to allow for some specialized training, General Harmon received support from individuals who 
also saw the necessity for flight training. One significant example was the academy’s Dean-
designate, Colonel Dale Smith. Smith was the Director of Education at Headquarters Air 
University, having recently completed his Master of Arts and a doctorate in education at 
Stanford University. He worked with General Harmon and his planners primarily from Maxwell, 
with occasional trips up to the Pentagon, as needed. As discussions to include flight training in 
an academy program intensified, Harmon began a correspondence with Smith on this puzzle. 
General Harmon received a lengthy official letter from Smith in December 1952, the first 
paragraph of which recognized that any academy bill might not pass without a modicum of flight 
training, given the position of some members of Congress. So Smith believed the academy 
program had to have such training. He argued that, from the Fairchild Board (1948) on, the 
critics who rejected flight training at the academy based their position on the World War II 
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experience at West Point—Smith emphasized that the West Point program had been a full-
fledged pilot training program during an already condensed three-year, war-time curriculum. He 
concluded: “It seems advisable to work out alternate schedules which will include flying training 
as an integral part of the program, through basic stage…Congress may insist this be done and we 
should be prepared to implement it.” He recognized that they should be prepared to have a plan 
with an intense flight program. The “basic stage” was one complete course—almost 6-months of 
concentrated flight training—at Air Force pilot school. However, significant in his 
memorandum, Smith suggests that military training periods, or “tactics” courses, be used to 
accommodate the training.278 He meant to substitute specialized flight training in the curriculum 
                                                 
278 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 7, Commandant of Cadets, Number 147, 
“Memorandum for General Harmon, from Dale O. Smith, Colonel, USAF, Subj: 
Examination of Pilot Training for the U.S. Air Force Academy, 15 December 1952.” 
Many senior leaders believed that Smith would be the first Dean of the Academy—had 
Congress established the academy in the time frame Smith wrote this letter—he was in 
the running from 1950 to just after he wrote this letter. See Edward Anthony Miller, Jr., 
“The Founding of the Air Force Academy: An Administrative and Legislative History” 
(Ph.D. diss, University of Denver, August 1969), 351; also, AFAHD, 1954-1956, 
Appendix, Vol. 4, Number 12, “Interview with General Dale O. Smith, Planning for the 
Establishment of the Air Force Academy, Washington, D.C., 18 April 1956,” 2. Smith’s 
proposal meant that a cadet graduated with his pilot wings—“basic stage”—this means 
that 270 flight hours was necessary. Smith calculates that planning 810 total hours within 
the last two years allowed for this enhanced program—3 hours for every flight hour. 
NOTE: In his agreement to get each cadet 30 hours of flight, Harmon calculated 136 
ground hours…4.5 hours per flight hour. A similar requirement for Smith’s 270 flight 
hours, equates to over 1,215 total hours. These extra hours are among those that Smith 
incorporated into military studies and training, as well as the general academic program. 
The flight program would begin with the summer before the cadet’s junior year, to allow 
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at the expense of academic subjects within the intended military studies program. Any level of 
flight training had an effect on the proposed program, especially military studies. 
 Smith followed up his official memorandum with an informal letter to General Harmon a 
week later offering his basic views on education and the role of an Air Force academy. The letter 
begins with a discussion about flight training. The intent of Harmon’s letter was to note that his 
previous official correspondence had discussed the rigorous pilot training course, since the 
planners had to be prepared to satisfy Congress. However, Smith stated: “I do think a reasonable 
emphasis on flying training is feasible,” even at a level much below the necessity for earning 
one’s pilot wings. He added: “Education is a lifetime proposition…. In the Air Force we can be 
assured that an enterprising officer is sent to schools progressively throughout his career. Thus 
we need not cram his lifetime education into his four years at the academy. Instead, we can teach 
him what he must know to best pursue his junior officer duties, and be sure that he has learned it. 
It seems to me that such a program should rightfully include flying.”279 Smith believed that flight 
                                                                                                                                                             
for consistency. What is interesting about the pressure the air leaders received from 
Congress on flying training, is that on 27 June 1951, Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH), 
entered Senate Bill 1760, to provide for a United States Air Force Academy. In the 
record, Senator Bridges, as well as the co-sponsor, Senator Richard Russell, stressed the 
need for an Academy to provide officers “educated and trained from youth in the arts of 
war and leadership and strongly motivated to a lifetime of service to our country.” They 
did not mention flying training at all. See AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, 
Number 99, “Congressional Record – Senate, June 27, 1951 (EXTRACT).” 
279 AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 4, Number 86, “Letter from Dale O. Smith, 
Colonel, USAF, to Lieutenant General Hubert R. Harmon, Senior Air Force Member, 
Military Staff Committee, United Nations, 22 December 1952.” Smith’s insistence on a 
robust flight-training program put him at odds with those who wanted to limit the 
program. This position was one reason why he chose not to be in the running to become 
139 
training should replace some of the academic program, including that devoted to military studies. 
Also, Smith underscored the belief of many other senior officers that serious military studies, to 
include any air-centric lessons of warfare and doctrine, were not a requirement for officer 
candidate education, assuming that this study occurred later in the service school education 
program after one had become a commissioned officer. 
 General Harmon took Colonel Smith’s recommendations seriously. The day after 
receiving Smith’s official memorandum, Harmon directed the planners to use Smith’s 
calculations for a proposed flight program, interpolated over a three-year program, instead of 
two-year—Smith proposed a flight training program only in the final two years of a cadet’s 
career. The result was 292 flight hours requiring 1,168 scheduled hours.280 Much like Smith, 
Harmon wanted to be prepared for Congress. With this information, General Harmon requested 
that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force convene a board of senior officers to address the flight 
training issue. Colonel Smith prepared the briefing for the ad hoc board.  He admitted that this 
pilot training program seriously affected the academic program, but so did athletics, and athletic 
training was a necessity.281 The leaders recognized that there were opportunity costs for 
                                                                                                                                                             
the first Dean.  Another reason was that he was “out of sympathy with the procedures and 
policies of the new Secretary [Harold Talbott].” See AFAHD, 1954-1956, Appendix, Vol. 
3, Number 12, “Interview with General Dale O. Smith, Planning for the Establishment of 
the Air Force Academy, Washington, D.C., 18 April 1956,” 2. 
280 Today’s undergraduate pilot training is a year-long program in two phases. Pilot 
trainees are trained in a different aircraft for each phase. The total hours received in the 
entire program is just over 200 hours. This offers some perspective on what Harmon and 
Smith were planning in order to mollify Congressional opponents of and Air Force 
Academy with no flight training. 
281 AFAHD, 1954-1956, 484-485, 487-488. 
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everything, and accepting the requirement for flight training was essential to gaining an 
academy, even if it was to the detriment of the academic program. Incorporating flight training 
into the already crowded proposed program would have a direct impact on military studies, since 
any time that was once devoted to military education might now support the flight program. 
 At about the same time when Harmon proposed the meeting of an ad hoc board of senior 
leaders to discuss flight training and other curriculum issues, the Air Force Council convened 
also to discuss the flight training requirement for the Academy. General Harmon had given the 
Council three presentations at the request of the Chief of Staff to request senior leader guidance 
concerning various issues. General Nathan Twining, the Air Force’s Vice Chief of Staff, sent a 
memorandum to the Chief with the recommendations. The final of the three presentations was on 
the curriculum. Responding to this, the Council first concurred with the Special Assistant 
concerning the focus towards a more “generalized curriculum…as opposed to a curriculum 
specializing in engineering courses.” Even though the Council agreed on this, it did stipulate that 
the proposed senior-year elective course be eliminated with the cadets taking additional course 
work in either aeronautical engineering or foreign languages. The Council included two items 
that occasioned some measure of attention to what the Council saw as professional military 
studies. One of the issues was that, although “the entire curriculum should be oriented toward 
qualifying the Cadet for a professional military career in aviation,” which included a flight 
training program “to the greatest degree practicable,” the proposed 35 hours seemed sufficient, 
but only minimally so. The other issue was that “tactics and strategy of air warfare should be 
included in the curriculum for the First and Second Classes [seniors and juniors].”  This 
proposal, the Council concluded, “[s]hould clearly indicate the USAF view as to requisite 
141 
training for a career Air Force Officers can best be obtained through an Air Force Academy.”282 
Although the Council’s comments on Harmon’s view of the way ahead did reveal that Air Force 
leaders recognized the need for a military studies program, they also reflect the leaders’ 
emphasis to the specialized training. The Academy curriculum had to include flight training, but 
it was to the detriment of other academic course work. 
At the request of General Harmon, the ad hoc board of senior leaders met at the 
beginning of January 1953 to review all curriculum planning.  After reviewing the program, the 
board came to three conclusions: 1) “That the curriculum of the Air Academy should lead to the 
award of a Bachelor of Air Science degree”; 2) “that the concept of ‘global indoctrination’ 
should be made part of the Air Academy curriculum”; and 3) “that the curriculum of the Air 
Academy be developed so as to produce competent airmen, trained and rated as aircraft 
observers, who have completed the pilot training now included in the Phase I Primary Course, as 
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Staff, N.F. Twining, General, USAF, Chairman Air Force Council, Subj: (Unclassified) 
Air Force Academy, December 1952,” 3. The issues required attention since the plan was 
to open an interim site in 1953. On the minimum flight program, the Council advised that 
“actual flying training to the greatest degree practicable should be included in the 
curriculum.” General Vandenberg had established the Air Force Council on 26 April 
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Force Council was similar to the Army Air Force Board (Air Board) established 5 March 
1946 by General Spaatz, as discussed in Chapter 2. See also Ibid., 209. The Vice Chief 
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deputy chief of staffs as Council members. See Robert F. Futrell, Ideas Concepts, 
Doctrine, Vol. 1, Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1960 (Maxwell Air 
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a minimum objective.”283 This statement is of significance because it offered a level of training 
that equated to the cadet receiving navigator’s wings—thus the reference to “rated as aircraft 
observers.” Other officers had discussed this level of training, but now the idea gained further 
traction. Most significant is that these senior leaders of the Air Force were rejecting the 
recommendation of the AFAPBS and the Stearns-Eisenhower Report that the Academy not 
include flight training in the curriculum. 
Three main issues seemed to favor an Air Force academy as 1953 opened. The Air Force 
continued to grow in size, primarily because of the Korean War, but also because of the 
developing containment strategy of the early Cold War.284 Also, most top graduates of West 
Point and Annapolis were choosing to cross-commission into the Air Force. And, most 
significant, the other two academies solidified their academy traditions—so the entire service 
academy structure was not going to meet with any radical changes, such as the creation of a joint 
academy that some had been proposing.285 Also, the architects of the two studies examining the 
structure of service academies and the air academy, specifically, believed they had advanced the 
rationale for an additional academy, had created a solid curriculum and structure, and, more 
significantly, had done the leg work for a legislative proposal. However, even though a new 
press for an Air Academy was reactivated in January 1953, when the Honorable Dewey Short 
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(R-MO), the Chairman of the HASC, introduced H.R. 2328, “To provide for the establishment of 
the United States Air Force Academy and for other purposes,” Congress did not move on the 
Academy. Congressman Short re-introduced a DoD-sponsored bill as H.R. 5337 in May. More 
significantly, in February, General Harmon had reached mandatory retirement age and so was 
prepared to end his career—General Vandenberg extended his active duty commitment by six 
months to see the Academy come to fruition. The May effort in Congress also failed, so General 
Harmon, again retired his position as the Special Assistant for Air Force Academy Matters at the 
end of June 1953—though he kept abreast of issues concerning the Academy. As 1953 came to a 
close, the new Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Nathan Twining, believed things were set 
for a final push. To ensure everything would be in order for the presentation to Congress—
Congressman Short had reintroduced the bill for a third time—President Eisenhower recalled his 
classmate, General Harmon, back to active service for a third time.286 After the continued delays 
and debates in creating the Air Force’s academy, President Dwight Eisenhower signed its 
establishment into law on 1 April 1954. The Secretary of the Air Force officially established the 
U.S. Air Force Academy on 27 July 1954 as a “separate operating agency…under the direct 
control of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, with the procedural functions and 
responsibilities of a major air command.” However, until the Academy was manned and 
coordinated to do so, Air Training Command assisted in all administrative and logistical 
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functions, to include the command statistical reporting function.287 The proposed curriculum 
underwent final scrutiny before its implementation. 
The proposed curriculum that was in place at the beginning of 1954 embodied an intense 
academic program with a demanding observer program included as well. The flight program, 
however, did not include actual pilot time, but was dedicated to training an observer, or 
navigator. By March 1953, the organizational plan had diverged from what had been proposed 
originally by the AFAPBS. Specifically, the plan to have a Division of Military Studies under the 
Dean of Faculty, who would be under some control from the Commandant, as well as to have the 
two other divisions, was now changed by the planning team. Instead, the OSA designed the 
Academy structure so it had two branches: the Academic Curriculum, under the supervision of 
the Dean of Faculty, and the Airmanship Program, supervised by the Commandant of Cadets.288  
The small coterie of officers under General Harmon in the Officer of the Special Assistant 
(OSA) presented the completed “Program of Instruction” in January 1954. The planners 
proposed a curriculum of 5,353 total contact hours: 3,177 devoted to the Academic Curriculum 
and 2,176 in the Airmanship Program—effectively the same plan from 1953.289 This was the 
plan circulated right before President Eisenhower signed the bill to establish the Academy, and it 
would undergo final modifications before the cadets arrived the following year. 
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Examining this proposal illuminates the declining role of professional military education 
in the program. The Academy historians, writing in 1957, recognized that one reason for the 
success in creating the new academy was that academy officer candidates were required to gain a 
“basic education in military matters and in the arts and sciences and dedication to the service of 
the Air Force and the Nation which was required of the Air Force officer,”290 and only an Air 
Force academy could accomplish this goal. More significantly, academy planners and 
proponents agreed on a curriculum that showed a more “functionalized and modernized” 
approach to education, one that recognized the two main considerations for an Air Force 
academy: “the influence of technological advancements in aerial warfare and the influence of the 
global aspects of aerial warfare.”291 One might agree with these ideas, which might suggest a 
curriculum with a concentration in military studies. Yet the actual program as envisioned at the 
beginning of its existence, when the President signed the bill, integrated a specialized training 
program that demanded much time and discouraged wrestling with larger concepts. 
However, the attention that flight training had received since the AFAPBS and the 
Stearns-Eisenhower report had changed the framework of the program. In the 1954 Program of 
Instruction, the planners divided the Airmanship Program into four divisions: Basic Training, 
Physical Training, Flying Training, and Leadership Training.292 The planners included any 
military studies material within the Basic Training area. The emphasis in this area, as explained 
in the program’s content, however, was merely on drill and ceremony and tactics, as “the 
majority of the instruction will be devoted to military fundamentals.” But the program did not 
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ignore military studies entirely. As the area description continues, it stated: “Orientation in the 
material, methods and techniques of the various arms and services of the Armed Forces…will be 
included within this area and unification will be stressed. Instruction will be given in the various 
weapons of warfare, particularly air warfare.” The program does not provide a distribution of the 
hours in the Basic Training area. Instead, the designers combined the Basic and Leadership 
Training hours, which amounted to 958 program hours. So, the 2,176 hours devoted to the 
Airmanship Program was distributed as 958 hours for Basic Training and Leadership, 373 hours 
for Physical Training, 645 hours for Observer Training (for the cadets to receive navigator’s 
wings), and 200 hours for Pilot Training (Phase I)—almost more hours for flight training than all 
other training and education.293 The inclusion of a flight program—which now included 
Observer Training and a basic Pilot Training—created tension for a military studies program. 
Even though the planners believed they had created a solid product, it drastically departed from 
the AFAPBS, especially regarding the proposed Division of Military Studies in that plan. The 
integration of a rigorous flight training program affected military studies. As an historian of the 
service academies notes: “When the Air Force Academy moved from planning to the operational 
stage, problems latent in the organizational design became manifest almost immediately, 
aggravated by clashes of disparate personalities. For example, the prescribed curriculum, despite 
the years of planning that had gone into it, was a jerry-built structure, the enormity of which 
reflected the inability of planners to reconcile their differences other than by including virtually 
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everything that was proposed.”294 In the attempt to include everything, the planners restricted the 
military education of the officer candidates. 
 Besides a focus on the new requirement of flight training, the planners recognized the 
need to validate its general academic curriculum as most important. The emphasis on the 
academic realm overshadowed every other aspect of the Academy—this discussion was central 
to its developers. The main reason was that the Air Force leaders involved in the planning, such 
as General Harmon, knew that if an academy was to be an attractive institution, it would need 
proper formal academic accreditation. As was insisted in the AFAPBS, “Accreditation 
requirements should be taken into consideration in the organization and overall operation of the 
academy.”295 Also, as the early plan acknowledged, this quest for recognition as being on a par 
with its peers across the country required a solid faculty, which the Board considered necessary 
to “secure early accreditation.”  The Board also believed that the Academy’s organizational 
structure would meet any accrediting institution’s basic requirements.296 Accreditation was 
central, the AFAPBS members believed, to provide “a concrete basis for self analysis, 
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improvement, and continuous progress toward the degree of excellence desired.” As the planners 
concluded in discussing accreditation, “The institutional prestige accruing to the Air Force 
Academy from such accreditation, with the desired public and academic esteem and the 
consequent assured status of those to whom it grants degrees, places early accreditation in the 
category of a major objective.” The early planners began to plan based on the requirements of 
the Association of American Universities. Since the location of the Academy was not yet 
decided, the AAU was a prudent choice, since it was the only national accrediting 
organization.297 However, the planners understood that most accrediting associations “require 
that an institution be in operation for a sufficient period of time so that it may be judged 
objectively.”298 The early operators of the new Academy, who wanted their first graduates to 
matriculate from an already accredited institution, were not satisfied with a waiting period. 
The focus on the need for accreditation drove even stronger emphasis on the general 
academic curriculum. General Harmon remained adamant that the curriculum maintain its 
balance between the sciences and the humanities to assist with this effort. As he reviewed the 
work done by the 1949 Planning Board Study, he had suggested that there be “slightly more 
emphasis” on the humanities. The future Superintendent believed that the education of officer 
candidates should focus on “human relations and negotiations and with ‘communications’ [more] 
than with detailed technical activities.” This concept suggested the General’s vision of effective 
military studies, also. Furthermore, he realized that in the immediate future at least 50 percent of 
the Regular officer corps had to come from civilian institutions, so the Air Force could gather its 
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technical specialists from that source.299 Colonel Robert McDermott also recognized the need to 
emphasize the humanities and social sciences. His experience attending and teaching at West 
Point led him to conclude: “There was too much emphasis on engineering in our curriculum.”300 
McDermott arrived at the Academy in 1954 and assumed the role as Vice Dean. As the early 
social scientists Masland and Radway note, “The service academy provides the most complete 
nontechnical education that [officers] will get during their careers. For all of them this 
experience comes at an age when they are still relatively impressionable. Even if this were not 
so, the academies would warrant close examination because they are peculiarly the repositories 
of service ethos. It is at their academies that the services define the ideals to which they expect 
their officers, from whatever source derived, to aspire.”301 As Colonel Boudreau admitted in 
1956, just a couple of years after the Academy’s founding: 
Civilian colleges have specified objectives; the Air Force Academy would have the 
primary objective of starting professional airmen on their careers . . . .  Only those 
subjects and those things which would produce the kind of an Air Force officer we 
wanted were to be included in the program of instruction. A young graduate of the 
academy would receive the professional education of an airman in the same manner as a 
man going to law school comes out a lawyer. This was to be a distinct educational 
program developed to produce a professional airman. If we want aeronautical engineers 
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in the Air Force, we will go to MIT for them. They can produce better engineers then we 
can.302  
So the Academy planners had an idea of what constituted a solid professional military studies 
background, and they intended on developing that at the new academy. But it focused on the part 
of the professional military studies course work that was within the responsibility of the Dean of 
Faculty—in the disciplines such as history and political science, for example. And yet, now a 
challenge was put to make the curriculum more technical in nature than be steeped in the 
humanities and social sciences. The professional military studies program continued to be under 
pressure, struggling for time and space in the education the cadets. 
 The focus on the academic curriculum, and now the debate on the proper balance 
between the humanities and social science coursework versus the emphasis on the sciences and 
engineering-related courses, most definitely affected the role and emphasis on professional 
military studies throughout the Academy’s history. When the act of Congress creating the 
Academy was signed into law, one of the first criticisms launched at General Harmon, which 
was a continuation of complaints and struggles when the Academy was being formed, involved 
this balance within the curriculum. Specifically, the complainants criticized what they saw as an 
imbalance favoring studies that were not “technical” in nature. In an 18 May 1954 letter to the 
Air University commander, Lt. Gen. Laurence S. Kuter, General Harmon answered the recent 
criticism that had been passed to him through General Ira Eaker from Air University students 
who believed the proposed Academy curriculum had too much emphasis on “Cultural 
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subjects”—the humanities—instead of the more “Technical studies.” The Air Force already had 
a cabal of officers who believed the only coursework needed by any officer candidate was that 
which focused on the modern-day equivalent of “STEM” (Science, Technical, Engineering, 
Mathematics) coursework—and they were ready to neglect studies within the social sciences and 
humanities realm. This seems to have been the first shot across the bow on the debate that 
continues even well into the 21st century concerning the Academy’s curriculum.303 According to 
the concerned officers, General Eaker informed General Harmon, the curriculum favored the 
cultural studies over technical studies by 70 percent to 30 percent. Again, this complaint reveals 
the belief that the Air Force Academy needed to mirror the service’s significant technical role in 
national defense. A defensive General Harmon replied in the memo that, “while I personally 
admit or, if you wish, advocate considerably more emphasis on the Cultural side than now exists 
at either West Point or Annapolis, our figures are nowhere near as much out of balance as the 
above statements would indicate.” Instead, General Harmon showed that science and engineering 
coursework was already the emphasis. Those cadets who took languages had a balance of 1,548 
hours “Cultural,” with 1,395 hours “Technical”—a 52½ percent to 47½ percent split. Whereas, 
as Harmon wrote, “the other portion of the class (inferentially the more technically minded 
cadets)” had a balance of 1,314 hours cultural and 1,629 hours technical—or a 44.7 percent 
versus 55.3 percent split. Furthermore, General Harmon informed General Eaker that the cultural 
hours included 288 hours in courses such as “Psychology of Leadership, Military Law, and 
Military Art”—courses that Harmon defined as “Military Training.” An additional 490 hours, 
beyond those already discussed, were those Aircraft Observer hours, which consisted of 
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“classroom and laboratory instruction in all types of navigation and bombing equipment and 
techniques”—one would most definitely classify these hours as military training, and technical in 
nature. Harmon intended for this letter to reach the original officer complainants.304 
 Besides his own views of what was necessary in professional education, General Harmon 
received input from others on the subject of curriculum. The various exchanges usually 
mentioned the necessity of ensuring an effective academic curriculum—hinting at the need for 
accreditation. General Harmon received support for his curriculum from Colonel Dale Smith. 
Smith favored more emphasis on the liberal arts within the curriculum. Also, in the same letter in 
which he addressed the need for a flying program and stressed the humanities in education, 
Colonel Smith disclosed his thoughts on professional military education and his “educational 
philosophy.” The lengthy comment deserves notice:  
We have separated [military studies] from academics in our plans. This follows the 
American belief that things military are not quite respectable as central courses of study, 
that if we must deal with these undesirable subjects, they should not taint our pure liberal 
arts and (civilian) professional subjects by being included in the same curriculum. So we 
teach them “after school” like vocational subjects. The end result is that tactics and 
strategy take a back seat to subjects like Chemistry and Physics. To me this does not put 
first things first. For example, in 19 years of service I cannot recall one time when I have 
needed to use my knowledge of Chemistry, consequently I have forgotten it so 
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completely that I couldn’t use it now if I were required to. But tactics and strategy have 
been of continued concern and interest to me and to my contemporaries. 
Why must this body of fundamental knowledge be treated so lightly? Why isn’t it central 
to the curriculum as Math and English? I believe it is a mistake to start out with a 
dichotomy with things civilian on one side and things military on the other. If we do so 
the military subjects will stagnate because orthodox academic subjects are backed by the 
whole weight of the educational world. If we integrate our [military studies] with our 
academics, we will tend to build respectable and systematic bodies of knowledge which 
will eventually be utilized in the academic world. 
 I strongly recommend that all scheduled education and training be a responsibility 
of the Dean. The Com[mandant] could act as the Director of Tactics, but should be 
responsible to the Dean for all training of whatever nature.305 
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Not only did Colonel Smith support General Harmon’s emphasis on the social sciences and the 
humanities, which greatly contributed to the cadet’s professional military education.  He also 
supported the necessity of a strong military studies curriculum, also advocating that all education 
topics fall under the Dean.  
 The Superintendent’s supposed emphasis on social sciences and the humanities was not 
without its headaches. When the first curriculum was unveiled, besides Air University pushback, 
the Academy’s office in D.C. had been inundated with inquiries about the cadet academic 
program, and the Academy’s balanced program, as opposed to a more rigorous science and 
engineering program. The most recent attack had come from Mr. Roger Kyes, Deputy Secretary 
of Defense, who “was disappointed that the technical aspects were not stressed more.”306 He 
objected to the balance, instead demanding more technical instruction and less liberal arts course 
work.  As he suggested to Chief of Staff General Thomas D. White, the Air Force Academy had 
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a “technical aspect…not applicable to West Point and Annapolis.”307 This fallout led the Vice 
Chief to direct that the Academy submit a “periodic report” on all its positive actions—especially 
regarding the curriculum.308  
 The planning group continued to focus on the academic course work throughout the 
summer, since it received the majority of the criticism, which affected any course design for 
military studies. The small group assigned to the Office of Special Assistant recognized that 
there were not enough people assigned to tackle all of the major issues. A common belief was 
that the office should have been manned with personnel for all the staff and major fields and 
programs immediately after the signing of the Academy Act. Instead, the OSA only had the same 
three personnel to accomplish the monstrous effort to organize and complete major aspects of 
work regarding the Academy until the late summer 1954. “All the planning…initially was on the 
faculty side. There was a very minimum amount of planning for the staff and Commandant of 
Cadets”—who was responsible for the military studies program. As one of the planners noted, 
“We were always concerned with the necessity for economy of personnel and resources. We 
undermanned some activities due to lack of knowledge and to lack of proper support capabilities 
from Training Command. Our biggest problem was an outgrowth of the lack of organizational 
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planning.”309 The lack of manning and planning would weaken both the vision and the 
consistency of effort toward an effective military studies program.  
 The general academic program received most attention from the planners. Lt. Col. Cooke 
was in charge of manpower in the OSA, and he first secured the assignment of department heads 
and assistants for each academic department.  He accomplished this pressing matter because, 
even though the OSA had the assistance of approximately sixty-five “leading educational 
consultants” in the period between 1951-1954 to firm up the curriculum, he wanted to have the 
academic heads of each department to begin their own curriculum planning.310  
 As the Academy prepared to welcome the first class at the temporary location at Lowry 
AFB, just outside of Denver, the final version of the curriculum received approval. One of the 
many issues that the Dean needed to resolve resulted in a staff study on the “Establishment of the 
Course in Military History.” A key question concerning this topic was whether this necessitated 
another department—a Military History Department separate from the already staffed History 
Department. The issue that drove this question was the view that the military history course 
would consist in part of traditional military history, as in a study of “the great military 
leaders…and of significant battles and campaigns,” integrated with study, during the second half 
of the course, “devoted to air power and air doctrine, the methods by which military power is 
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formed, and ‘military power as an instrument of national policy’.”311 General Harmon approved 
the recommendation to establish a Military History Department and course. More significant was 
the possibility of having some of the course instruction provided by the Airmanship Program, 
which was the new title given to what the AFAPBS organized as the Division of Military 
Studies. 
 The Office of Operations and Training, subordinate to the Commandant, published its 
draft Airmanship Program curriculum in January 1955, which also contained the sub-
organization structure and the course work for military studies. Within the Airmanship Program 
was the Department of Military Training, whose function was “to provide each cadet with a 
broad military education.” Set up in October 1954, this department was divided into three 
sections: the Tactical Division, “in charge of cadet discipline, guidance and character formation”; 
the Training Division, “charged with basic military training”; and the Leadership Division, 
“responsible for the task of leadership training and the Aptitude for Commissioned Service 
System.” Upon receiving the January 1955 Airmanship Program curriculum General Harmon 
stated that he was in general agreement, even though “he had not…examine[d] the program in 
detail,” but the general had concern about the practical ability of the Commandant to execute this 
comprehensive plan.  He asked: “Can you do it all?”312 Similar to the academic curriculum, the 
Commandant’s office was attempting to do it all. Although the simple definitions do not offer 
insight into which division was responsible for an academic program, the role of education fell to 
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the Training Division. The lack of discussion on any program devoted specifically to military 
education demonstrates how it was subordinated even within the Commandant’s responsibility. 
 The Commandant’s office published the first complete Airmanship Program curriculum 
on 15 June 1955. This larger plan contained the program of courses dedicated for military 
studies. The four-year program, which included the Military Training, Flying Training, and 
Physical Training departments, allocated 2,543 hours of cadet participation, which had already 
been increased from 2,505 hours just six months earlier—the January plan. From this program, 
the plan allocated 231 contact hours during the fall semester—only 36 hours to the Military 
Training Department (the rest was devoted to flight training and physical education), of which 
seventeen were for drill and five for a survey course, called “National Defense Organization,” on 
the functions of the Department of Defense and the three service branches. The final fourteen 
hours was reserved for a familiarization course on the “Operational Commands of the Air 
Force,” which was intended “to acquaint” the cadets with the organization and functions of the 
Air Force’s combat commands.313 This was the program for the freshman entering the Academy 
in its first year. The emphasis on flight training and physical education hindered the cadet’s 
education in military studies.  
 Any emphasis on professional military studies – that is, intellectually demanding study of 
military and strategic issues and not mere repetitive training – at first suffered because of the 
Academy’s need to win accreditation. In winter 1955, Colonels McDermott, Boudreau, and 
Rigsby, and Lt. Col. Larsen, met with Manning Pattillo, Jr., the Associate Secretary of the North 
Central Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools. Mr. Pattillo confirmed the fears of the 
Academy officials by emphasizing “that the Academy would not qualify for accreditation until it 
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had completed at least four academic years of instruction.” The major issue for the Academy was 
the need for a “legislative body that represented all educational interests”—so that the 
changeover of each Superintendent did not create drastic changes. West Point and Annapolis had 
developed a Faculty Board.314  
 In the spring 1955, Dr. Pattillo visited the Academy to provide an initial appraisal for 
accreditation, and to continue the discussion on the school’s legislative body. In a productive 
meeting with General Harmon, Pattillo shared that he thought the Dean, General Zimmerman, 
was not the proper person for the job. As Pattillo put it later, “[Zimmerman] was floundering 
badly.” Providing this individual assessment was not a standard procedure for Pattillo. However, 
Pattillo was not the only person questioning the Dean’s ability. Word had gotten back to the 
Director of Personnel Planning, Brigadier General William Stone, on the Air Force staff. He, too, 
had heard issues about Zimmerman’s ability. General Stone met with Dr. Pattillo in Chicago, and 
Pattillo again stated his “reservations on General Zimmerman’s ability to handle the position of 
Dean.” Given all of the evidence and criticism, General Harmon relieved Zimmerman as Dean 
on 1 December 1955—just as the first semester was concluding.315 The mission to achieve 
accreditation led to the quick sacrifice of anything, such as Zimmerman.  
In the summer of 1955, the Superintendent formally established the Academy Board. 
Colonel McDermott had recognized that this organization assisted their efforts towards 
accreditation—not all decision making was in the Superintendent’s hand. The issue was 
membership on the board, which would be the main policy-deciding organization for the 
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Academy—the “institution’s governing body”—and delineating some of its subsequent 
responsibilities and reach, which did not yet extend to changing the curriculum or determining 
admission standards for incoming cadets—that was still the Superintendent’s purview.316  A 
debate between the Commandant and the Vice Dean on membership, and, according to Colonel 
McDermott, the Commandant’s disapproval was that the Dean dominated so much of the Board. 
As the Vice Dean discuss in a memorandum for record, “[Too many representatives from the 
Dean’s officer] would establish a precedent for a composition of the Board with a plurality of 
more than one of ‘career educators’ as opposed to ‘career line officers.’ [General Stillman] stated 
that this institution was first a service academy and second, an undergraduate college…. [The 
General] stated that he felt that the present plurality of one in favor of the ‘career educators’ is a 
danger point beyond which he would not care to go.”317 This discussion demonstrates the 
continuing tug between those emphasizing specifically military interests and those emphasizing 
broader academic preparation at the Academy. 
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Much of the lack of vision for the initial development of the professional military studies 
program at USAFA must be tied to the first Commandant of Cadets, Brigadier General Robert 
Stillman.  Even when there was increased emphasis on a broad education, there was still a cabal 
of individuals who believed that any move to provide too rigorous a curriculum would not help 
the development of warriors, and General Stillman led this group. In his remarks in the cadet’s 
first year’s catalogue, General Stillman offered his narrow view of the Academy’s mission. He 
emphasized military training – not a fuller education – and he focused on the making of aviators. 
The best example of this came in the institution’s first official catalogue for the Academy’s first 
academic year (1954-55). In this catalogue, section seven provided the prospective candidate the 
“program of instruction,” which first outlined the academic curriculum before offering an insight 
into the professional curriculum. The section on the professional curriculum included as its the 
main subtitle “Airmanship.”  The broad purpose of this program was “to train and condition the 
cadet for his destined role of leadership in the field of aviation.” The Commandant’s work 
included oversight of flying training, military training, physical training, and leadership training. 
The military training program, the catalogue specified, “starts promptly upon the new cadet’s 
arrival at the Academy and has as its objective the development of character and the provision of 
a broad military education”—this was focused on airpower and air tactics, as well as on 
acquainting cadets “with the equipment and techniques of all the Armed Force of the United 
States.”318 The significance is that the Academy had now formed and instituted its overall 
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program of study, and the role of more demanding and intellectually rich professional military 
studies was reduced to merely specialized training within the aviation realm—a very narrow 
viewpoint. 
 Early in the first academic year 1955-1956, the heavy workload of the academic program 
already was taking a toll on cadets.  After a meeting on the previous day, General Stillman 
composed a memorandum to the Dean on 16 September expressing empathy with the cadets in 
the matter of the academic workload, which, if not reduced, would crush the confidence of “our 
boys” early in the program. The Commandant’s evidence, besides some inquiries around the 
campus, included three football players who were “obviously dragging at football practice” 
because they had been staying up late and getting up early to study, as well as the fact that none 
of the cadets were attending football practices as spectators. This was a concern of the 
Commandant. The Commandant pleaded with the Dean to “err on the other side” rather than 
have too much of a workload, until they could find the right mix.319 Although he had a point with 
the crowded curriculum and a program that was possibly too demanding, General Stillman was 
not overly concerned with the infringement on the academic approach to military studies, but 
was instead insistent on military training—and he included football training in his vision of what 
was effective training. 
 But General Stillman could go too far, and he was one reason why professional military 
education was hostage to a comparatively anti-intellectual posture.  This became clear in an 
incident that grew out of an effort to avoid a “terrazzo gap”—that is, to bridge the “terrazzo,” or 
terrace in the middle of the main core of buildings with the offices of the Commandant and Dean 
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on opposite sides.  The Commandant and the Dean were assigned space so they would live next 
door to each other in Academy housing. As he recalled later in life, General McDermott decided 
to car pool one day with then-General Stillman to drive up to Lowry AFB to go flying together.  
On the drive up, General Stillman remarked: “I want you to know that I’m doing this to give you 
a chance to understand: I have no intention of socializing with you. We’re not in the same 
profession. When you got a graduate degree, you gave up your right to be referred to as a 
professional military officer.”320 Stillman believed that all members of the faculty, especially the 
permanent professors, were not professional officers.  McDermott concluded that, if this was the 
first Commandant’s view of how to educate officers, “you can imagine how difficult it was to do 
anything about the terrazzo gap while he was Commandant of Cadets.”321 
 General Stillman was never shy about expressing his views.  After the relief of General 
Zimmerman, for example, the Academy established a board to determine the next Dean. General 
Stillman announced to the board: “We’re teaching cadets defense policy and international 
relations. They are reading books that I never read until I went to the Air War College. I never 
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read a book from the time I graduated until I went to the Air War College. [The faculty] 
shouldn’t muddle up [cadets’] minds with course like this.”322 
 This attitude extended throughout the new Academy, including the Athletic Department. 
When the Academy met with the North Central Association to accredit the institution, the 
director of athletics opened his presentation with a chart that quoted the Secretary of the Air 
Force: “The mission of the Air Force Academy is to beat Army and Navy in football.”323 
In contrast to Stillman’s interpretation, General Harmon had a broader vision of how to 
develop the professional military officer. He viewed the mission as three-fold: The first part was 
to instill in the cadets a desire for life-long service to the country, through Air Force duty. The 
second was “to provide them with an education, tailormade [sic] to meet what we conceive to be 
their requirements as officers of the Air Force.” And the third was “to develop character—that is 
to say, integrity, patriotism and leadership.”  Harmon believed that, if the Academy could meet 
these three objectives, then “the results for the Air Force will be a continuing, dependable supply 
of highly capable young officers—a group which can be relied upon to form the hard core of the 
Air Force in peace or in war.”324 
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 In his time as Dean of the Faculty, Brigadier General Robert F. McDermott also sought a 
balanced approach to keep humanities and social sciences in a good balance with STEM-related 
coursework.  Reflecting on his own service in an interview after he retired, McDermott said the 
achievement of this balance was his best accomplishment in the core curriculum, which set the 
precedent and tradition to this present day.  McDermott had wanted to emphasize the humanities, 
but he constantly battled those who believed the Academy needed to put much more emphasis on 
STEM coursework. As he put it, “Individual disciplines fight for their disciplines, the professors 
have tunnel vision…they don’t think of…preparing the [officer candidates]. They think in terms 
of their discipline, research, and education of their discipline. So, I was trying to put the focus 
the other way…Is there a common area that everybody should know something about.”325 
During 13-18 February 1956, another group of general officers convened for the 
Curriculum Review Board.  The Board’s final recommendation, responding to the pressures that 
cadets experienced in their first academic year, was to reduce the total number of hours for 
graduation to 140: social sciences and humanities, 65 hours; science and engineering, 63 hours; 
professional studies, 12 hours—only 2.6 semester hours was devoted to military studies subjects 
during the academic year. The Academy approved and implemented a new curriculum of 141 
semester hours, with the addition of one more semester hour for the sciences. Given the 
turbulence and change in the curriculum, the most significant recommendation was: “In the 
interest of stability during the formative years of the Air Force Academy, the Board recommends 
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that there be no further changes in curriculum…for a period of at least 3 years.”326  In addition, 
total program contact hours in the first year were reduced from 2,577 to 2,490. Flying training 
took a large hit, as it was reduced from 83 to 34 hours.327 
 The Academy’s academic year 1956-57 saw a major change to the curriculum, despite 
the Curriculum Review Board’s recommendation for a three-year stay in changing it, which 
again showed the second-class status of academically meaningful military studies. Prior to this 
year, the discussion of the Academy’s academic program had always been about a prescribed 
curriculum—similar to West Point and Annapolis—where every cadet took the same courses in 
the same manner. The Academy planners had created the curriculum based on the assumption 
that cadets would have had no previous college experience. However, 114 cadets of the 306 
members of the Class of 1959, and 103 cadets of the 300 members of the Class of 1960, had 
already had one or more semesters of college instruction—28 members of the Class of 1960 had 
at least two years of college. The leaders of the Academy recognized that many of the cadets 
were already familiar with some of the coursework, so the Academy began the Enrichment 
program.328 The Enrichment program allowed cadets to test out or validate certain program 
requirements and subsequently take elective classes.  
                                                 
326 Jay Miller, et.al., 134. See endnote 209n20, which states, “This recommendation for 
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 The initial emphasis of the program, however, was to accelerate the students in the 
mathematics and engineering courses. In the move for accreditation, Colonel Archie Higdon, 
who had been the head of the Mathematics Department during the initial year and had assumed 
duties as the head of the new Department of Mechanics and Materials during the 1956-57 
academic year, did a comparison of the courses at the Academy with what the American Society 
of Electrical Engineers called for.  He found a disparity—the Academy’s program was not 
demanding enough in engineering sciences.329 So an initial push was to use the Enrichment 
program to assist the move to give more attention to courses in engineering. 
 Then the new Dean, General Robert McDermott did not want the entire focus of the 
Enrichment program on only mathematics and engineering. A strong proponent of the balanced 
curriculum, General McDermott did not want all attention on one or two areas. Instead, he 
believed that additional course work in the social sciences and humanities “might have more 
cultural than vocational value to the cadets.” He even opened the accelerated program to the 
Commandant, whose Director of Military Training, and later Division of Military Studies chief, 
Colonel H.L. Hogan, III, did not believe this program was amenable for courses in the 
Department of Military Training.  Colonel Hogan observed that “all of [the military training] 
courses were new to the cadets.” He did, however, recognize that some professional military 
studies courses were in the Dean’s purview, and he recommended that the Humanities Division, 
specifically Military History, offer advanced courses on “great military leaders, campaigns, 
weapon development, etc.”330 Although the Department of Military Training did not do itself any 
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favors, the emphasis of the Enrichment program was already on the general academic course 
work.  There were various changes in the following years including name changes.  Overall, 
however, the decision prevailed not to drastically change the curriculum for the next four years.  
The Academy’s attention to accreditation reaped dividends in 1959. As desired, the 
Academy received accreditation on 24 April 1959, just before the first class graduated. In the 
North Central Association’s report, the examiners endorsed the institution’s approach for a 
“broad general education” as well as the institution’s balance between the sciences and liberal 
arts. They believed that the course work, including the academically meaningful military studies 
program, met the “goals of the institution.” Recognizing the requirement for military education, 
the examiners noted that the institution provides “for an understanding and commitment to the 
proper relationship of the military establishment to the civilian government which our 
democratic ideals require, for an understanding of present and potential weapon systems, and for 
a basic orientation to key problems and decisions of national defense.”331 
Just as the Academy received positive acknowledgment of its program, the military 
studies program went through a few turbulent years. After the departure of General Stillman in 
1958, the Dean pressed for a more rigorous academic approach in the military studies program 
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year. Military History was a senior-level course, so the course had not yet been offered. 
The Dean eliminated this department in 1958, and all responsibilities returned to the 
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by involving his faculty more heavily. The weight given to the general academic coursework led 
to a reorganization of the military studies program in 1960. For 1959-1960, the Airmanship 
Studies program took 29¼ hours of the total 176-hour curriculum. However, only 5¼ semester 
hours were tied to military studies. To facilitate the instruction of the course work, the 
Superintendent, Major General William S. Stone, agreed with McDermott to include most of the 
military studies program in a newly designed May term—the Dean used fifty faculty members to 
facilitate the courses’ instruction.332 Although the May term concentrated on military studies and 
leadership studies, the Dean did offer some other academic courses during this truncated term. 
However, the concentration of military studies in this one condensed period allowed for total 
focus on academic subjects during the academic year. Significant in this effort is that the faculty 
worked with the Department of Military Studies through weekly course preparation during the 
spring semester, and many believed that this enhanced cooperation between the Dean’s and 
Commandant’s personnel, which had always had a level of conflict.333  
                                                 
332 Stone was intimately familiar with the planning for the Academy. As then-Colonel 
Stone, he was in charged of the Field Extension at Bolling AFB. Some times this group 
of planners is referred to as the “Stone Group.” I used the term “Bolling Group” above. 
333 AFAHD, 1959-60, 302-305, 447-455; Ringenbach, 169; 333 AFAHD, 1960-61, 90. 
Incoming freshman took a course their initial summer on “Growth and Development of 
the USAF,” for ¾ credit hours and during the May term, as they prepared to enter their 
sophomore year, the freshman cadets had “National Security and the Armed Forces”—a 
1½ credit hour course; sophomores preparing to be juniors took “Applied Aerospace 
Power and Armed Forces” in the May term; and juniors had, “Contemporary Military 
Thought”—1 credit hour. The military studies program had, beyond the 5¼ credit hours 
already mentioned, additional military studies credit for summer programs. This included 
Military Studies 210, “Field Study of the Armed Forces,” where the new sophomores 
toured the domestic combat commands, which provided 4 semester credit hours; Military 
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 However not everyone agreed that this effort was so beneficial. The Royal Air Force 
exchange officer within the Department of Military Studies recognized the relative lack of 
serious military studies course work. In his end of tour report, which encompassed his tour from 
August 1958 until May 1960, Wing Commander R.W.G. Freer commented on the second-tier 
role that military studies had assumed in the officer candidate’s program at the Academy. His 
perspective included the program’s status during 1958-59, and then the change to rid the 
academic year of any military studies program as the Academy now relegated that course work 
to the May term in 1960. For the first May term, the Commandant had reduced his department by 
over 30 percent, due to the assistance provided by the Dean’s personnel. As the Wing 
Commander reflected:  
My predecessor’s [Group Captain MacDougall] observation is true that the bulk of 
formal instruction in military or purely Air Force subjects is provided by the Department 
of Military Studies. It is this department which…characterizes this institution as a 
military and not a civilian university. However, since the baccalaureate degree is tied 
firmly to civilian accreditation requirements, the academic programme does not generally 
permit the employment of military subjects as vehicles for education. Thus the subject of 
“military studies” is physically divorced from the faculty and the associated study fields 
of History and Political Science. Moreover, where once ‘military studies’ were taught 
throughout the Academic Year with the same status as purely academic subjects, they are 
now compressed into a special four week May Term…. I personally believe it to be an 
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inferior way of educating a cadet in his chosen professional field. The principal problem 
would seem to be a lack of Military Studies contact between one May programme and 
another and there may be evidence for this in the growth of the cadet’s Professional 
Studies Group and the basic Air Force instruction which Upperclassmen are endeavoring 
to give the plebes in “4th Class Schooling.”334 
The view from an outside observer succinctly and astutely captured the dilemma of 
military studies. Freer justifiably relates the lack of attention to military studies to the cadets’ 
creation of the Professional Studies Group (PSG), which was “designed to acquaint cadets with 
the latest activities and developments in the Air Force and the field of aerospace power and to 
provide literature and trips motivational to an officer career.” Within the year, the PSG began 
publication of its “Aerospace Newsletter,” and the group included over 500 members.335 RAF 
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Wing Commander Freer recognized the second-tier status, even the poor implementation, of the 
military studies program within the Air Force Academy curriculum. 
 The May term program continued with the 1960-61 academic year, as the success 
claimed of the first May term caused the institution to repeat the effort. The Director of Military 
Studies, Lieutenant Colonel M.L. Boswell, concluded that the May 1961 term had been the most 
effective instruction in military studies provided to the cadets since his involvement in the 
program beginning in 1958.  However, he did lament that limiting military studies education to a 
one-month period “leaves a tremendous void throughout the academic year.” Even so, the 
director noted that the execution of the one-month program was a better alternative to the future 
plan, which moved more of the program to the Dean and began some of the military studies 
instruction on Saturdays, during AOC time.336 Military studies again took a back seat to the other 
demands of the institution, primarily those within the general academic program.  
The inclusion of more military studies courses under the Dean’s authority through a 
transfer from the Commandant came about because of the success of the May initiative and 
because of a study ordered by the Superintendent. Facilitating this move to put classroom 
military studies courses under the Dean’s purview, the Superintendent, Major General William 
Stone, presented a major reorganization to the Academy through his “Progress Report: United 
States Air Force Academy, January-July 1961.” In an attempt to integrate academic and military 
training responsibilities, and to prevent unnecessary overlap, the Superintendent assigned 
“responsibility for all academic instruction, including classroom instruction in military subjects” 
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to the Dean. He developed a Division of Military Affairs within the Dean’s organization that 
would effectively assimilate the 26½ program hours of “military-oriented” courses, to include 
military and diplomatic history, psychology and management, economics of national security, 
international relations and defense policy, and weapon systems and their employment. The Dean 
had to incorporate these courses into the academic year—nullifying the need for the separate 
May period. Stone believed that this reorganization and division of responsibilities would allow 
for the “clear cut division between [professional military studies] and Military Training” which 
“will make for a better integration of the traditional academic subjects and those which include a 
military orientation.” He also notes that this change would keep the academic “balanced 
program”—that ensured an even division between the humanities and social sciences on one 
hand with the science and engineering on the other.337 The leaders recognized deficiencies within 
the military studies course work, and continued an ad hoc restructuring within the institution to 
create an effective military studies program. 
 Wing Commander Freer’s replacement, Wing Commander J.A.G. Slessor, suggested that 
the change in the 1961-1962 academic year military studies program led “to the demise of the 
never popular May Term.” At the same time, putting the program back under the Commandant’s 
authority led to an organizational change that created the Military Training Division. He 
remarked: “I do feel very strongly that the Academy missed a great opportunity during the 
Summer of 1961 when, with the demise of the May Term already mentioned, they did not 
combine the integration of the military training programme into the academic year, with an 
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increase in the establishment of this department. Had this been done it would in one move have 
recognized the status that the department deserves and would have enhanced the standard of 
professional education that the cadet receives.”338 The Academy struggled to provide a 
consistent approach for its military studies program. But the move from the academic year to the 
May terms and back demonstrates that its significance was not on as high a level as was the 
general academic program. 
 The change to the Academy’s military studies program that Wing Commander Slessor 
alluded to above occurred in 1962, although this one had lasting effects. Continuing to be 
introspective, the Superintendent appointed a Military Training Review Panel to offer a 
“penetrating analysis of all phases of military training and to evaluate major changes in the 
military program during the past year.” One of the observations was: “The transfer of officers 
from the faculty to positions under the Commandant of Cadets has made a valuable contribution 
to a more effective integration of the military and academic training programs.” The instructors 
from the Faculty were not teaching academic subjects within the Commandant’s curriculum; 
instead, the transfer of faculty members to the Commandant was to provide a second Air Officer 
Commanding in each of the cadet squadrons. This initiative was how the institution was 
attempting to correct the “Terrazzo Gap.” In general, however, the sense of improvement was 
widespread. As the evaluators noted: “The entire curriculum of the military training courses was 
enthusiastically endorsed…courses are well organized…placement of the courses in the 
curriculum is both logically and educationally sound…panel is particularly impressed with the 
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constant updating effort by the staff in the military training area.” The military studies program 
under the Commandant was now reduced to 4 semester credit hours of classroom instruction. 
Also, the organization reverted back to the “Military Training Division,” which comprised the 
instructors for the military studies coursework.339 The Academy had come full circle in a few 
years, landing back into the comfortable realm of training, and having little emphasis on military 
studies. 
 To support this effort, General McDermott recommended in May 1962 that the Faculty 
Council eliminate the year-old Military Affairs Division, which housed the Department of 
Military Studies, under the Dean of Faculty. The Military Studies Department was only three 
faculty strong, with the responsibility of instructing one course during the 1961-62 year, which 
was Military Studies 432, “Weapon and Space System Technology”—a 2½ semester hour course 
provided to 269 seniors in the spring semester.340 The Faculty Council, Academy Board, and 
Superintendent all agreed to this new arrangement.341 One casualty of this move was the 
interdisciplinary major in Military Affairs.  Another was the 4½ semester hours of Military 
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Studies that had been proposed under the new division but really never came into effect. The 
Dean had dropped all responsibility for teaching military studies by returning all elements back 
to the Commandant.  General McDermott’s support to end the May term and to eliminate 
Military Affairs from the academic program concluded a few years of solid cooperation between 
the Dean and Commandant.342 This also led to stagnation and to the relative insignificance of the 
military studies program.  
 The effect of ending the May program without any substantial vision resulted in the 
continued marginalization of military studies within the academic program. Starting in 1962-
1963, the Academy implemented the new curriculum, with military studies course work, under 
the designation as “Military Training,” administered once again by the Commandant of Cadets. 
The total Program of Instruction for a cadet was now 186½ semester hours. This included 143½ 
semester hours per cadet for academics, 14½ in athletics, and 28½ hours in the “Airmanship 
Program”—which contained the military studies program and a 2½ airmanship. However, the 
program only included 5 hours of what one can consider military studies, instead of military 
training.343 The 5-hour curriculum was spread over the cadet’s four years. This course work 
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required little work outside of the classroom. The leaders of the Academy kept this basic military 
studies structure in place for the next decade and a half with little change to the overall program. 
Between the first significant curriculum change in the realm of military studies in 1955 and 
significant change that was to occur toward the end of the 1970s, at least 21 changes in the 
military studies curriculum were made. The military studies program never received the attention 
and priority necessary to ensure that it would provide a solid military education for the cadet. 
Instead, the focus was on an intense academic program and the requirement to offer specialized 
military training. 
 The general academic program was central to Air Force leaders and Academy planners 
from the beginning. Even after the institution gained accreditation, the emphasis remained on the 
Academy’s general academic program with the military studies program almost an afterthought. 
The Dean encouraged departments to develop academic majors in the summer and fall of 1963, 
pushing for individual disciplines to get those majors accredited—chemistry did such a thing 
through the American Chemical Society. Colonel John Ault, Professor of Mathematics, 
suggested a math major in September, and Colonel Ruenheck, the head of the Department of 
History, proposed a history major in October.344 The move to the enrichment program in the late 
1950s opened the path to the development and planning for academic majors. General 
McDermott also was leading the effort to make it a reality. In January 1966, the Academy 
announced that an academic major for every cadet was a mandatory requirement, and the Dean 
pressed his faculty to create new majors that inspired the cadets. One of the first approved was 
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the Military Arts and Science major, “for cadets desiring to focus on their chosen profession,” 
yet only a few cadets chose this path. This coursework did not reach all cadets, The Dean created 
the “General Studies” major, recognizing that some cadets could have trouble completing a 
major before graduation and commissioning.345 The core program for all cadets within the 
military studies sphere suffered because of the attention always given to the general academic 
curriculum. 
 The attention given to the general academic program and the inclusion of flying training 
meant that other areas suffered, notably the military education responsibilities of the 
Commandant. The Academy, however, was still experiencing excitement in the 1960s that this 
whole venture was really working, at least well enough. So now the Academy leaders believed 
the institution required a period of less innovation and change, even as the conflict in Vietnam 
expanded.346 Also, in January 1965, the Academy experienced a monumental cheating scandal—
on a par with the West Point scandal of 1951. The Secretary of the Air Force appointed a 
committee to investigate the incident with retired General Thomas D. White as the chair. 
Findings of the White Committee in response to the scandal included concerns over “strong peer 
groupings, poorly trained AOCs [Air Officer Commanding], and inadequate military 
training.”347  
 The cheating scandal and the White Report could have been an excellent opportunity to 
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expand and improve the military studies program. The incident of 1965 and the subsequent 
report did lead to some minor changes, including a small role for AOCs to teach some academic 
coursework within the Dean’s realm, and Dean of Faculty instructors acting as assistant AOCs 
and participating in cadet wing inspections.  These measures were intended to break up the 
“good guy/bad guy (academic instructor/AOC) dichotomy that had developed over the years.”348 
However, the larger result after the scandal was merely a continued effort to maintain stability 
and status quo rather than to pursue the kind of innovation and adaptation often shown in the 
formative years—specifically within the general academic realm.  This was so even though the 
report of a Congressional subcommittee “voiced concern about the curriculum only in a 
suggestion that ‘the professional and military training aspect of the curriculum may not receive 
its proper share of attention.’”349 Even though officers such as General McDermott had 
recognized the need for a more rigorous and expanded military studies program, it was the 
general academic curriculum that received the attention.  
 The role given to the military studies program by this time is best reflected in an article 
written in 1968. That year’s final edition of the Air University Review focused on the Academy. 
The new Commandant, Brigadier General Robin Olds, contributed only a small article on 
military training and education at the Academy, offering only a single paragraph on military 
studies.  He stated: “During the academic year, both faculty and cadets teach a variety of military 
subjects designed to familiarize cadets with the armed forces of the United States and its allies 
and the forces of the Communist powers. Classes are also conducted on the combat operations 
and tactics used by the United States Air Force…. Through the use of officer-conducted 
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seminars and guest speakers, cadets are kept abreast of current military and political affairs.”350 
The coursework to which he referred, and as discussed above, did not match the rigor and 
amount included in the general academic curriculum. The Academy would have to experience 
additional incidents and pressures to review the military studies program and to push for a more 
solid contribution. This would occur in the ensuing decade. 
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Concepts of the United States Air Force Academy” (pp. 1-10); the Dean of Faculty, Brigadier 
General Robert F. McDermott, USAF (ret) provided another ten-page article on “The USAF 
Academy Academic Program” (pp.11-20); Colonel Jesse C. Gatlin, Jr., the head of the 
Department of English, offered, “The Role of Humanities in Educating the Professional Officer,” 
demonstrating the continued need to educate the service on why humanities was almost as 
influential in the course work at the Academy (pp. 21-25); and Colonel Richard F. Rosser 
contributed, “The Air Force Academy and the Development of Area Experts” (pp. 26-32). 
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Chapter 5 - The Rise of Professional Military Studies 
 After the cheating scandal in 1965, the White Report had called for a period of stability in 
the Academy’s curriculum.  This came to an end, marked by reviews associated with two 
landmark events.  The Academy’s 20th and 25th anniversaries inspired the officers serving as 
Superintendent at each of those times to examine how the Academy was doing, especially in 
light of the extensive transformations that occurred in the military branches after the Vietnam 
War. The reviews that the Academy personnel conducted for these anniversaries ultimately led to 
more attention being given to the professional military studies program, which remained under 
the direction of the Commandant of Cadets.  The Military Training Division, the organization 
responsible for classroom instruction in military studies under the authority of the Commandant, 
was certainly one of the areas that experienced little stability and continuity. In response to the 
inquiries conducted in the 1970s, major modifications of the military studies program were 
instituted.  One key provision was the appointment of a Permanent Professor for the military 
studies program, under the general authority of the Commandant, and, as the decade of the 1980s 
began, the Permanent Professor worked to improve organization and to demand rigor and 
continuity within the program.  Like counterparts in other disciplines such as History or 
Chemistry, the Permanent Professor would enjoy a special status substantially protected from 
short-term changes of mind among higher-ranking leaders. 
 The country’s involvement in the Vietnam War was the most significant event in the 
world at large affecting the Academy since its founding. Especially since it was the first conflict 
involving graduates of the Air Force Academy, the war provided an early rationale for self-
evaluation of the institution’s military training and academic curriculum—specifically, those 
courses and initiatives that support a cadet’s overall professional military education. Because of 
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the nature of the conflict, academic departments began to include, while the war was being 
fought, various courses that provided previously disregarded material to a cadet’s military 
education. For example, the History Department developed an elective course on “Theory and 
Employment of Unconventional Warfare” that it first offered in the spring term of 1964.351 Other 
departments followed suit. However, these necessary changes and the course work that emerged 
did not reach all cadets. 
 While History offered certain new courses, a whole new department was also established 
in that period – the Philosophy and Fine Arts Department – which added “a whole new 
dimension” to professional military studies at the Academy. Created in 1967, the department was 
fortunate to have a forward-looking thinker at its helm. The Dean, Brigadier General Robert 
McDermott, had selected then-Captain Malham Wakin as the fifteenth Permanent Professor at 
the Academy in 1964. Since Wakin was one of only a few officers in the Air Force with a 
doctorate in philosophy, the Dean chose him to oversee the newly-created department from its 
beginning.352 By 1970, Wakin, now a Colonel, saw a need for change.  For example, almost half 
                                                 
351 Brigadier General Jesse C. Gatlin, Jr., et. al., eds. The United States Air Force 
Academy’s First Twenty-Five Years: Some Perceptions (U.S. Air Force Academy, 
Colorado, 1979), 154; AFAHD, 1 July 1963-30 June 1964, 136. The course “was a study 
in depth of insurgent warfare. The social, economic, philosophical and political 
backgrounds of each country were studied to place the insurgent problem in proper 
perspective. The course traced briefly the evolutionary development and employment of 
theories of revolutionary warfare.” This “enrichment” course—beyond the core or major 
requirement, had 39 cadets enrolled in the spring 1964 —25 enrolled in fall 1964 and 53 
in spring 1965. 
352 The Department of Philosophy and Fine Arts was established on 1 July 1967. Wakin, 
who graduated from the University of Notre Dame with a degree in mathematics in 1952, 
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of the senior class was enrolled in the department’s ethics course, which was a core elective 
course that competed with a modern English literature course. (Cadets had to take one or the 
other.) The core philosophy course focused on the great thinkers in the Western tradition. 
However, the issues brought up by the contentious conflict in Vietnam motivated cadets to take 
the course in philosophy, which was widely considered more challenging than the English 
course.353 By the mid-1970s, Wakin had modified the optional core philosophy course so that it 
became a professional ethics course. Although he did not ignore the great thinkers, Wakin later 
recalled, he “added a very hefty set of reading on the role of ethics in the military profession and 
the concept of professionalism in the military profession and then all of the sticky questions 
                                                                                                                                                             
earned a Master’s degree the next year at the State University of New York at Albany. He 
accepted an opportunity later, while in the Air Force, to receive a Ph.D. in philosophy 
from Stanford in 1959. As the only person in the Air Force with such credentials, the 
Dean got Wakin a step promotion from Captain to Lieutenant Colonel in September 1964 
to become the fifteenth Permanent Professor—a Title 10 U.S.C. position. He received a 
similar step promotion to Colonel in 1967 to become the department head. See Paul T. 
Ringenbach, Battling Tradition: Robert F. McDermott and Shaping the U.S. Air Force 
Academy (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 2006), 221, 253; “Interview with Brigadier 
General Malham M. Wakin, USAF, Ret. by Colonel James C. Gaston, USAF, Ret., May 
20, 2003” in United States Air Force Academy, 1954-2004: 50th Anniversary Oral 
History (Colorado Springs, CO: The Friends of the Air Force Academy Library, 2005), 
304. 
353 USAFA Special Collections, “Interview of Brigadier General (Retired) Malham M. 
Wakin by Lieutenant Colonel Vance Skarstedt, Department of History, April 20, 2000,” 
9, 11. Wakin notes that the literature course was “fun”—reading novels, such as Catch-
22, whereas the Philosophy 440 Ethics course was seen as more challenging, with major 
papers and a rigorous reading list.  
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having to do with morality in warfare.”354 In the fall of 1977 the elective core course made its 
transition complete. The course, Philosophy 310, focused on professional ethics and became a 
new course in the core curriculum required of all juniors. As an academic course that greatly 
contributed to the officer candidate’s professional military education, the course was “designed 
to foster an intensive inquiry into human values and their relevance to the military profession. 
This is accomplished by looking critically at some major ethical themes including: views of 
man’s nature, conceptions of moral responsibility, human rights, the concepts of duty and 
obligation, notions of the general good, moral complexities of the military profession, and the 
relationship of war and morality.”355 Within the year, Colonel Wakin developed a compilation of 
readings to use as a text, until he published it the following year. This text, War, Morality, and 
                                                 
354 USAFA Special Collections, “Interview of Brigadier General (Retired) Malham M. 
Wakin by Lieutenant Colonel Vance Skarstedt, Department of History, April 20, 2000,” 
12. This course in “applied ethics” mirrored a development occurring throughout the 
United States, as various disciplines recognized the need to investigate ethical behavior—
such as in medicine, business, law, and, of course, war and peace. Wakin suggests that 
the Vietnam War set the stage for this academic change—and acceptance in the 
curriculum by the permanent professors and department heads of other departments—
including engineering. As Vietnam passed into memory, the continued Cold War 
confrontation and nuclear arms race bolstered the course—see, 12. The Philosophy 440 
core course made the transition beginning with the 1971-1972 academic year. Prior to 
this, the course was a pure Western canon ethics course. However, during this academic 
year it included, “the problem of alienation, morality and war, relativism, egoism and 
altruism, authority and dissent, freedom and responsibility.” See USAFA Special 
Collections, USAFA Curriculum Handbook, 1971-72, 99, and compare with USAFA 
Special Collections, USAFA Academic Program Handbook, 105. 
355 AFAHD, 1 January 1977 – 31 December 1977, Appendix, Vol. II, Documents DF 9 – 
47, Number DF-18, “Dept of Philosophy and Fine Arts,” 3. 
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the Military Profession, became the standard not only at the Air Force Academy but also at other 
institutions of higher learning.356 This course remains a pivotal part of the cadet’s professional 
military studies, although it was housed within an academic department other than the military 
studies branch in the Commandant’s realm. 
 Although the academic departments introduced new courses and incorporated course 
changes that would affect a cadet’s study of military professionalism, the military training 
department under the Commandant did not meaningfully change its academic coursework until 
certain events transpired in the mid-1970s. 
 
20th Anniversary Study 
 In July 1975, just a few months after the fall of Saigon in Vietnam, Colonel Philip Erdle 
submitted the 20th anniversary report on the Academy to the Superintendent, Lieutenant General 
James Allen.  Colonel Erdle was the Vice Dean of the Faculty, and he had been entrusted to 
serve as chairman of the special study group charged with assessing the Academy and its 
programs.  Formally named the “20th Anniversary Study: Curriculum and Cadet Way of Life, 
Final Report, 11 July 1975,” this work was the culmination of thousands of hours of committee 
work, tasked in the autumn of 1973 by the direction of the previous Superintendent, Lieutenant 
General A.P. Clark.357 General Clark had recognized the need for reflection and accountability as 
                                                 
356 Malham M. Wakin, ed., War, Morality, and the Military Profession (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), ix-x. The second edition is the most common, with 
additional chapters, published in 1986. 
357 20th Anniversary Study: Curriculum and Cadet Way of Life, Final Report, 11 July 
1975, USAFA Special Collections Branch, i-ii. A. P. Clark was the sixth Superintendent 
of the Academy, 1 August 1970 – 31 July 1974. He retired in 1974 as a lieutenant 
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the Academy reached the milestone of 20 years since the signing of the act that had established 
it. He had charged Colonel Erdle with the “terribly important responsibility” of setting the course 
of the Academy for years to come, and emphasized that the committee’s “singular and clear aim 
must be the establishment of wise recommendations which lead away from parochialism toward 
a program of professional excellence.”358 Colonel Erdle’s memorandum accompanying the 
report to the new Superintendent notes: “There was a general agreement by those subcommittee 
personnel reviewing cadet programs that the existing curriculum and the general training 
syllabus of this institution were very fine by every educational measure…several subcommittees’ 
efforts were addressed toward the goal of simply ‘fine tuning’ an already well recognized and 
successful educational program.”359 The 20th Anniversary Study saw no need to overhaul a 
program and structure that already had revealed some shortcomings, and it certainly did not 
change the vector so as to foster a more robust, rigorous professional military studies program. 
Parochialism seemingly would win out. 
 Organized in thirteen chapters—to a total of just over 130 pages—the report opens with a 
comprehensive chapter of recommendations followed by more detailed rationale for the 
recommendations from the twelve topically focused committees in the remaining chapters. The 
longest chapter was from the Cadet Scheduling and Program Interface Committee (22 pages), 
                                                                                                                                                             
general, but continued a strong relationship with the Academy. He was a World War II 
POW, and part of the infamous Stalag Luft III escape attempt, memorialized in the book, 
and later movie, The Great Escape. The character Flight Lieutenant Robert Hendley (an 
American RAF pilot), played by actor James Garner, was an amalgam of POWs, one of 
whom was General Clark. 
358 20th Anniversary Study, i. This memorandum, “20th Anniversary Study,” from the 
Superintendent to DFV (Col Erdle), is dated 5 Oct 1973. 
359 20th Anniversary Study, ii. 
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followed closely by the 21-page input from the Scheduling Committee’s (which expanded the 
investigation of scheduling issues beyond merely the cadet schedule to include all personnel and 
mission elements on the Academy]), while the Physical Education Subcommittee and Committee 
on Intercollegiate Athletics (this entire entity was one single committee) provided only a one-
page summation stating that its five officers had participated in other committees and therefore 
had had “significant input” in the report.  This committee did not offer any specific 
recommendations.360 The report included 88 recommendations.361 
An event as pivotal as the United States’ military involvement in Vietnam arguably might 
have warranted a significant review, resulting in changes reflecting the characteristics of the 
current war. However, the rapid pace at which the Academy initially developed led many to 
believe that what they had accomplished in the first two decades was already rather special, and 
the time now dictated that the institution stay its course, perhaps even “resting on its laurels”—
that it be a place, as one historian has put it, where “the emphasis was on stability rather than 
innovation.”362 The Academy also had done well in its second round of accreditation in 1969 and 
                                                 
360 20th Anniversary Study, XIII-1. The page number signifies the thirteenth chapter, the 
final of the twelve-committee inputs—the first chapter is the group’s recommendations to 
the Superintendent. 
361 20th Anniversary Study, I-1 – I-12. The report lists the twelve committees with their 
proposed recommendations in this chapter. 
362 John P. Lovell, Neither Athens nor Sparta? The American Service Academies in 
Transition (Bloomington and London: Indiana Press University, 1978), 90. Lovell states 
that, during the period after the mid-1960s, “There continued to be incremental program 
developments, of course. But the organizational milieu had been decidedly altered,” best 
demonstrated with the retirement of the Dean, General McDermott, after 12 years. 
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its leaders therefore believed its entire program had been justified a success.363 Although there 
were some minor changes due to the military and societal disorder caused by the Vietnam 
conflict, the Academy did not undergo considerable transformation until later in the 1970s—to 
include the professional military education of the cadets. It is noteworthy that the 20th 
anniversary study of the institution only used the term “military training” for the same kinds of 
subjects that a later study—the 25th Anniversary Study—called “professional military studies” at 
least part of the time.364 Overall, however, the professional military studies program would 
remain largely unchanged until more time and reflection had occurred. 
With respect to academic subjects, the report reinforced the thinking of the founders 
regarding the balance of the curriculum between the science and engineering courses, on the one 
hand, and social sciences and humanities course work, on the other. Supporting what General 
McDermott believed contributed to the success of the Academy, the study’s Curriculum Review 
Committee recommended that the overall academic program should require a minimum of 138 
semester hours (supervised by the Dean—this did not include military training, aviation, and 
                                                 
363 USAFA Special Collections, “United States Air Force Academy Institutional Report 
for the Review Examination by the North Central Association of Colleges and Secondary 
Schools, 1968-1969,” 1-4. The report, accomplished by all major elements and 
departments of the Academy, is 355 pages—most of it glowing. The Deputy 
Commandant for Military Instruction highlights as strengths its faculty and curriculum. 
The only areas of concern are airmanship training and the budget for off-Academy 
grounds summer training. See ibid., 105-106. 
364 Philip D. Caine, “A U.S. Air Force Academy Dilemma: Professional Military 
Studies,” in Elliot V. Converse, III, ed., Forging the Sword: Selecting, Educating, and 
Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern World (Chicago: Imprint 
Publications, 1998), 225. The reference here is that the chapter discussing the 
Commandant’s purview, was the “Professional Military Training Review Committee.”  
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physical education hours, which added another 41 semester hours), 102 of which would 
comprise the core curriculum, “evenly divided between social science/humanities and 
engineering/basic sciences.”365 This included the action of the Dean to add three additional 
“technical” core courses (a third physics course, a materials course, and a engineering design 
course) in compliance with a Superintendent’s directive.366 This seemingly went against Clark’s 
aspiration to “lead away from parochialism,” because the established tradition of keeping a 
balanced curriculum now became even more binding—each department understandably fought 
                                                 
365 20th Anniversary Study, I-1. This was the fourth recommendation of this committee—
arguably the most influential and important of the twelve committees. The 138 minimum 
hours would be for a general B.S degree. A disciplinary degree might take 144 hours. The 
other recommendations were to keep 14 semester hours for physical education and a 
maximum of 27 hours for military training and studies, which will be discussed below. 
General McDermott was Dean from 1956 to 1968. 
366 AFAHD, 1 July 1975 – 31 December 1975, 44, 46-48. In this official annual history, 
as well as the letter from the Dean that informed this history (see AFAHD, 1 July 1975 – 
31 December 1975, Appendix, Vol. II, Documents DF 17 – DF 64, CW 1 – CW 65, 
Number DF-44, “Ltr, DF to CS, subj: Notes from Dean’s Remarks at Supt’s Staff 
Meeting, 28 Oct 75, 29 Oct 75”), it refers to the 20th Anniversary Study as what caused 
this change to add more technical course to the core; however, there is nothing in the 20th 
anniversary report that states this change. Instead, the Superintendent, Lt. Gen. James 
Allen, under pressure from the Air Staff, proposed “a very modest expansion of the core 
curriculum, primarily in the scientific/engineering subjects” to expose cadets to those 
disciplines with the plan that it would entice more majors in technical subjects. See ibid., 
Number DF-40, “Ltr, SUPT to DF, subj: Graduation of Cadets with 
Scientific/Engineering Degrees, 29 Sep 75.” The Dean complied. However, to keep the 
balance, he added a management course (Social Sciences) and another (the fourth) 
English course (as well as additional Physical Education Courses), reducing the overall 
major’s requirement from 17 to 11. 
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to keep its own influence in the curriculum. This enforced the conservative approach to changes 
in the curriculum that continued to affect the military studies program, as there was little room to 
expand the curriculum. This recommendation by the Curriculum Review Committee did not 
really explore the best ways of transforming the officer candidate into a strong military 
professional.367 Instead, the traditional notion remained – namely, that a broad education, 
encompassing a range of disciplines, was effective by itself to prepare the officer candidates, 
much as the Air Force Academy Planning Board had concluded in 1949.  
The report did address some issues concerning the program of professional military 
studies. One of the major committees tasked with reviewing the Academy program was the 
Professional Military Training Review Committee. It provided the third chapter to the report. 
The committee included the Deputy Commandants for Military Instruction and the Cadet Wing, 
members of the Military Training Division, the Director of Athletics, and members of the 
Department of Law, Department of Life and Behavioral Science and the Department of History.  
                                                 
367 This significant recommendation actually concerned itself with scientific and 
engineering studies more than military studies. As the members agreed, “The total 
academic load should approximate that of the better engineering programs, particularly in 
view of the need for Air Force officers to understand technical issues.” See 20th 
Anniversary Study, II-4. The Superintendent’s push to include more technical core 
supports this view of the greater Air Force on what was most important. He assured a 
member of Congress, “The Air Force is a technically oriented service, and increasing 
emphasis is being placed on graduating more cadets in the basic and engineering 
sciences.” See, AFAHD, 1 July 1975 – 31 December 1975, Appendix, Vol. II, Documents 
DF 17 – DF 64, CW 1 – CW 65, Number DF-39, “Ltr, SUPT to The Honorable Jim 
Lloyd, House of Representatives, Wash., D.C., 26 Sep 75.” 
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It met twenty-three times in the year—its last meeting was on 8 January 1975.368 The committee 
offered thirteen recommendations. The committee’s members understood that it needed to cast a 
wide net, since, as the report later stated, the “cadet’s professional military experience is 
achieved through: (1) Academic studies, (2) Leadership and military instruction, (3) Physical 
education and athletics, and (4) The entire cadet environment.”  This included interaction with 
the military faculty and staff as well as just the day-to-day requirement of being in a military 
environment. The committee reviewed the Air Force’s recommended pre-commissioning core 
curriculum (for all commissioning sources—the Academy, ROTC, and Officer Training School), 
the Academy’s core curriculum, and the Academy’s military environment.369 The committee did 
recognize that it needed to address military studies in some way.  
Among the committee’s thirteen recommendations only three directly referred to 
“Academic studies,” which concerned the military studies program. The committee continued to 
support the two semesters of military studies for freshmen — each semester consisted of only ten 
double-period blocks (so ten hour and a half classes each semester). This provided cadets with 
“the fundamentals” of Air Force military studies—Air Force structure and the service’s role in 
overall national security.370 The senior-level “Officer Transition” course, Military Studies 420, 
                                                 
368 The Commandant had a Vice Commandant, a colonel who supported his boss, and 
two Deputy Commandants—one each for overseeing the Cadet Wing responsibilities and 
Military Instruction, which included the Military Training Division (where the military 
studies program and summer programs were housed) and an Aviation Division (flying 
and jump programs). 
369 20th Anniversary Study, I-2 - I-3, III-1. 
370 20th Anniversary Study, I-3, XI-5; AFAHD, 1 July 1973 – 30 June 1974, Appendix, 
Vol. III, Documents DF 39 – DF 64, CW 1 – CW 39B, Number CW-28, “Annual USAFA 
History, CW to HO, 18 Jul 74,”  “Military Training Division (CWIT),” 1, provides a 
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was proposed for expansion from eight lessons to twenty, which would include “no outside 
preparation.”371 Finally, the committee proposed that the sophomore-level two-semester military 
studies communications curriculum be redesigned, since the core English course assumed some 
of the responsibility for the objectives that overlapped in the course—reducing military studies 
for sophomores to one semester.372 The committee that was specifically designed to tackle and 
improve military studies and training at the Academy did not seem too concerned with the 
Military Training Division that managed the program nor with the rigor or attention that this 
program received. 
The committee called on the Dean to give more attention to the military education 
program. This again showed the committee’s recognition that some elements of the military 
studies curriculum were housed in other departments’ academic course work. One very clear 
                                                                                                                                                             
good example of the course topics that the committee agreed should remain. Just because 
each lesson had two 50-minute periods devoted to it, does not mean that the instructors 
efficiently used the allotted time. As discussed below, evidence from 1979 shows that the 
second-half of each lesson was for showing films about the Air Force, which were 
optional for the freshmen. 
371 20th Anniversary Study, I-3; AFAHD, 1 July 1973 – 30 June 1974, Appendix, Vol. 
III, Documents DF 39 – DF 64, CW 1 – CW 39B, Number CW-28, “Annual USAFA 
History, CW to HO, 18 Jul 74,” “Military Training Division (CWIT),” 2-3. This was 
really not a rigorous military studies course. As a ten-lesson (single period) course, it had 
five classroom sessions and three panel discussions, with one lesson for introduction and 
one for concluding session, with no exam.  
372 20th Anniversary Study, I-2. This would be accomplished by the fall of 1977. See, 
AFAHD, 1 January 1977 – 31 December 1977, Appendix, Vol. III, Documents, CW 1-57, 
AH 1-19, CSU 1-12, AC 1-7, Number CW-56, “CW Annual History, 1 Jan-31 Dec 77, 25 
Jan 78” “Military Training Division (CWIT),” 2-3. Note: The 1977-1978 school year 
curriculum handbook does not accurately reflect this change. 
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recommendation stated: “Cadets should receive more formal instruction on Contemporary 
Military Ethics.”373 Although this certainly assisted the change in the core philosophy course as 
discussed above, this also led to adjustments in the Law Department’s core curriculum. The 
senior-level core course was “Law for the Commanders.” Given the struggles in the Vietnam 
War, the committee advised that, since the curriculum did not yet offer instruction on the laws of 
war, “an additional ½ semester hour [should] be added to the Law Core Curriculum to provide 
instruction in the laws of war and additional instruction concerning the legality of orders.”374 The 
Academy instituted this change with the 1976 fall course.375 Again, the professional military 
studies course work was not confined to the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction’s 
curriculum. 
However, besides the Professional Military Training Review Committee, other 
committees offered recommendations that affected the overall military studies program within 
the Commandant’s sphere. Most significant was the continued competition to get the reasonable 
portion of cadet time. The Curriculum Review Committee (CRC), for example, stressed: “The 
formal military training and military studies curriculum should not exceed 27 semester hours and 
should extend through the four-year curriculum. Some aircrew duties should be a graduation 
                                                 
373 20th Anniversary Study, I-3. 
374 20th Anniversary Study, I-3, III-4. Most certainly influenced by the catastrophe at My 
Lai (Son My), 1969. 
375 AFAHD, 1 January 1976 – 31 December 1976, Appendix, Vol. III, Documents DF 
10-60, Number DF-14, “Dept of Law,” 2. Compare with the previous course description, 
AFAHD, I July 1975 – 31 December 1975, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1 – SUPT 
30, RR 1 – RR 48, DF 1 – DF 16, Number DF-13, “Dept of Law,” 2. 
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requirement for all cadets.”376  This was the report’s ninth recommendation. The military 
training and military studies program gave credit for summer training programs at 20.5 semester 
hours and the military studies curriculum at only 6.5 semester hours for a cadet’s four years.377 
However, even though it limited the maximum number of semester hours for the entire military 
studies and training program, this recommendation actually proposed an increase in the total 
hours semester hours for military studies. Established midway through the 20th Anniversary 
Study, the Cadet Scheduling and Program Interface Committee exhaustingly reviewed the 
formula for semester hour credits and determined that Military Studies course work should 
receive 1.5 semester hours per course.  This would bring the total to 9 semester hours in a cadet’s 
program, so the summer military training hours would be reduced.  The committee also 
recommended an “expanded military studies program”—merely a scheduling recommendation—
that would not be attempted in earnest until the beginning of the new decade. It proposed that the 
senior course be made up of 42 lessons, instead of the 10 lessons and that other times in cadets’ 
schedules be used to enhance contact time in the professional military studies curriculum.378 
Even though these recommendations were not carried out, they did demonstrate that elements 
within the Academy recognized an issue within the military studies program.  
The 20th Anniversary Study itself did not introduce major changes into the military 
studies curriculum. However, it did bring together the various personnel from the offices of the 
Commandant, the Dean of Faculty, the Athletic Department, and other staff agencies to 
                                                 
376 20th Anniversary Study, I-1. 
377 20th Anniversary Study, II-6. The credit was 1 hour for each semester course the first 
three years (Mil Stud 111/112, 221/222, 321/322) and ½ semester hour for the senior-
level course. 
378 20th Anniversary Study, I-1-2, I-11, XI-1, XI-12 -13 
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recognize that a need did exist to examine the Academy’s program and that some specific 
attention was needed to bolster the military studies program.  
 
Honor Review Committee 
Soon after the submission of the 20th Anniversary Study, which sparked little progress in 
the program of military studies or in other areas at the Academy, an incident outside the 
Academy put in motion efforts to make drastic changes that put more emphasis on its military 
studies program. In March 1976, West Point experienced a serious cheating scandal whose 
impact rivaled earlier problems at West Point in 1951 and the USAFA 1965 honor code scandal. 
At the end of this West Point investigation, 152 cadets either resigned or were involuntarily 
separated.379 This developed into an “unprecedented drama” that led the Chief of Staff of the 
Army, General Bernard Rogers, to form what would became the West Point Study Group 
(WPSG), which included three investigative committees chaired by a one- or two-star general.380 
General Rogers received the final report from this group in July 1977.381 Recommendations from 
                                                 
379 Lance Betros, Carved in Granite: West Point Since 1902 (College Station, TX: Texas 
A&M University Press, 2012), 57. This incident received significant attention in The New 
York Times and The Washington Post during the months after the event, when in April 
and May many cadets began to resign or receive punishment. See, AFAHD, 1 January 
1976 – 1 December 1976, Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents CW 1-74, AH 1-38, CSU 1-13. 
380 Betros, 59. Three chairmen of key committees in the WPSG were Maj. Gen. Hillman 
Dickinson, Maj. Gen. Jack V. Mackmull, and Brig. Gen. Jack N. Merritt, who led, 
respectively, the Academic, Environment, and Professional Development committees.  
381 Betros notes: “As a blueprint for reform, [the West Point Study Group report] was the 
most significant document since Thayer established the four-year curriculum over 150 
years earlier” (59). To implement the recommendations, in December 1976, the Army 
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the WPSG would inform the Superintendent of the Air Force Academy, who would order his 
own studies and would institute substantial changes because of this latest and damaging incident. 
This affair eventually led to serious reforms at the Air Force Academy, specifically with respect 
to the professional military studies program. 
The WPSG investigation and subsequent report inspired self-reflection at the Air Force 
Academy. The report offered 152 recommendations, including the need to create various 
committees for further study and to implement organizational changes. Both actions were 
intended to address the environment that had led to the cheating scandal, as well as other 
reforms. For example, the report specified the need for a “Committee on Professional 
Development” and a “Committee on Cadet Life” that would allow for “continuing review of all 
aspects of the educational training and extracurricular programs of the Academy.” Also, the 
report advised the Commandant to reorganize and rename his offices. The changes were to 
include moving one department from under his purview to the academic Dean’s responsibility.382 
                                                                                                                                                             
recalled to service as its new Superintendent General Andrew Goodpaster—he had to 
wear three stars rather than show his four-star rank—as General Rogers prepared to 
establish the group. Rogers wanted a strong, stable, academically sound choice to lead the 
Academy out of the quagmire (60). Betros observes: “The thoroughness of the WPSG 
report merits special note. In my extensive research of the Military Academy, I have 
come across no other external committee report that so ably balances breadth, analysis, 
clarity, and cogency. The quality of the report had much to do with Gen. Rogers’s deep 
personal interest in the work of the WPSG. He received periodic reviews from the 
chairmen of the three investigative committees and provided guidance that influenced the 
WPSG’s final recommendations.” See ibid., 342-343n105. 
382 AFAHD, 1 January 1977 – 31 December 1977, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-
19, RR 1-56, DF 1-8, Number SUPT-10, “Ltr, West Point Study Group to General 
Bernard W. Rogers, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., subj: [Report of the 
197 
The span and significance of these proposed changes spilled over to the other service academies 
as, if nothing else, a measure against anything as embarrassing as what had occurred at West 
Point and against the brutal publicity that came with the affair. 
Responding to events at West Point, and motivated by the WPSG, Air Force Academy 
Superintendent Lt. Gen. Kenneth Tallman directed his own investigation into the structure and 
climate of the cadet wing. Sworn in as the eighth Superintendent on June 27 1977, General 
Tallman used those WPSG recommendations as a springboard to justify and to implement his 
own radical changes. On 28 July 1977, he convened the Honor Review Committee (HRC) to 
“evaluate the administration of the cadet honor system and related aspects of cadet life.”383 The 
committee interviewed a broad cross-section of over 300 cadets and staff personnel, and, 
although it “asserted its firm belief that the Cadet Honor Code remains the paramount feature of 
                                                                                                                                                             
West Point Study Group], 27 Jul 77,” 10-11. The report recommended that the Office of 
Military Psychology and Leadership be renamed as the Department of Behavior Sciences 
and Leadership and fall under the Dean as an academic department. The report 
recommended that other offices within the Commandant’s purview, such as Military 
Instruction, be named “departments.” The report had 156 recommendations, but four 
concerned the US Military Academy Preparatory School. See Betros, 343n106. Merely 
coincidental that there were 152 recommendations in the report and 152 cadets resigned 
or were dismissed. 
383 Quoted in AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, 4. Although his letter came 
out the day after the official release of the WPSG report, there is little doubt that he was 
fully aware of what the group was finding and subsequently recommending prior to the 
official release. See, again, Betros, 342-343n105.  The group was releasing information at 
it went along. There is no doubt that Gen. Tallman received information about the 
group’s work—either formally or informally—especially after the Air Force named him 
as the next Superintendent and as he was preparing to assume the position.  
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the cadet way of life,” its September interim report did recommend that follow-on 
subcommittees investigate eight areas for “possible improvement actions.”384 The committee 
specifically recommended forming subcommittees to further study “Professional Development” 
and “Cadet Life,” which were suggestions that the WPSG had recommended for its institution.385 
Tallman approved creation of the subcommittees and gave the HRC until the beginning of the 
year to provide the findings and recommendations.386 
The HRC submitted its final report on January 1, 1978. The report gave special attention 
to some significant problems that both staff and cadets had with the military studies program. 
The subcommittee focused on “Management of Cadet Wing” and gave eleven findings, one of 
which  was the issue concerning “Stability of Military Training Programs.” As the HRC report 
stated, “[o]ne of the greatest sources of irritation or confusion” for cadets and staff were the 
“continual changes” within the military studies program that came with the turnover (about every 
                                                 
384 AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, 4. The HRC interim report date was 
30 September 1977. AFAHD, 1 January 1977 – 31 December 1977, Appendix, Vol. I, 
Documents SUPT 1-19, RR 1-56, DF 1-8, Number SUPT-12, “Ltr, SUPT to all Academy 
Personnel, subj: USAFA Honor Review Committee, 11 Oct 77.”  
385 AFAHD, 1 January 1977 – 31 December 1977, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-
19, RR 1-56, DF 1-8, Number SUPT-12, “Ltr, SUPT to all Academy Personnel, subj: 
USAFA Honor Review Committee, 11 Oct 77”; AFAHD, 1 January 1977 – 31 December 
1977, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-19, RR 1-56, DF 1-8, Number SUPT-10, 
“Ltr, West Point Study Group to General Bernard W. Rogers, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 
Washington, D.C., subj: [Report of the West Point Study Group], 27 Jul 77,” 10. 
386 AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-
38, RR 1-37, Number SUPT-2, “Report of the Honor Review Committee, 1 Jan 78,” I-4. 
General Tallman, in a letter of 13 Oct 1977, provided this direction to the HRC. 
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two years) of the Commandant of Cadets.387 As the report notes, “[b]oth cadets and graduates 
point out that there have seldom been two [cadet year group] classes who have undergone the 
same program of military training [education].” The result of this “institutional turmoil” was that 
that the cadets had a “negative view” of military studies—the cadets did not view military 
studies as an important aspect of their education, and they viewed the program as one with little 
rigor.388 This was not an original finding, as the committee provided similar examples of cadet 
end-of-course critiques that showed the program had “little stability since the mid-1960s” or was 
of little significance to the cadets.389 However, the pressure now affecting the academies due to 
the scandal at West Point made clear to Academy leaders and faculty that meaningful change 
was necessary in the organization of professional military studies and in its curriculum. 
Upon receiving the final report, General Tallman immediately established an 
Implementation Committee to develop some direct actions on the findings and recommendations 
from the HRC. This included findings about how to improve the professional military studies 
                                                 
387 The Commandant of Cadets traditionally is a relatively recent pinned-on brigadier 
general, one who is expected to advance further in his or her Air Force career. In recent 
years, especially, accomplishing the tour as Commandant leads almost immediately to a 
two-star promotion, upon completion of the tour; thus the reason for a short tour of two, 
versus three or more years. Recent Superintendents, on the other hand, are already 
pinned-on lieutenant generals whose last assignment will be with the Academy.  
388 AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-
38, RR 1-37, Number SUPT-2, “Report of the Honor Review Committee, 1 Jan 78,” IX-
8. The report had nine chapters—one for an introduction and eight for each of the 
subcommittees. Chapter IX was on “Management of Cadet Wing.” 
389 AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-
38, RR 1-37, Number SUPT-2, “Report of the Honor Review Committee, 1 Jan 78,” IX-
8. 
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program. Headed by Colonel Tom Richards—who already was a Brigadier General-select and 
was in line to become the Academy’s 10th Commandant of Cadets upon pinning on the rank—
this group of six officers reviewed the HRC’s over 200 findings and recommendations and gave 
the Superintendent an outline of which ones to implement as soon as possible, those that required 
further study, and those that could be dismissed outright. The committee provided its input to the 
Superintendent within the month.390  
The Implementation Committee specifically addressed the situation within the military 
studies program. Among the recommendations from the HRC, which acknowledged the lack of 
consistency over time and level of rigor in the professional military studies curriculum, was the 
suggestion that a colonel manage all aspects of training and education within the Commandant’s 
realm as well as coordinate between the Commandant’s military studies program and related 
faculty departments. In addition, the committee believed that this person should be the Deputy 
Commandant for Military Instruction. They wanted the new Deputy Commandant to receive at 
least two continuous tours of duty (each tour was two or three years) or “some form of 
assignment stability to lend coherence and continuity to this very important program.” Finally, 
                                                 
390 AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-
38, RR 1-37, Number SUPT-5, “Ltr, SUPT to DF, CW, AH, and CS, subj: 
Implementation of Honor Review Recommendations, 6 Feb 78”; AFAHD, 1 January 
1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-38, RR 1-37, Number 
SUPT-2, “Report of the Honor Review Committee, 1 Jan 78,” I-9. The Implementation 
Committee report is divided into three sections: Honor, Cadet Life, and Academic 
Community.  Each section provides an introduction, and then sorts each finding or 
recommendation from the HRC into the implement, study further, or do not implement 
overall recommendations. Brig. Gen. Richards became Commandant 20 March 1978, 
relieving Brig. Gen. Stanley Beck (22 July 1975-19 March 1978, which was a long tour). 
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the committee recognized the need for this Deputy Commandant to have under him or her “a 
limited number of continuous tour positions within” the division so that the instructors could 
help build and maintain this continuity.391 In the five years before this report (January 1973 to 
January 1978), four officers had held the position of Deputy Commandant for Military 
Instruction (CWI).392 Putting a full colonel in this position, and providing him or her the 
authority and responsibility that goes with it, would demonstrate a level of seriousness for 
change. Although it tentatively agreed with the findings and proposed recommendations from the 
HRC, however, the Implementation Committee believed that something of this significance 
required further study.393 Lieutenant General Tallman contacted the Chief of Staff of the Air 
Force, General David Jones, who was interested in these studies due to the continued scrutiny on 
West Point.  General Tallman said that, although the Academy would implement various 
solutions to issues immediately, some “recommendations are primarily in the academic area or 
                                                 
391 AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-
38, RR 1-37, Number SUPT-2, “Report of the Honor Review Committee, 1 Jan 78,” IX-
8-IX-9. 
392 Colonels A.K. Taylor, Ben M. Pollard, William Breckner, and Lt. Col. Gary Knight. 
During this pivotal year of 1978-1979, three others would assume the position: Col. Jack 
Farris (Aug 78 – Mar 79), Lt. Col. Jack Singleton (Mar 79 – Jun 79), and Lt. Col. 
Michael Pavich (who took over on 22 Jun 79). This demonstrates the extremely high 
turnover within this important division. See AFAHD annual histories—the opening 
paragraph in the “Commandant of Cadets” section usually lists appropriate personnel, if 
not within the first page. 
393 AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-
38, RR 1-37, Number SUPT-3, “Honor Review Implementation Committee Report, Jan 
78,” II-28. 
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Academy…organization and would require greater lead time for implementation.”394 This 
included the desire to change the organization of the military studies branch. General Tallman 
was preparing himself for serious change at the Academy, specifically within the program of 
military studies. 
As the cadets entered the fall term of 1978, General Tallman revealed his earnestness to 
create change within the military studies program. He had assigned to the Implementation 
Committee the responsibility for organizing project committees for all those issues requiring 
further study. Among these issues was how to structure the administration of the military studies 
program and how to staff it, as well as to determine the structure and content of the academic 
course work. These project committees were composed of members from across mission 
elements (Dean of Faculty, Commandant of Cadets, Athletic Department, staff agencies, etc.) 
and were responsible for offering specific recommendations. They provided updates to the 
Implementation Committee and then to the Superintendent throughout the year.395 The 
Superintendent informed the Dean and the Commandant of his proposed radical change by letter 
in late September.  He said: “The best long-term interest of the Academy will be served by a 
complete reorientation of our efforts in the area of Leadership and Military Studies…. It is my 
intention to examine placing both the challenge of [the military studies] program development 
                                                 
394 AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-
38, RR 1-37, Number SUPT-4, “Ltr, SUPT to Gen. David C. Jones, C/S HQ USAF, 
Wash., D.C., subj: [review and assessment of the West Point Study Group Report], 26 
Jan 78.” 
395 AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-
38, RR 1-37, Number SUPT-5, “Ltr, SUPT to DF, CW, AH, and CS, subj: 
Implementation of Honor Review Recommendations, 6 Feb 78.” 
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and the responsibility for teaching the subject matter pertinent to this professional division with 
the Dean of Faculty.”  This was because “excellence can be achieved only through long-term 
continuity and program coherence, with most of the instruction provided by a faculty possessing 
appropriate advanced degrees.” Realizing that the Commandant did not have the personnel 
needed to realize his vision, nor the continuity of personnel, General Tallman believed that this 
profound new arrangement that he was instituting would then allow similar radical changes in 
“program content, faculty manning, and other issues of pedagogical importance to be considered 
on a detailed and comprehensive basis before beginning this exciting venture in military 
education.” The letter to the Dean and Commandant directed them to establish whatever 
organization was necessary to provide “semi-monthly progress reports” to him.396 The Dean and 
the Commandant worked to fulfill the Superintendent’s intent by organizing the eight-member 
Professional Development Studies Committee, which the Superintendent formally commissioned 
                                                 
396 AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-
38, RR 1-37, Number SUPT-29, “Ltr, SUPT to DF and CW, subj: [reorientation of 
leadership and military studies], 26 Sep 78. In this decision, not only was the 
Superintendent influenced by the Honor Review Committee and the subsequent 
Implementation Committee, but also in a professional development report prepared by 
faculty member, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Taylor, a Department of Economics, 
Geography and Management professor, who had submitted his own study, “Professional 
Development: A Report,” which acknowledged the significance of stability in a 
professional development program. The report, fourteen pages of comments and 
observations followed by five appendices of 42 pages outlining a proposed curriculum, 
was completed in August 1978. See, “The Professional Development Curriculum, Lt 
[Col] Robert L. Taylor (Econ/Geog/Management), August 1978,” USAFA Special 
Collections, Vertical Files, Box 12, Folder 33. 
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in November, approving the proposed committee.397 The Superintendent continued his 
determined drive for serious change in order to provide continuity and rigor to the military 
studies program. 
The Superintendent was not the only one who pushed for change, as the Board of Visitors 
also demanded rigor and organization in the program. General Tallman had briefed the Board 
about the on-going study by the Honor Review Committee during the October 1977 visit. And in 
its annual report for 1977, the Board noted that members would expect an update the following 
year.398 The Board received “an extensive review” of the findings and recommendations during 
                                                 
397 AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-
38, RR 1-37, Number SUPT-32, “Ltr, SUPT to DF and CW, subj: Professional 
Development Studies Committee, 7 Nov 78. Colonel John Wittry, who became the Vice 
Dean in late November, chaired this eight-member committee. Notably present on the 
committee was Lt Col Robert Taylor, whose professional development study from 
August 1978 influenced the Superintendent (see note 43 above); Colonel Philip Caine, 
the Deputy Department Head for the Department of History, whom the Superintendent 
appointed as the first Permanent Professor in the Commandant’s office; the Deputy 
Commandants for the Cadet Wing and Military Instruction; and, Colonel Ervin Rokke, 
who was the Permanent Professor and Department Head for Political Science, who was 
appointed Dean in 1983. Rokke had already been a participating member of the Honor 
Review Committee and the Implementation Committee. 
398 USAFA Special Collections, Board of Visitors Annual Report, 1977, 6. The Board, 
established by public law through Title 10, U.S.C., first visited the Academy in 1956 and 
reports to the President of the United States, following the example and law established at 
West Point in 1819 and Annapolis in 1850. See William E. Simons, ed., Professional 
Military Education in the United States: A Historical Dictionary (Westport, Connecticut 
and London: Greenwood Press, 2000), 82-84. Also, USAFA Special Collections, “Report 
of the Board of Visitors, United States Air Force Academy, 1956.” The Academy BOV 
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its November 1978 visit, and the Superintendent closed his “USAFA Update on Academy 
Changes,” given to the Board, with word that “studies and committee actions are continuing in 
several areas including…a broader curriculum for cadet professional development.”399 The 
Board, in discussing future meetings, stated that it was “particularly interested in a thorough 
discussion at the next meeting of academic methodology and military studies,” requesting a 
“seminar-type discussion” with appropriate personnel and Board members.400 Senator Gary Hart, 
the co-chairman of the Board, followed up the BOV visit with a letter to General Tallman about 
the issues regarding “the study of warfare” at the Academy. The Superintendent responded with 
his outline to revamp the military studies curriculum that included an objective “to increase 
significantly the cadets’ perception of the importance of the Military Studies curriculum vis-à-vis 
their other academic studies.” Tallman believed that the proposed changes to the program “are 
                                                                                                                                                             
consists of fifteen members: six appointed by the President (for three-year periods), four 
designated by the Speaker of the House (two of which come from the House 
Appropriations Committee), three members are appointed by the Vice President or the 
President pro tempore of the Senate (two are members of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee), and the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the 
Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee appoint one member each. Board 
members are required to visit the Academy annually and “inquire into the morale, 
discipline, curriculum, instruction, physical equipment, fiscal affairs, academic methods 
and other matters relating to the Academy which the Board decides to consider.” 
399 USAFA Special Collections, United States Air Force Academy, Board of Visitors 
Annual Report, 1978, 19, 62. The Superintendent’s update is Appendix 5, pp. 51-62.  
400 USAFA Special Collections, United States Air Force Academy, Board of Visitors 
Annual Report, 1978, 21. Of the fifteen Board members only six attended the visit: Co-
Chairman, Senator Gary Hart, Representative Frank Evans, Representative John J. Flynt, 
Jr., Lieutenant General (Ret) Brent Scowcroft, Mr. Bruce Sundlun, and Dr. Sheila 
Widnall (Secretary of the Air Force, 1993-1997). 
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closely aligned” with those mentioned by Senator Hart in his letter.401 General Tallman now 
received both support and pressure from the Board of Visitors. 
Besides the Board of Visitors, the third accreditation visit by the North Central 
Association (NCA) offered insight into the military studies curriculum. The Association granted 
accreditation of the bachelor’s degree in July 1979 for another ten years, but it offered a 
significant criticism: “The distinction between academic and military studies seems artificial to 
the members of the team and appears likely to lead to the description of these activities as first- 
and second-class studies.” The NCA concluded that the Academy should do what is appropriate 
“where military studies represent a significant and professionally necessary part of the work of 
every student.”402 So yet another organization from outside the Academy gave its support to the 
Superintendent to intensify the rigor and perception of the military studies curriculum for the 
cadets. 
Finally, the Superintendent’s ambition to revitalize the military studies program received 
endorsement by the Professional Development Studies Committee. Given his charge to 
determine if the military studies program should be under the supervision of the Dean of Faculty, 
the committee agreed that such a measure was warranted and used its report as a proposal for 
implementation.  In its report, submitted on April 6, the committee suggested that the 
Superintendent should announce as soon as possible the creation of the Department of 
Professional Military Studies (DFPMS) under the supervision of the Dean of Faculty. However, 
                                                 
401 AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. III, Documents DF 
26-69, CW 1-59, AH 1-15, Number DFD-65, “Ltr, SUPT to Hon. Gary Hart, U.S. Senate, 
Washington, D.C., subj: [reorientation of military studies program], 26 Dec 78.” Sen. 
Hart’s letter was from November 28. 
402 AFAHD, I Jan 1979-31 Dec 1979, 39. 
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although the report did propose this major change to occur by 1 June 1979, so that the new 
department could use the entire summer to work through reorganization and refine a new 
curriculum, the committee also recognized that with summer assignments already made by the 
Air Force it would be more practical to wait until summer 1980 for so major a move to be 
made.403 
Noteworthy in the report is the committee’s rationale for the reorganization and structure 
of military studies. As with other studies and discussions during these two years after the West 
Point scandal, this report affirmed the need for continuity in the military studies program. It 
highlighted the need for a Permanent Professor as well as four other “chairmen of instruction,” to 
whom the Air Force would give longer tours or even tenured status, to assist with curriculum 
development and to “provide the bureaucratic clout” necessary for daily operations and tussles 
with the other academic departments.404 To good effect, the committee discussed professional 
development of the cadets, which it conceded was accomplished through all aspects of the 
Academy’s effort to fulfill its mission. But the committee clearly saw the difference between 
military studies and military training, and it insisted on strengthening the academic studies by 
adding four, 3-semester hour courses in the cadet’s overall program.405 This is especially 
significant because the committee affirmed that courses had not yet received sufficient attention 
                                                 
403 USAFA Special Collections, Vertical Files, Box 12, Folder 28, “Report of the 
Professional Development Studies Committee, 6 April 1979,” 16-17. The report is 18 
pages with another 10 pages of appendices. 
404 USAFA Special Collections, Vertical Files, Box 12, Folder 28, “Report of the 
Professional Development Studies Committee, 6 April 1979,” 10. 
405 USAFA Special Collections, Vertical Files, Box 12, Folder 28, “Report of the 
Professional Development Studies Committee, 6 April 1979,” 2-6, 12. 
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and, as a result, military studies held only “second-rate status in the eyes of the cadet.”406 The 
committee supported the Superintendent’s campaign to introduce drastic changes in the cadet 
program. 
Although it agreed with many of the findings of the committee, the Commandant’s office 
pushed back on the ultimate recommendation to transfer the responsibility of military studies to 
the Dean. The Military Training Division (CWIT), which remained responsible for the military 
studies curriculum under the supervision of the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction 
(CWI), responded to the three major criticisms that the Professional Development Studies 
Committee had strongly articulated, which actually echoed criticisms that had been made for 
quite some time.407 First, the division reorganized itself, establishing two branches that 
recognized the difference between military studies (CWITS) and training (CWITT). Certainly 
                                                 
406 USAFA Special Collections, Vertical Files, Box 12, Folder 28, “Report of the 
Professional Development Studies Committee, 6 April 1979,” 7. 
407 The Military Training Division (CWIT) did not show any concern or reveal any issues 
with its program. For example, the division provided inputs for an endeavor by the Dean. 
In late-1978, the fourth academic Dean, Brig. Gen. William Orth, who had recently 
replaced Brig. Gen. William Woodyard, appointed a committee to publish essays on each 
academic department, including the mission elements of the Athletic Department and 
Commandant of Cadets. Completed in May 1979, this work did receive inputs from the 
Deputy of Military Instruction: Chapter 22 (pp. 289-323) of the compilation discusses the 
airmanship programs and Chapter 23 (pp. 325-331) provides a curt discussion of 
“Military Studies: 1955 to 1979,” which includes more pages on summer training 
programs than on the classroom academic course work. So, this effort is not a very 
thorough or engaged look at military studies at the Academy. See USAFA Special 
Collections, Brig. Gen. Jesse Gatlin, Jr., et al, eds. The United States Air Force 
Academy’s First Twenty-Five Years: Some Perceptions (United States Air Force 
Academy, 1979), 289-331. 
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this occurred because of the scrutiny being given to the program and because of the continuing 
discussions about the role of military education as distinct from military training. Second, the 
division established an Objectives Review Committee (ORC) to ensure effective integration 
between the courses in each branch as well as to revise the curriculum within the military studies 
branch. Finally, a third branch—CWITZ—was established to build an effective instructor corps. 
This branch was responsible for training of new instructors and was also expected to promote 
standardization and to conduct evaluation.408 These actions and continued studies persuaded the 
Superintendent to delay any major rearrangement.409 These evolutionary changes acknowledged 
problems with the program and introduced some important changes to improve the credibility 
within the division and for the curriculum. 
 
25th Anniversary Review Group 
The critical evaluation of the Academy that General Clark had called for at the time of its 
20th anniversary is what General Tallman pursued.  General Tallman insisted on an honest 
assessment of the Academy’s programs, particularly of those under the Commandant’s care, at 
the time of the 25th anniversary. The Superintendent respected the pushback he received from the 
Commandant that the military studies program remain under the Commandant’s authority, but 
General Tallman used the 25th anniversary of the Academy as a chance for yet another review of 
                                                 
408 AFAHD, 1 January 1979 – 31 December 1979, Appendix, Vol. III, Documents CW 1-
38, AH 1-16, CSU 1-14, AC 1-6, Number CW-1, “CW History, 1 Jan-31 Dec 79,” 74. 
The instructor training was also involved in continuation training of the instructors, to 
include “upgrade” instructor training. 
409 AFAHD, 1 January 1979 – 31 December 1979, Appendix, Vol. III, Documents CW 1-
38, AH 1-16, CSU 1-14, AC 1-6, Number CW-1, “CW History, 1 Jan-31 Dec 79,” 23. 
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this issue raised by the Board of Visitors. As the visit of the Board began in August 1979, 
General Tallman asked the Board to establish a subcommittee, the Twenty-fifth Anniversary 
Review Group, to act as the instrument for the review. The BOV recommended that, at a 
minimum, “The subcommittee should focus primarily on the core (or required) curriculum, the 
military studies program, and the curriculum review and change mechanism.” The Board 
immediately named General Brent Scowcroft and Dr. Sheila Widnall as the member 
representatives to the subcommittee, while recognizing that more time was needed to fully 
establish the group.410 What proved to be the final and most effective review of the professional 
military studies program received its commission in November 1979 from General Lew Allen, 
Jr., Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and from Senator Gary Hart, Chairman, USAFA Board of 
Visitors.411 General Tallman was going to get his officially sanctioned and strongly supported 
review of the professional military studies program. 
                                                 
410 USAFA Special Collections, Report of the Board of Visitors, 26-28 August 1979, U.S. 
Air Force Academy, Twenty-Fifth Anniversary, 1979, 6.  
411 AFAHD, 1 January 1979 – 31 December 1979, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-
24, RR 1-23, DF 1-6, Number SUPT-22, “OI News Release No.315, ‘25th Anniversary 
Group Formed,’ 9 Nov 1979,” and AFAHD, 1 January 1980 – 31 December 1980, 
Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-23, RR 1-31, Number SUPT-7, “Report of the 25th 
Anniversary Review Committee, U.S. Air Force Academy, 1 March 1980,” 3. The Air 
Force news release provided the listing of members, who, besides BOV members General 
Scowcroft and Dr. Widnall, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics at 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (who was a Board member 1977-1979 and 
became chairman of the 1980 visit. Also, she later became Secretary of the Air Force, 
1993-1997), included: chairman, Dr. John Corbally, Professor Emeritus and 
Distinguished Professor of Higher Education, University of Illinois; Dr. Paul Jennings, 
California Institute of Technology; Dean William Sangster, Georgia Technical 
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The final report of the 25th Anniversary Review Committee offered two significant 
observations and recommendations regarding the professional military studies program. The 33-
page report, submitted to the Chief of Staff, the BOV, and to General Tallman in March 1980, 
and released for public consumption along with the minutes if the BOV annual visit in April, 
included 30 recommendations.412 The committee agreed with similar observations made in the 
previous several years and in other studies that the program needed to “create permanent 
positions in Military Studies” and “enhance visibility, strength, and content of professional 
academic curriculum under leadership of [the] Superintendent.”413 Similar to the other reports, 
this one recognized that the professional military studies curriculum required some continuity of 
faculty in order for the program to be solid and capable of competing with other academic 
departments, while bolstering its rigor and credibility with cadets. 
The report provided another significant input that was related to the two formal 
recommendations. To better understand the elements of the Academy program, the committee 
                                                                                                                                                             
University, College of Engineering; Dr. Thomas Cronin, Visiting Research Professor, 
Colorado College; General (ret) William McBride, former Vice Chief of Staff; Lieutenant 
General Robert Marsh, Commander, Electronics Systems Division of the Air Force 
Systems Command; Lieutenant General Thomas Ryan, Jr., Vice Commander-in-Chief of 
Military Airlift Command; Major General Charles Cleveland, Vice Commander of Air 
Training Command; and Colonel Charles Stebbins, National Security Council. 
412 AFAHD, 1 January 1980 – 31 December 1980, 4; AFAHD, 1 January 1980 – 31 
December 1980, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-23, RR 1-31, Number SUPT-7, 
“Report of the 25th Anniversary Review Committee, U.S. Air Force Academy, 1 March 
1980,” 2. 
413 AFAHD, 1 January 1980 – 31 December 1980, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-
23, RR 1-31, Number SUPT-7, “Report of the 25th Anniversary Review Committee, U.S. 
Air Force Academy, 1 March 1980,” 24. 
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members developed their own framework to organize what was occurring at the institution. 
Similar to other studies, they offered an outline of five areas of focus within the Academy 
program that included: “1. ‘Regular’ academic curriculum, 2. ‘Professional’ academic 
curriculum, 3. Professional military activities, 4. Physical Training, 5. Military environment.” 
The members realized that the main, or “regular,” academic curriculum—the responsibility of 
the Dean of Faculty—concentrated on the core curriculum and branched into the offerings for 
various academic majors. This academic curriculum, however, included some courses—the 
committee named six—that directly contributed to the professional military education of the 
officer candidate.414 These six courses, combined with the military studies courses, fulfilled the 
“professional” academic course work. To give the entire professional military development 
program credibility with the cadets, the committee concluded that the Commandant had to 
continue, but further develop, a serious academic program. So the report stated that the majority 
opinion of the committee was to keep a portion of the military studies program under the 
Commandant’s control, executing that mission and providing assistance and support to the 
military training branch. This was a major stance taken by the committee in the report, and, 
                                                 
414 AFAHD, 1 January 1980 – 31 December 1980, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-
23, RR 1-31, Number SUPT-7, “Report of the 25th Anniversary Review Committee, U.S. 
Air Force Academy, 1 March 1980,” 8. The courses were Behavioral Science 220 
“Applications to Leadership” (1.5 sem. hrs.), Economics 221 “Economics of National 
Security” (3 sem. hrs.), History 202 “Modern Warfare and Society” (3 sem. hrs.), 
Behavioral Science 330 “Applications to Leadership (1.5 sem. hrs.), Law 400 “Law for 
Commanders” (3 sem. hrs.), and Political Science 412 “Defense Policy” (3 sem. hrs.). 
Noticeably missing from the list is Philosophy 310 “Ethics,” as discussed above, which 
included studying the major themes of philosophy, many that concern application within 
the context of warfare. 
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although it supported the emphasis that General Tallman desired, the committee members agreed 
with the Commandant’s studies from the previous summer to keep the military studies academic 
program where it already was. An additional comment in the report, again emphasizing the need 
for rigor and prominence for the military studies course work, was that the Commandant’s 
curriculum, as well as the Dean’s “professional” course work, should require minimum “levels 
of proficiency” as a graduation requirement.415 The BOV’s 25th Anniversary Report Committee 
most definitely stressed the significance of professional military studies, showing support for the 
Superintendent’s initial efforts. 
 The Board of Visitors seemed to intensify its support for the military studies curriculum 
and the 25th anniversary study’s conclusions just a month later. The Board met in April 1980 and 
released its annual report at the beginning of June. This BOV report included the entire report of 
the 25th Anniversary Review Committee, but it gave even stronger commitment to the idea of a 
minimum level of proficiency.  The BOV report stated: “Designate the military studies and other 
professional courses (such as `Law for Commanders’) as a `professional’ academic curriculum 
with a minimum required grade point average and special weight in computing the cadets’ 
graduation order of merit.”416 The Board’s report of 4 June 1980, which summarized the work of 
their various committees and the Board’s own sessions in April, again underscores the 
significance that the Board required for the Commandant’s staff—the need for a Permanent 
Professor and for a more comprehensive and rigorous curriculum. Specifically, the Board 
                                                 
415 AFAHD, 1 January 1980 – 31 December 1980, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-
23, RR 1-31, Number SUPT-7, “Report of the 25th Anniversary Review Committee, U.S. 
Air Force Academy, 1 March 1980,” 24-25.  
416 “Report of the Board of Visitors, 7-9 April 1980, U.S. Air Force Academy,” USAFA 
Special Collections, 19. 
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asserted: “The purpose of the new program should, at least in part, be to produce officers who 
are conceptual thinkers versed in such areas as military history, strategic doctrine, and concepts 
of tactical warfare.”417 The Superintendent had presented the BOV with issues and possible 
solutions, and he got the support from the BOV to make the structural and other necessary 
changes to improve the credibility of the professional military studies program. 
The release of the 25th Anniversary Review Committee’s report and the subsequent 
meeting of the BOV in the month after its release gave General Tallman the endorsement to 
pursue change in the Commandant’s office. He received even more public support on the Senate 
floor at the end of June from Senator Hart, who, in discussing the latest appropriations bill, 
exclaimed: “Today, our military schools, from the service academies through the National War 
                                                 
417 “Report of the Board of Visitors, 7-9 April 1980, U.S. Air Force Academy,” USAFA 
Special Collections, 21. Another recommendation of the Board was to reduce the core 
curriculum by 12-16 semester hours—the core had inched up to 111 total semester hours, 
of a total 136-142 semester hours for graduation, in recent years, thus reducing the 
flexibility available in the curricula of various majors. See ibid., 19. Commenting on the 
20th Anniversary Review, which discussed the demand on cadet time—a constant 
concern since the founding—the Board of Visitors again emphasized the demands on 
cadets’ time, pertaining specifically to lack of study time, in their 1977 report. This was 
still an issue even though the disciplinary major had been reduced from 53 credit units to 
48 credit units (the report used the aeronautical engineering degree as an example), and 
only 46 credit units for a divisional major (the example was a general engineering 
degree). AFAHD, 1 January 1978 – 31 December 1978, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents 
SUPT 1-38. RR 1-37, SUPT-1, “Ltr, John C. McDonald, Chairman of the USAFA BOV 
to the President of the United States, subj: Report of BOV, 22 Dec 77.” The BOV 
members present for the meeting, other than McDonald, were Dr. James E. Brown, Mr. 
Robert Herring, Dr. Dorothy W. Nelson, Mr. Robert F. List, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Brent 
Scowcroft, and Representative John J. Flynt, Jr. 
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College, concentrate on management, give some attention—at least in the junior level schools—
to leadership, and largely ignore [military] theory. Military history, which is the basis of military 
theory, receives little emphasis. A cadet can today graduate from any of the service academies 
with only one semester of military history.”418 This motivated General Tallman to continue with 
his reforms to ensure that rigor and continuity permeated the military studies curriculum. 
 
Permanent Professor in the Commandant’s Office 
 With the Honor Review Committee’s findings and the recommendations of the 
subsequent Implementation Committee, as well as with pressure from the Board of Visitors and 
the proposal from the Professional Development Studies Committee, Lt. Gen. Tallman had the 
rationale and support to institute his plans to improve the military studies program. On 6 June 
1980, he signed a letter recommending Colonel Philip Caine for the position of Permanent 
Professor in the Commandant’s department, specifying that his initial assignment was as the 
Special Assistant to the Commandant for Professional Military Development, pending higher 
approval.419 Colonel Caine’s immediate task was to “work on the concept, content, and 
                                                 
418 AFAHD, 1 January 1980 – 31 December 1980, Appendix, Vol. I, Documents SUPT 1-
23, RR 1-31, Number SUPT-17, “Memo, Lt Col Richard H. Slye, USAF, Chief, AFA 
Activities Group, Wash, DC to Lt Gen Tallman, subj: [Sen Hart’s views on teaching 
military theory in the military schools], 7 Jul 80.” This was similar to the line of 
argument and concern that Senator Hart had communicated to General Tallman years 
earlier; one can deduce that these conversations occurred between the two annually at the 
BOV meetings, if not on other occasions as well. 
419 The Permanent Professor position at the academies requires Senate confirmation. 
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organizational structure of the department.”420 The three-year journey to fix military studies was 
coming to fruition. 
 General Tallman chose Colonel Caine since Caine had the attributes necessary to make 
this move successful. First, Colonel Caine had a solid background in academia.  He held a 
Master’s and a doctoral degree in history from Stanford University, and he had completed tours 
at ranks of instructor up to that of a tenured professor in the History Department at the Academy. 
Colonel Caine brought to a new department the experience and stability that he had already 
demonstrated, since he had served as acting department head and was in line as a candidate to 
compete for the Permanent Professor and Department Head of the History Department. In the 
operational Air Force, he had graduated at the top of his pilot training class and had accumulated 
over 5,000 flying hours in various aircraft—primarily airlift. Also, he served a tour in Vietnam as 
the acting head of Project CHECO (Contemporary Historical Examination of Current 
Operations).421 The General realized that Colonel Caine could bridge the “Terrazzo Gap” 
between the Dean of Faculty and the Commandant of Cadets.  Nonetheless, as Caine later 
reflected: “With few exceptions, I was [still] looked upon as an outsider; as one whose 
qualifications to be in the Commandant’s area were marginal, given my long faculty background 
                                                 
420 AFAHD, 1 January 1980 – 31 December 1980, Appendix, Vol. III, Documents CW 1-
45, AH 1-10, CSU 1-13, AC 1-11, Number CW-29, “Staff Summary Sheet, CW to SUPT, 
subj: Appointment of Col. P.D. Caine as Special Assistant to the Commandant, 2 June 
1980,” and Number CW-31, “Ltr, SUPT to DF, CW and DP, Subj: Appointment of Col 
Caine as Special Assistant to the Commandant, 6 Jun 80.” 
421 See, Philip D. Caine short biography in Elliot V. Converse, III, ed., Forging the 
Sword: Selecting, Educating, and Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern 
World (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1998), 413. 
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at the Air Force Academy.”422 The challenge remained as it did at the founding of the Academy 
– to bridge the gap between the two pillars. General Tallman believed that Caine could do just 
that. 
 The temporary position as the special assistant did not work out well. As General 
Tallman and Colonel Caine soon realized “very, very, rapidly…the Special Assistant to the 
Commandant wasn’t anything . . . .  [The Superintendent and Commandant] had these grandiose 
ideas…but the [Special Assistant] didn’t have any authority to do anything.”423 Without the 
authority, even with the support of the Commandant, Colonel Caine found it difficult to 
implement his ideas.  
 Even though he did not implement major programs, Colonel Caine did learn the 
organization and prepared himself for the task at hand. He had an understanding of what he 
needed to do. Given direction by General Tallman to develop a military studies program “that 
was responsive to cadet needs, responsive to Air Force needs, academically viable, stable, [and] 
                                                 
422 Philip D. Caine, Brigadier General, USAF (Ret.), “CWI 1980-1992 End of Tour 
Report” (1992), 10. As discussed in Chapter 4, the “Terrazzo Gap” was the tension 
between the Commandant’s and Dean’s personnel. Dean of Faculty personnel were often 
viewed by Commandant’s personnel as lacking the necessary military credentials—even 
though they were officers. The friction between Colonel Stillman and Brigadier General 
McDermott in the previous chapter reveals this bizarre situation. 
423 USAFA Special Collections, “Interview of Brigadier General (Retired) Philip D. 
Caine by Lieutenant Colonel Vance Skarstedt, Department of History, 13 December 
1999,” 2. General Tallman understood that this would be difficult, but the current Deputy 
for Military Instruction was Lt. Col. Michael Pavich, who was a strong officer. Certainly 
the General informed Caine when they first discussed the move in April 1980. See Philip 
D. Caine, Brigadier General, USAF (Ret.), “CWI 1980-1992 End of Tour Report” 
(1992), 8. 
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credible,” Caine began to reorganize since he understood the different aspects of cadets’ 
professional development.424 He realized that military training included those things that a cadet 
needed to know and learn during his or her cadet military experience – things needed “in order to 
function out in the operational Air Force.” However, in professional military studies, “you need 
to know how warfare works…how strategy is built…[a] much more academic” approach to 
understanding and learning about the profession.425 Although the interim period was difficult for 
him, Colonel Caine was thus well prepared to take fuller responsibility when the time came. 
 The first change that helped Colonel Caine to institute his programs came in October. 
The Commandant, Brigadier General Tom Richards, found an opportunity for the current Deputy 
Commandant for Military Instruction, Lt. Col. Michael Pavich, to move into a deputy wing 
commander position at another base—a promotion.426 This gave the opening for Colonel Caine 
to assume the duties as the deputy commandant on October 2, 1980.427 
 To implement his vision about training versus education, Colonel Caine first made an 
organizational change.  This happened that November. Continuing the evolution that began the 
previous year, he made a permanent split in the Military Training Division. This divisional name 
remained, but it was now responsible for all training activities of the cadets, including some 
work in professional development. The other division was already within the deputy 
                                                 
424 USAFA Special Collections, “Interview of Brigadier General (Retired) Philip D. 
Caine by Lieutenant Colonel Vance Skarstedt, Department of History, 13 December 
1999,” 5. 
425 USAFA Special Collections, “Interview of Brigadier General (Retired) Philip D. 
Caine by Lieutenant Colonel Vance Skarstedt, Department of History, 13 December 
1999,” 5. 
426 Michael Pavich would advance to the rank of Major General before he retired. 
427 AFAHD, 1 January 1980 – 31 December 1980, 127. 
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commandant’s realm, the Aviation Sciences Division.  It remained an entity to itself, but it would 
experience modifications in the years to come, aimed at improving programs and span of control 
for leaders. Finally, Colonel Caine created the Military Studies Division (CWIS), under the 
direction of Major James Simpson, to concentrate the academic courses and programs that were 
responsible to the Commandant.428 He now had a working structure under his authority—three 
divisions with their distinct responsibilities. 
 The Academy received Senate approval of Colonel Caine as the first Permanent Professor 
of Military Instruction, as he continued as the Deputy Commandant for Instruction in January 
1981. As one of the Academy’s Permanent Professors, he had greater authority and 
recognition—he was on a strong footing from which to compete. As Caine later reflected, 
General Tallman’s influence was absolutely necessary to create a Permanent Professor position 
in the Commandant’s office, since the conflict with the academic faculty would have ensured 
that, if it had been up to a vote, he “wouldn’t have won” a permanent position.429 The conflict 
with the Dean was going to be initially difficult. 
 In the effort to bring credibility and rigor to the course work, Colonel Caine now 
reorganized his supporting faculty and worked on the curriculum. The role of the academic 
military instructor was a significant factor for Colonel Caine, since he was familiar with the role 
from his time on the faculty. The emphasis on a solid force of well- qualified instructors began 
                                                 
428 AFAHD, 1 January 1980 – 31 December 1980, 131, 137. 
429 USAFA Special Collections, “Interview of Brigadier General (Retired) Philip D. Caine by 
Lieutenant Colonel Vance Skarstedt, Department of History, 13 December 1999,” 10. Caine was 
named a Permanent Professor in November, but did not assume the official position until the 
New Year. See, the Academy Spirit, Friday, November 21, 2014, 12 in USAFA Special 
Collections. 
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with the first study of the Air Force Academy Planning Board Study from 1949. The study’s first 
volume includes a chapter specifically on “Faculty, Staff and Educational Administration” that 
recognized the importance of the qualifications and credentials of faculty and staff.430 The 
planners devoted fifteen pages to discuss the number, quality, status, educational level, and 
method of selection and appointment of the proposed academy’s faculty. In a proposed 
breakdown of the academic faculty, the planners estimated that 28.5 percent should hold Ph.D. 
degrees, 43 percent a Master’s degree, and the remaining 28.5 percent a minimum of a 
Bachelor’s degree. They further recommended that of the proposed 260-member faculty, there 
should be 37 professors, 37 associate professors, 74 assistant professors, and 111 basic 
instructors.431 According to the AFAPB, one of the functions of the Commandant of Cadets was 
to provide personnel to conduct instruction in “military subjects” for the Division of Military 
Studies.432 The Commandant decided to rely on the squadron tactical officers overseeing the 
day-to-day running of the cadet squadrons to assist with maintaining the desired student-teacher 
ratio by facilitating the coursework in the Military Studies Division, even though they might not 
have formal education in some of the coursework—for any military officer, leadership believed, 
                                                 
430 Air Force Academy Planning Board Study, Vol. 1, “A Plan for an Air Force 
Academy,” 47. 
431 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 51. 
432 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, 42-43. In the plan’s delineation of each area’s responsibilities, the 
commandant is given fourteen, labeled “a” – “n.” The responsibility as chairman of the 
division, and his role to provide the instructors and instruction are “k” and “l” 
respectively. 
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could instruct military subjects since they were already military specialists.433 This notion 
persisted for two decades. 
 Colonel Caine agreed, as earlier studies had proposed, that a strong and well- qualified 
staff of instructors was needed to each the military studies course work. Many of the studies in 
this chapter concentrated on establishing the Permanent Professor, as well as some additional 
instructors who would stay for more than one tour, to provide some consistency and continuity in 
the program. The Commandant began the process of providing a more capable instructional staff 
in the summer of 1980.  He wrote to Officer Assignments at Headquarters, Air Force Military 
Personnel Center (HQ AFMPC) in June to advise them that the current Air Force Regulation 
required updating, so that it would now show that personnel coming to teach in the 
Commandant’s office needed at least a Master’s degree.434 Colonel Caine continued this 
reorganization of personnel in November when he divided the staff into those who had legitimate 
Master’s degrees and those who did not and then placed them, respectively, in either the 
academic division or the training division.435 He also strengthened the course that prepared 
instructors for the classroom. Colonel Caine instituted an instructor-training week in the summer 
1981 to facilitate better lesson planning and teaching in the classroom. He also had these 
instructors audit academic courses taught within the Dean of Faculty for information and 
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434 AFAHD, 1 January 1980 – 31 December 1980, Appendix, Vol. III, Documents CW 1-
45, AH 1-10, CSU 1-13, AC 1-11, Number CW-34, “Ltr, CW (CWIT) to HQ 
AFMPC/DPMRPP, subj: Changes to AFR 36-20 Officer Assignments, 24 Jun 80.” 
435 USAFA Special Collections, “Interview of Brigadier General (Retired) Philip D. 
Caine by Lieutenant Colonel Vance Skarstedt, Department of History, 13 December 
1999,” 6. 
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techniques of instruction. Finally, within that first year, Colonel Caine sent off his first 
Commandant-sponsored Ph.D. student, when Captain Jerry Martin headed to Ohio State to work 
on his doctorate in military history.436 The pursuit of a solid faculty to instruct the course work 
focused on military studies was in motion. 
 Finally, in his first year as the Permanent Professor and Deputy Commandant, Colonel 
Caine began a process to improve courses and the curriculum as a whole. Some effort to develop 
better courses was already present. The Objectives Review Committee (ORC) evaluated its 
curriculum and began to find solutions to a more rigorous program. A previous Commandant and 
Deputy Commandant had promoted this committee when the Professional Development Studies 
Committee submitted its report in spring 1979. The ORC redesigned all four core courses as 42-
lesson classes and started to rename them Professional Military Studies courses. These 
redesigned courses were submitted to the Dean of Faculty’s Curriculum Review Committee in 
the spring 1980.437 These efforts set a solid foundation as Colonel Caine and the CWIS division 
continued refinement of the four core courses that were actually used in the fall semester 
1981.438 The drive for a rigorous and credible program had begun. 
                                                 
436 AFAHD, 1 January 1981 – 31 December 1982, Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents DF 
60-75, CW 1-56, Number CW-5, “Military Studies Division (CWIS), 1981,” 1-2. The 
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 The recognition by Academy leaders, especially Lt. Gen. Tallman, that the military 
studies curriculum required significant improvement began a process of change leading to a 
Permanent Professor in the Commandant’s office who focused on this subject area, as well as a 
stronger teaching faculty and growing desire to improve curriculum. The arrival of a new 
Commandant just a month after Colonel Caine officially became a Permanent Professor 
demonstrated that the change and improvement would continue. Brigadier General Robert D. 
Beckel, the first Commandant who had graduated from USAFA – Beckel was in the Class of 
1959 – reflected that it was important to “have a credible educational element of that total 
concept…There’s a tendency to think of the commandant as in a training mode only and not a 
more stylized educational process…. [Caine] gave appropriate credibility to the type of courses 
of instruction that were responsibilities of the commandant…. The symbolism of him being a 
part of the commandant’s office was very, very important.”439 Professor Caine had started his 
reforms with change in the organization, the strengthening and improvement of the division’s 
faculty, and implementation of a stronger core curriculum for the military studies program. His 
first year had produced results, and he would use the following decade to continue this work. 
 
  
                                                 
439 USAFA Special Collections, 50th Anniversary Oral History (Colorado Springs, CO: 
The Friends of the Air Force Academy Library, 2005), 251. 
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Chapter 6 - Academic Credibility for Professional Military Studies  
 The professional military studies program continued to gain credibility during the 1980s. 
The program prospered because of the creation of a Permanent Professor of Military Instruction 
within the Commandant of Cadets’ office, especially since the first person the U.S. Senate 
confirmed to the position came with strong academic and professional qualifications.440 Colonel 
Philip Caine’s attributes provided the much-needed firepower and attention required for the 
Commandant to establish an academically respectable program that offered some stability and 
continuity for the military studies program within the overall officer candidate’s education. The 
effort to develop a curriculum with rigor, continuity, and credibility, similar to what the 
academic community had accomplished within the authority of the Dean of Faculty during the 
first twenty-five years, reached a crescendo in the 1990s. Finally, after decades of second-class 
status, professional military studies now had a role in officer candidate development at the 
Academy and a significant place in its structure so that it also had a chance to gain the cadets’ 
approval, as the program taught three full-credit courses, offered additional elective courses, 
developed a strong academic major, and gained respect from the Dean’s academic faculty. The 
continuing efforts of the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction, the office that Colonel 
Caine pioneered, allowed this meaningful progression to occur. This success as an academic 
program finally revealed itself when the sexual assault and harassment crisis struck the Academy 
                                                 
440 Colonel Caine had already received his line officer promotion to Colonel—he was not 
a Lieutenant Colonel awaiting promotion—having amassed over 5,000 flying hours 
during a career that included a tour in Vietnam. He received his M.A. and Ph.D. in 
history from Stanford, attended and was later a Professor of Strategic Studies at National 
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with some time as the Acting Department Head. 
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during the early 2000s and a resulting study recommended, and the institution approved, that the 
professional military studies program be moved under the Dean’s direct responsibility as an 
academic department in its own right as one among equals. 
 The changes that Colonel Caine introduced in 1981 received strong approval from the 
Board of Visitors early in the following year. As requested, Colonel Caine reported on his work 
as the new Deputy Commandant of Cadets for Military Instruction during the Board’s visit in 
April 1982. In his presentation, he confirmed that all twenty-five officers in the Military Studies 
Division had a Master’s degree, with the division sponsoring its first two officers to pursue the 
Ph.D.—one in educational measurements and evaluation and one, Captain Jerry Martin, in 
military history and strategy. Colonel Caine also discussed the three new professional military 
studies courses that were now, for the first time, being offered as full-semester, academically 
accredited core courses that demonstrated a strong emphasis on military education. These three 
courses provided the cadet one full-semester class for each of the first three years. More 
important, Colonel Caine instructed the Board on the partitioning of his organization into three 
divisions—military studies, military training, and aviation—that he regarded as the most 
significant contribution yet.  This allowed for the effective focus on the respective areas in the 
aviation program, in military training, and in the academic military studies program. But he also 
presented a concern to the Board revealing what many of the Academy’s leaders thought: “Our 
graduates are not familiar enough with air power as it relates to the total spectrum of war: 
strategy, tactics, heritage, doctrine, and associated topics.” This was the work that he and his 
staff continued to tackle in the coming years. A sample solution, he offered, was a proposal to 
reform the senior-level course into a study of military thought followed by the force analysis of 
the Soviet Union’s military structure. In its final report to the President, the Board emphasized its 
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approval that the Academy was effectively directing its efforts toward sustaining and improving 
a solid program of professional military studies.441 Placing a Permanent Professor under the 
Commandant was already paying dividends for the academic study of the profession of war at 
the Academy. 
 Besides satisfying the Board of Visitors, these timely reforms in the professional military 
studies program eased the concerns of another civilian leader. In February 1982, the new 
Superintendent, Major General Robert E. Kelley, replied to a query from the Secretary of the Air 
Force, Verne Orr, regarding the continued pressure to reform the professional military studies 
program. Referring to the Board of Visitors’ meeting from 1979 that first questioned the lack of 
emphasis on military studies at the Academy and then to the 1980 findings of the 25th 
Anniversary Review Committee, General Kelley assured the Secretary that the Academy was 
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courses, as discussed in the previous chapter, were not dedicated for a full semester, nor 
was the content stable, challenging, or of a serious academic nature. In reviewing the 
courses and content, he considered them more in line with military training. See USAFA 
Special Collections, “Interview of Brigadier General (Retired) Philip D. Caine by 
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now on the right path. Recognizing, as Senator Gary Hart had suggested, that the “academies 
have virtually squeezed out the required study of military history and tactics in favor of social 
and political sciences,” General Kelley believed the increasing rigor of the curriculum, combined 
with the strengthening of the instructors who taught the courses, alleviated many of the concerns 
initially voiced by Senator Hart and other senior leaders. Also, General Kelley agreed with the 
structural changes within the Commandant’s realm, which divided the Deputy Commandant for 
Military Instruction’s responsibilities into a division supporting training and one supporting 
military studies—the latter of which would assist the “development of officers who are 
conceptual thinkers versed in such areas as military history, strategic doctrine and concepts of 
tactical warfare.”442 The academic approach to military studies was receiving attention. General 
Kelley supported his predecessor’s changes, desired to continue building the military studies 
program, and recognized the requirement for the Permanent Professor in that area. 
 The support of the Superintendent and attention from the Board of Visitors and senior 
leaders resulted in the increasing rigor of the military studies curriculum in the first few years, as 
the experience and commitment of a dedicated Permanent Professor shepherded the changes 
along. Although the first three courses seemed satisfactory to Colonel Caine in early 1982, as 
suggested in his discussion with the Board, he was already calling for additional, necessary 
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revisions.443 With purposeful courses established, Colonel Caine used his remaining tenure to 
oversee this evolving curriculum within the military studies division. Nuanced revisions did not 
upset overall stability within the curriculum, as Colonel Caine’s oversight ensured that the 
changes were reasonable and necessary and not merely pushed at the whim of an instructor or 
under pressure within the institution or the greater Air Force community. As he understood his 
leadership role in the directorate, Colonel Caine would use the military training curriculum, also 
under his authority, to respond to concerns of the institution or the Air Force—or other “outside 
influences”—so that, quite apart from military training, the course work for the military studies 
program could continue to build a solid academic reputation.444 Colonel Caine’s leadership 
inspired the Military Studies Division’s personnel with enthusiasm, since they recognized that 
the institution now endorsed the more involved professional military studies curriculum—
especially since the first three-year groups now received a 42-lesson course. However, the 
objective for Colonel Caine and his military studies division was to provide more rigor in each 
course and effective connection between the courses.  
 The military studies division changed the freshman course Professional Military Studies 
(PMS)-110, for example, to emphasize professionalism. During Colonel Caine’s inaugural year, 
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the course was titled “Introduction to Military Studies,” but the name—and presumably the 
focus—was now  “Professional Foundations.” As the division chief, Major Charles A. Wood, 
asserted: “The goal is to build a firm foundation upon which these future leaders can base a 
career…[with] lessons in the human elements in war, the obligations and responsibilities of 
military service, and the meaning of teamwork, corporateness and commitment to the 
mission.”445 This satisfied Colonel Caine, who believed that the revised curriculum for all 
military studies courses required a focus on professionalism and air power and who also believed 
that the previous course for the freshmen was a waste—no need to use this course to set a basis 
for military studies since that would be emphasized consistently within each course.446 The 
Permanent Professor had a vision and ensured that the revised curriculum had a purpose. The 
course changes provided better focus for how and why they were included in the program, and 
they reinforced a strong intellectual approach to military studies. 
 The greatest change in these initial years occurred with the sophomore-level course. The 
division dropped the PMS-220 course, “Air Force Organizational Communication,” after the 
spring term 1982 and replaced it with PMS-225, “Command and Control of Airpower,” during 
the fall term. PMS-220 had undergone a serious revision in 1978, when it was Military Studies 
220.  At that time, the Superintendent bowed to pressure from the Air Staff and Air Force Public 
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Affairs that there was a need to educate officer candidates on the role of the public affairs 
specialty in the Air Force and on the need for effective communication. As stated above, this is 
what Colonel Caine was now attempting to avoid: using the academically-focused military 
studies program to bend to the Air Staff ‘s interest in the latest concern or fad. Military Studies 
220 had provided study of the role of public affairs and the value of effective communication, 
but now Colonel Caine integrated the necessary objectives and information in this specialty into 
the senior-class military training program—and this communications coursework went from an 
entire semester course to only a few lessons. Since he saw the emphasis as no longer relevant, 
Colonel Caine released the officers with the public affairs specialty code from this Academy 
assignment, even while many of them were at graduate school in preparation for instructor duty 
in the Commandant’s office.447 Instead of the focus on communication and public affairs, and in 
keeping with his vision, Colonel Caine’s Military Studies Division developed a new course on 
the “Air Force organization and command systems and their relationship to combat power…with 
its focus on the organization, command, control, communication, and intelligence networks 
necessary to win on the modern battlefield.” This course, Caine believed, linked PMS-110 to 
PMS-330, which was a course on “U.S. Force Employment Concepts” that had remained the 
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same since the reorganization of all courses in 1980-81.448 In order to facilitate the course change 
and to prevent any confusion, the division gave the course the designation “PMS-225.” The 
division renamed the course “Airpower Doctrine and Employment” by 1983, since the faculty 
believed this title more effectively captured what the course description and supporting lessons 
emphasized.449 As the early-1980s progressed, the division personnel turned the military studies 
program into a series of strong academic classes with a pertinent focus and meaningful 
relationships among the courses. 
 Besides the significant changes in the sophomore course, the Military Studies Division 
began to concentrate on its capstone course for the seniors. Refinement of the senior-level 
course, PMS-440, “Military Theory and Force Analysis,” had begun in the fall semester 1981.  
As Colonel Caine had informed the Board of Visitors during their interaction, the course’s 
opening lessons included discussions on various military theorists, with “the remainder of the 
course…designed to demonstrate to the students a technique for the analysis of a nation’s 
military force.” Given the geopolitical realities of that period, the course used the Soviet Union 
as a test case for instruction. The course offered an introduction into Russian and Soviet military 
history, the role of Marxist and Leninist doctrine, Soviet military strategy and doctrine, and the 
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Order of Battle for Soviet forces.450 Also, for the first time, a military studies course participated 
in the Academy’s academic Honors Program. The PMS-440 core course offered an Honors 
section beginning in the fall semester 1983. The Dean now recognized the improvement in the 
rigor of the military studies curriculum and allowed the Commandant to contribute to the overall 
academic Honors program.451 Although the revised coursework for the entire PMS-440 class was 
well received by the Dean and the cadets – and some cadets even put on their course critiques 
that the Professional Military Studies course was their favorite of all courses –452 the cadets 
remained disappointed that the military studies courses in general, and not just PMS-440, did not 
receive unit course load credit for this 42-lesson course. A typical unit course load for a cadet 
was five or six courses a semester.  So even though PMS courses carried semester credits and 
contributed to a grade point average, not having a course unit load meant the cadet had to take 
another class. Cadets viewed PMS as not as significant as other academic courses, since all 
academic classes had a course load. The lack of this recognition contributed to this course, and 
military studies courses in general, not winning “complete academic credibility in the eyes of 
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cadets.”453 This remained a stumbling block to cadets’ regarding the course work as necessary 
and on par with the Dean’s course work. Even though the course received the appropriate two or 
three credit hours, which factored into the cadet’s overall grade point average, cadets often 
grouped military studies courses with other activities that did not receive unit loading, and 
therefore they did not see them as being as necessary as courses in traditional academic 
disciplines. 
 In the early 1980s, in order to add to academic rigor, other initiatives were taken to 
strengthen the academic instructors in the division beyond demanding that instructors now come 
equipped with a pertinent graduate degree. First, in 1982, with the continued development of the 
senior-level course that emphasized the Soviet Union’s airpower model and order of battle, the 
division sent four instructors, with the intent to send as many as possible in future offerings, to a 
five-day program known as “Soviet Military Power Week.” The Soviet Awareness Team of the 
Air Force Intelligence Service (AFIS/INC) at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C. taught 
the course. Also, three instructors from the division, who instructed the PMS-440 course, entered 
a doctoral program sponsored by Denver University and completed their first course on 
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contemporary Soviet defense policy.454 The division continued to strengthen its faculty with 
continued study and appropriate credentials. 
 The program of military studies had profited from some coherent changes in just a few 
years. Whereas the findings of the various studies and committees led to the establishment of 42-
lesson courses for each class, by the 1982-83 academic year the Academy finally had an 
academically reputable program of four courses in military studies that “was logical and which 
took the cadet from looking with a broad view at his or her profession, through air power, the 
employment of air power, and, finally, to military theory and a look at the Soviet Union,” the 
country’s largest competitor.455 Also, the division began to offer academically solid elective 
courses. In addition to the core course work, in the fall 1983 the division provided its first PMS-
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495 elective course, which “examined and analyzed selected air battles to a depth not achieved 
by any other course taught” at the Academy.456 The Deputy Commandant for Military 
Instruction, and his Military Studies Division, had established a solid framework of courses. 
 Also by 1983, the overall objective of the office of the Deputy Commandant for Military 
Instruction, specifically the Division of Military Studies, was codified into a basic military 
mission statement. The previous years of developing a rigorous, stable, and dedicated program 
for the academic study of the profession of arms culminated in constructing this vision. The 
Academy regulation states: “Professional Military Studies Division/CWIS: Plans, implements, 
and evaluates formal courses of Professional Military Studies. Manages curriculum development. 
Integrates professional military studies content with that of courses taught by the Dean of 
Faculty.”457 By 1985 the Military Studies Division had supplemented this official statement with 
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its own mission statement, too. The division was “responsible for providing future Air Force 
officers with a solid understanding of the traditions, tools, operating practices, theoretical 
principles and challenges of the military profession.”458 These statements underscore the 
division’s work to enhance its credibility—especially within the academic community—and the 
division did begin to receive it. 
 The increased attention given to the office of the Deputy Commandant for Military 
Instruction led to significant personnel changes during the first decade of the office having a 
Permanent Professor. Besides immediately sending two members off to earn doctoral degrees 
and rearranging personnel between the Military Training Division and the Military Studies 
Division, Colonel Caine acted on his new authority to gain more qualified personnel. He was 
able to make a deal with the Dean of Faculty and hired Lieutenant Colonel Jim Titus to take over 
the Military Studies Division in 1983.459 Titus came equipped with a doctorate in history from 
Rutgers University, had Air Force operational experience, and had taught in the Academy’s 
Department of History. Colonel Caine thought that it was even more significant not only that Lt. 
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Col. Titus had experience with curriculum development and teaching experience but also that he 
had the background and ability to be a Department Head and Permanent Professor.460 Within a 
short time, Colonel Caine, with the support of the Superintendent, had established a solid 
Military Studies Division with a credible and rigorous curriculum that was now headed by a 
credentialed and capable leader. 
 This action created a stir between the Dean’s personnel and the Commandant’s deputy. 
Specifically, the new Permanent Professor and Head of the Department of History, Colonel Carl 
Reddel, questioned the role and focus of the new Military Studies Division. Once again, the 
Superintendent offered significant support to Colonel Caine to ensure the success for the 
division.  Caine faced difficulties upon his elevation to be the Deputy Commandant for Military 
Instruction in 1981. One of those was the veto power that General Tallman had given the 
Professional Development Review Committee, which included a number of Permanent 
Professors from the Dean’s realm, who could influence curriculum development within the 
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Military Studies Division. Although General Tallman later agreed to disband this group, after it 
had helped develop the initial curriculum under the Commandant, the current Superintendent, 
General Kelly, “bought… a hundred percent” that CWI/CWIS could develop its own curriculum 
without other input from other departments. Even so, Caine notes: “In military art and science or 
professional military studies…we certainly made some significant compromises in curriculum in 
terms of what we would have like to have done versus what we actually did do driven by the 
concern that [the History Department, specifically] had.”461 This development with the History 
Department in the early 1980s suggests that the Dean’s permanent faculty recognized the 
academic quality that Colonel Caine had brought into his program in dealings within the 
Commandant’s branch, so that, in this case with the History Department, other disciplines 
showed some concern that the military studies curriculum would impinge on their own 
established fields of instruction. 
 Although the division had a solid program of courses for each class year by 1983, which 
seemingly embodied a logical progression from year to year, this did not eliminate the need for 
change or correction. However, Colonel Caine understood change as being “evolutionary”—he 
expected nothing to reverse or invalidate the half-decade of study, reflection, and 
implementation, which could now be forged into a rigorous and stable military studies 
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curriculum.462 However, tension remained between the Military Studies Division and the Dean 
of Faculty to keep the division’s core course program within the overall academic core 
curriculum. Whenever the Academy Curriculum Committee made changes in the academic core 
requirements, the change usually affected all academic departments, to include the Military 
Studies Division.  
 The most serious adjustment occurred just a couple of years after establishing a 
seemingly reliable and credible curriculum. In the spring semester in 1984, the Academy 
experienced another cheating scandal, this time in the Physics Department. In response to this 
crisis, and showing the ability to be flexible with his curriculum, Colonel Caine agreed to 
incorporate a serious readjustment of the freshman-level core course for the incoming class of 
cadets that fall of 1985, the class of 1989. This change was logical in that the new course brought 
serious attention to ethical issues to an early point in cadets’ studies. However, the division now 
split the freshman-level semester course into two half-semester courses, PMS-110 and PMS-111. 
The first course emphasized “the role of honor, integrity, and other professional values at the 
Academy” through a number of lessons directly discussing the Cadet Honor Code. PMS-111, 
“U.S. Defense Establishment,” followed in the second half of the semester.  It was to cover as 
many topics from the original course within the 21 lessons that it could—a challenge that could 
not be met. In order to teach the entire freshman class the first semester, the division used 
instructors from the sophomore-level course, which meant that PMS-221, “Airpower Theory and 
Doctrine,” was not taught during the first half of the semester—so it also was reduced to 21 
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lessons.463 The solid line-up now had now been significantly altered because of events outside 
the division itself, and the resulting disjointedness would take time to work through. 
 Once the Military Studies Division instituted these changes, it was hard to reverse course. 
Colonel Caine participated in the sabbatical program at USAFA from January 1987 until January 
1988, with Lieutenant Colonel Titus substituting for him as the Acting Deputy Commandant for 
Military Instruction. Upon his return in the middle of an academic year, Colonel Caine noted that 
the big issues facing his organization came from those changes in 1985, however necessary they 
had been at the time. He reflected that there were three significant concerns “internal to the 
[Military Studies] program” that his organization would need to address “in an evolutionary 
manner.” The most significant was the now normalized half-semester sophomore course, PMS-
221. The second concern focused on the freshmen courses that allowed only a half-semester for 
each topic—one related to the Cadet Honor Code and the other on the introduction to 
professionalism. The final issue concerned the senior-level capstone course, which failed to 
capture the cadets’ attention and interest and did not receive favorable evaluations from them.464 
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Colonel Caine would use his final years on active duty as the Deputy Commandant for Military 
Instruction to resolve these problems, an effort that gradually strengthened the academic quality 
of the program. 
 Colonel Caine resolved the issue of the freshmen-level course through a practical 
measure. As he recognized, since he had worked curriculum issues for over twenty years, in 
order to receive some benefit, there often must be a trade-off.465 Caine noted that the 
Commandant and Athletic Department got only a single vote each on the Academy Curriculum 
Committee, but the Dean’s faculty got one vote per Permanent Professor (for each department or 
discipline).  This established the pattern that, “If the [Dean’s] faculty doesn’t want something to 
happen[,] it isn’t going to happen.”466 Since Caine’s goal was to solidify the three upper-level 
courses, and to ensure that each course was assigned three credit hours, he knew that he had to 
concede something. The three credit hours per course was significant because this determined the 
amount of work outside the classroom that a discipline could assign, and Colonel Caine believed 
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that fewer than three hours restricted “in-depth study” of a topic.467 The Military Studies 
Division’s wild card was having a freshmen-level core course—even though it was now only a 
half-semester by the time he returned from sabbatical leave. In 1987, the division had convinced 
the institution to use other avenues, to include a military training period after lunch every other 
day, as an opportunity to expose the cadets to a more rigorous Cadet Honor Code curriculum. So 
the half-semester freshmen-level PMS-111 class that concentrated on this curriculum ended as a 
Military Studies Division responsibility, with its last offering in the fall semester 1987.468 Now 
the division had only the half-semester course on professionalism for the freshmen.  
 In 1992, in his last year on active duty, Colonel Caine jumped into a curriculum-wide 
effort to reduce the freshmen-year course load. He offered to eliminate the half-semester PMS-
110 course, but asked that the other three military studies core offerings all receive three credit 
hours, so that the remaining three would be rigorous, including expectations of more work 
outside the classroom. The curriculum committee agreed.469 This development was not limited to 
the Air Force Academy. A similar change occurred at West Point with the arrival of Lt. Gen. 
Dave Palmer as their new Superintendent. He, too, was concerned about the overloading of cadet 
time, which resulted in cadets neglecting their military science subjects—these courses carried 
less weight for a grade point average than other academic courses. He was pushing West Point in 
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a direction similar to that which was developing at the Air Force Academy.470 Colonel Caine’s 
efforts took a decade, but now the three remaining military studies courses each spanned a full 
semester with a full three-credit hour load. He could feel vindicated, knowing that he had at least 
three strong core courses in the curriculum and that he had done his part to assist in the efforts 
with streamlining the curriculum. 
 Eliminating the freshman-level course allowed the division to concentrate on 
strengthening the sophomore-level course. PMS-220, which had escaped the designation of 
PMS-225 and later PMS-221, as the course came to seem more normal in the curriculum, 
continued to emphasize air power, specifically doctrine, force structure, and force employment. 
In the 1988-89 academic year, the course regained its full-semester, 42-lesson curriculum, and 
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reverted to the PMS-220 label.471 With the additional lessons, the course again underwent some 
fine-tuning. The course was still focused on air power operations, but the increased number of 
lessons allowed for greater study of air power in the Middle East and a major case study of the 
Falklands War air campaign from 1982. The course included three new texts: Air Power: A 
Concise History, by Robin Higham; War in the Third Dimension, by R. A. Mason; and, 
presciently, Air Campaign, by John Warden.472 The next year, Warden, the architect of the air 
war in the First Gulf War, even provided a lecture, both semesters, to all sections of the course 
that detailed his vision of changes in theory and doctrine that he considered justified by modern 
improvements in air power. That academic year, 1989-90, saw increased enthusiasm and positive 
evaluations for the course.473 With the elimination of the freshmen core course, PMS-220 then 
gained its three credit-hour status by 1992, up from its standard two hours, and increased its rigor 
and status among the cadets and academic faculty. 
 Finally, Colonel Caine put more emphasis on the study of war for the senior-level 
capstone course. This course continued to provide an introduction to military theorists, with the 
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Academy staff in the late-1960s, early-1970s and was a major participant in the 
discussion of airpower. 
473 AFAHD, 1 July 1989 – 30 June 1990, Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents, CW 1-72, AH 
1-10, Number CW-38, “Military Studies Division (CWIS),” 4. 
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bulk of the course serving as a “force analysis” study focused on the Soviet Union. For the first 
few years, the course had used a division-developed, course-wide compendium of readings, 
some written by the instructors, to discuss the nature and theory of warfare. The intention was 
that, “As [the cadet] examines the great theorists and their works, the student realizes that war is 
a complex matter which requires more than simplistic quantitative comparisons of force 
levels”—and certainly more study. But the course’s emphasis, again, was mostly on Soviet 
military structure, doctrine, and capabilities.474 In 1985, incurring the disdain of the History 
Department, the course used portions of Hew Strachan’s European Armies and the Conduct of 
War (1983). To strengthen the investigation of military theorists and to provide “sufficient 
illustration of the concepts to make them understandable and relevant,” the cadets used most of 
the first seven chapters of the text, which covered the Age of Limited War, Napoleonic Warfare, 
Jomini, and Clausewitz—thus the need to use a historically-based text.475 The conflict was that 
                                                 
474 AFAHD, 1 July 1986 – 30 June 1987, Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents, CW 26-55, AH 
1-6, AC 1-7, Number CW-28, “Military Studies Division (CWIS),” 2. 
475 AFAHD, 1 Jan 1985 – 30 June 1986, Appendix, Vol. VI, Documents, DF 84-94, CW 
1-46, Number CW-44, “Military Studies Division (CWIS) (1 January – 31 December 
1985),” 4, Atch 9; AFAHD, 1 Jan 1986 – 30 June 1987, Appendix, Vol. VIII, 
Documents, CW 106-173, AH 1-44, Number CW-147, “Military Studies Division (CWIS) 
1986,” 3-4. The course opened with an introductory lesson, and then a lesson each on Sun 
Tzu and Machiavelli, before using the Strachan book for lessons 4-10. Following lesson 
9’s discussion of von Moltke and his views of Clausewitz, from the book, the course had 
four more lessons on various topics that did not use the text, before a review and mid-
term exam on lesson 15 and 16, respectively. The rest of the course was focused on a 
force analysis of the Soviet Union—which included bringing in a guest speaker, former 
Afghan Colonel Ali Jalali—to discuss Soviet operations in Afghanistan. Also, the 1986 
CWIS report contains almost a two-page, single-spaced “Abstract” that defines and 
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one of the History Department’s two core courses, the “Introduction to Military History” course, 
also used this book as one of its five texts for the course.476 So, to end the dissension, the 
division began to use Peter Paret’s revised version of Makers of Modern Strategy (1986).  
 After using the Paret text that first year, Colonel Caine and the instructors recognized that 
it did not meet the need, nor did the cadets think it did, as they made clear in their evaluations of 
the course. But Caine was resolved to expose the cadets to the theorists who had examined and 
written about war.477 So, although in the following year the course reverted to an instructor-
compiled reading guide, the senior-level course returned to using the Paret text, with 
supplemental readings, during the 1989-90 academic year.  This practice continued for a number 
of years. According to Colonel Caine, “The problem was not the [Paret] book but with the way it 
was used and taught.” So Colonel Caine leaned on one of his “master teachers who had been 
extraordinarily successful” with applying the text in the classroom, and had this instructor design 
and teach an orientation course for the rest of the staff, during the summer of 1989 on how one 
could effectively use the text—“the result was positive and the student evaluations completely 
                                                                                                                                                             
defends the curriculum of military studies, and offers the distinction between, and the 
need for incorporating so much military history in the program. This discussion does 
justice to providing the rationale for the senior-level curriculum, specifically the 
intertwining of theory, history, and war gaming. 
476 USAFA Special Collections, Department of History, Spring-Summer 1987, Vol. II, 
202, 202H, 202S, 303, 303H, 303X, 303XH, “History 202, Spr 87,” Syllabus. The 
military history course used this text beginning in 1985-86 academic year. 
477 Philip D. Caine, “CWI, 1980-1992: End of Tour Report of Brigadier General, USAF 
(Ret), Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction and Permanent Professor, 1980-
1992,” USAFA Special Collections, 105. 
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turned around.”478 The division had demonstrated again its ability to deliver course rigor. 
Colonel Caine and his instructors pushed for improvement within the course curriculum, and 
they ensured that the instructors were well prepared to provide sound education. 
 Not only were the courses continually in refinement during this period, but also the 
military studies instructors continued to improve and contribute in this more sophisticated 
academic environment. What happened regarding the senior-level military theory course, then, 
offers some understanding of the effort to enhance instructor performance and capability. Even 
more significantly, Colonel Caine also continued to send qualified officers to get advanced 
degrees in international relations, military history, and instructional technology.479 The academic 
                                                 
478 Philip D. Caine, “CWI, 1980-1992: End of Tour Report of Brigadier General, USAF 
(Ret), Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction and Permanent Professor, 1980-
1992,” USAFA Special Collections, 109. The “master instructor” was the division chief, 
Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Martin, who took over the division in 1987. Martin was the first 
candidate for a Ph.D. that Colonel Caine sent off in the summer of 1982, who returned 
complete from The Ohio State University in 1985. 
479 AFAHD, 1 Jan 1985 – 30 June 1986, Appendix, Vol. VI, Documents, DF 84-94, CW 
1-46, Number CW-44, “Military Studies Division (CWIS) (1 January – 31 December 
1985),” 1; AFAHD, 1 July 1987 – 30 June 1988, Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents CW 17-
60, AH 1-7, CW-25, “Military Studies Division (CWIS),” 1; AFAHD, 1 July 1988 – 30 
June 1989, Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents, DF 58-63, CW 1-55, Number CW-20, 
“Military Studies Division (CWIS),” 3; AFAHD, 1 July 1989 – 30 June 1990, Appendix, 
Vol. IV, Documents, CW 1-72, AH 1-10, Number CW-38, “Military Studies Division 
(CWIS),” 2; AFAHD, 1 July 1991 – 30 June 1992, Appendix, Vol. V, Documents CW 55-
107, CW-75, “Military Art and Science Division (CWIS),” 3 and CW-74, “Instructional 
Technology (CWII)”, 2. The focus on IT was for the use of computer simulations and 
programs to assist instruction through wargaming, primarily. For advance degrees, 
besides then-Major Martin completing a Ph.D. from The Ohio State University in 
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year 1989-1990 saw two of the division faculty leading the Academy’s Soviet and East European 
Studies Group (SEESG), as well as continuing the tradition of instructors teaching in the 
Political Science and Foreign Languages departments.480 The increasing credibility of the 
military instructors led to academic promotions—other than Colonel Caine—recognized by the 
Dean of Faculty. For example, in the 1991-1992 academic year, Major Michael Whyte, whom 
                                                                                                                                                             
military history (1982-1985), the division sent Captain Milton Nielson to the University 
of Texas (Austin) to pursue a degree in Curriculum Instruction Specialization 
Instructional Technology (Microcomputer Application) in 1985, to continue computer 
integration and war gaming into the CWIS curriculum; Major Doug Erwin completed his 
Ph.D. in international relations at Denver University and Captain Glen Kennedy received 
his Master’s degree in military history from Texas A&M, both in 1986; Captain Michael 
Whyte was sponsored for his doctorate in instructional technology from the University of 
Southern California (1988-1991); Major Allen Dorn completed a Ph.D. in political 
science at the University of Indiana (1989-December 1992); Captain Forsyth also went to 
Denver University on a Ph.D.-sponsored program in international relations (1990-1993), 
and Major Greg Elder did a Ph.D. in IT at Arizona State University (1990-1993). This 
demonstrates that Colonel Caine solidified Academy-sponsored credentialed degrees for 
his personnel, similar to what the Academy Dean of Faculty had put in place since its 
inauguration. 
480 AFAHD, 1 July 1989 – 30 June 1990, Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents, CW 1-72, AH 
1-10, Number CW-38, “Military Studies Division (CWIS),” 2-3. The SEESG was an 
Academy-wide program, primarily targeting interested faculty serving on the Dean’s 
side, as well as those in staff positions with the Superintendent and Commandant. Newly-
selected Lieutenant Colonel Martin, still the Military Studies Division head, chaired the 
organization, and Captain Yurij Holowinsky, a fluent Russian speaker who taught in the 
Foreign Language department, acted as the group’s secretary. Major Ishino, the Japanese 
Air Force exchange officer, similar to previous exchange officers, also taught in the 
Foreign Language department. 
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the division had sponsored for a Ph.D., received an academic promotion to associate professor; 
eleven other division members attained assistant professor status.481 The Dean now included the 
military studies instructors under his academic promotion regulation. By the time of Colonel 
Caine’s retirement, not only had the curriculum achieved a level of parity with those of other 
academic departments under the Dean, but his instructor force had also gained acceptance by the 
academic community. 
 To support this more enriched academic environment, the division began various 
programs to enhance learning. In the 1987-1988 academic year, the division initiated the Visiting 
Airpower Professional Program (VAPP), which was “designed to increase cadet exposure to 
retired officers who have made significant contributions to the development or employment of 
airpower.” In the inaugural program, Major General Haywood S. Hansell, Jr. (USAF, Retired) 
spent a day with the cadets and offered a lecture to all PMS-221 students on “Airpower Doctrine 
in WW II.”482 Also, the division continued to support a speakers’ series initiated by the 
Commandant, Brigadier General Beckel, in 1981. This program, the Commandant’s Leadership 
Series (CLS), introduced the cadets and staff “to some of the prominent military and civilian 
leaders” of the day. During the first year, the division sponsored talks from Captain Richard 
Stratton (USN), Director of Operations, U.S. Naval Academy and former Prisoner of War 
(POW) in Southeast Asia; Brigadier Robinson Risner, an ace from the Korean War and also a 
                                                 
481 AFAHD, 1 July 1991 – 30 June 1992, Appendix, Vol. V, Documents CW 55-107, 
CW-75, “Military Art and Science Division (CWIS),” 3. 
482 AFAHD, 1 July 1987 – 30 June 1988, Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents CW 17-60, AH 
1-7, CW-25, “Military Studies Division (CWIS),” 4. 
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former POW in Southeast Asia; and Tom Lasorda, manager of the Los Angeles Dodgers.483 By 
1985, the CLS series focused on military leaders—primarily Air Force—as it sponsored General 
T.R. Milton, the former chairman of the NATO Military Committee; Lieutenant General Merrill 
A. McPeak, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs and Resources; Colonel Ali Jalali, formerly 
of the Afghan Army; and Ronald de Valderano, 18th Duke of Valderano, a terrorism expert.484 
Colonel Caine’s leadership and vision as the Permanent Professor of Military Instruction ensured 
that a solid academic program would form under his watch. 
  The difficulties that Colonel Caine had confronted regarding the curriculum upon his 
return from sabbatical leave were now resolved as he entered his last year of active duty in 1992. 
His vision had been to establish a rigorous, credible, and relatively stable curriculum in military 
                                                 
483 AFAHD, 1 January 1981 – 31 December 1982, Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents, DF 
60-75, CW 1-56, Number CW-5, “Military Studies Division (CWIS), 1982,” 1-2. 
484 AFAHD, 1 Jan 1985 – 30 June 1986, Appendix, Vol. VI, Documents, DF 84-94, CW 
1-46, Number CW-44, “Military Studies Division (CWIS) (1 January – 31 December 
1985),” 2. General McPeak would visit the Academy again in this capacity, this time as 
the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. See AFAHD, 1 July 1991 – 30 June 1992, Appendix, 
Vol. V, Documents CW 55-107, CW-75, “Military Art and Science Division (CWIS),” 7. 
That same academic year that Gen. McPeak visited, Lt. Gen. Charles Horner, the 9th Air 
Force Commander—the air component supporting CENTCOM—discussed his role in 
DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM (his lecture was 6 Dec 1991), as the senior Air 
Force officer, and Maj. Gen. Buster Glosson, in charge of the air plans in Riyadh (his 
visit was 20 Sep 1991), also visited. Sometimes these were single lectures provided by 
the distinguished visitor, other times it was an opportunity for a seminar setting for an 
entire course. As a point of interest, during the 1982-1983 academic year, Gene 
Roddenberry spoke to the sections of PMS-440. See AFAHD, 1 January 1981 – 31 
December 1982, Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents, DF 60-75, CW 1-56, Number CW-5, 
“Military Studies Division (CWIS), 1982,” 4. 
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studies that the academic community accepted before he retired. He was successful in this 
endeavor. But as he closed his career, Caine implemented two final changes. One concerned the 
name of the division that carried out the academic education of the cadets in military studies. The 
second was a rearrangement of the curriculum—the order in which the core courses were 
delivered by the academic division. The name change was not only cosmetic but also a matter of 
public relations, taking on the name “Military Art and Science Division” with the initials 
“MAS”—as Colonel noted, “thus eliminating the dreaded ‘PMS’ acronym.”485 – The new name 
also reflected a philosophy that encapsulated Colonel Caine’s vision of a rigorous, academic 
approach to military studies. The idea was that “Military Art referred to ‘the creation and 
exploitation of advantages in war that enable military power to achieve political objectives’ and 
Military Science represented ‘a discipline concerned with the nature of war and methods of 
conducting war’.”486 To some, this may have seemed to be a minor change, but it did restore 
some credibility with cadets, and it suggested the philosophical ground for the significance of 
military studies. 
 The other change was with the line-up of courses offered to the three most senior classes. 
Colonel Caine felt vindicated in removing PMS-110 from the core curriculum, as he now had 
three upper-level core courses, each given at three credit hours—he actually gained one credit 
                                                 
485 AFAHD, 1 July 1991 – 30 June 1992, Appendix, Vol. V, Documents CW 55-107, 
CW-75, “Military Art and Science Division (CWIS),” 8. The two changes were agreed 
and announced in April 1992, but did not take effect until the 1992-1993 academic year. 
486 Department of Military and Strategic Studies, Dr. John Farquhar, Historian, Vol. 1, 
34th Education Group Annual History Reports, “34th Education Group Annual History 
Report, 30 June 2004 to 31 July 2005,” Appendix 5, “Valor to Victory—A Thematic 
History of the 34th Education Group, by Dr. John T. Farquhar, 25 Jul 2005,” 2. 
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hour for his academic division’s total.487 But now the division had the opportunity to restructure 
the three remaining courses. The study that Colonel Caine and the Military Art and Science 
Division undertook was also affected by geopolitical changes in the world, specifically the 
break-up of the Soviet Union. The senior-level course, PMS-440, had already “reduced the 
emphasis” on the section of the course that dealt with Soviet force analysis and, therefore, had 
already allowed more time to discuss military theory and theorists.488 The decision was to 
discuss military theory and professionalism in MAS-220, air power theory and doctrine in MAS-
330, and lessons on joint and combined operations in the senior-level MAS-440.489 As Colonel 
Caine put it: “The fundamental academic purpose in making the change was the realization that, 
in today’s study of [warfare], theory and the theorists had to come first to provide the bedrock on 
which to build the remainder of the program.” As he concluded, the order of the coursework that 
                                                 
487 Philip D. Caine, “CWI, 1980-1992: End of Tour Report of Brigadier General, USAF 
(Ret), Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction and Permanent Professor, 1980-
1992,” USAFA Special Collections, 112; AFAHD, 1 July 1992 – 30 June 1993, 
Appendix, Vol. IV, Documents, CW 78-119, Number CW-81, “Military Art and Science 
Division (CWIS).” Before the change, only PMS-440 earned 3 credit hours. PMS-110, 
the half-semester course, was valued at only one credit hour; PMS-220 and 330 each 
were 2 credit hours each. The division could now expect more dedicated time, and more 
focused time, on their course work outside of the classroom (instructors could assign 
more reading, writing, etc.). 
488 AFAHD, 1 July 1991 – 30 June 1992, Appendix, Vol. V, Documents CW 55-107, 
CW-75, “Military Art and Science Division (CWIS),” 5. The new designation of “MAS” 
did not take effect until the 1992-1993 academic year. 
489 AFAHD, 1 July 1992 – 30 June 1993, Appendix, Vol. VI, Documents CW 78-119, 
CW-81, “Military Art and Science Division (CWIS),” 2. The courses were MAS-220, 
“The Profession of Arms”; MAS-330, “Airpower and Doctrine”; and, MAS-440, “Joint 
and Combined Arms.” 
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cadets took was now almost entirely reversed from what had been originally developed.490 Even 
so, the first Permanent Professor of Military Instruction within the Commandant’s realm could 
be satisfied with the work that his directorate had accomplished, especially within the academic 
coursework offered in military studies. 
 Colonel Caine’s retirement in 1992 offered a significant opportunity for the institution to 
name another Permanent Professor to head the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction. 
Colonel Caine retired after thirty-seven years of active service—twenty-seven of those years had 
been committed to the Academy. Staying true to the newly-established tradition, the Academy 
replaced now-Brigadier General (Retired) Caine with another confirmed Permanent Professor of 
Military Instruction, Colonel David Wagie. Colonel Wagie, a former KC-135 pilot, had taught at 
the Academy in the Department of Astronautics, eventually becoming the department’s deputy 
head. He held a doctorate from Purdue University in aeronautics and astronautics.491 Although 
not specifically credentialed in military studies, or in another discipline that would have seemed 
more compatible with heading the military instruction directorate, Wagie was at least 
                                                 
490 Philip D. Caine, “CWI, 1980-1992: End of Tour Report of Brigadier General, USAF 
(Ret), Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction and Permanent Professor, 1980-
1992,” USAFA Special Collections, 113. 
491 Biography of Brigadier General David A. Wagie, 
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/Biographies/Display/tabid/225/Article/105323/brigadier-
general-david-a-wagie.aspx. Colonel Wagie would take a sabbatical in 1994 and not 
return as the Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction, as he inaugurated a larger 
Academy the vision to create the Center for Character Development at the Academy—
now the Center for Leadership and Character Development. He served as the Academy’s 
Vice Dean from 1996-1998, and then as the Dean of Faculty from 1 July 1998 – October 
2004. 
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academically credentialed with strong ties and previous experience with the Dean of Faculty. 
The new Permanent Professor and Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction implemented 
portions of the new military studies program during the 1992-1993 academic year, followed by 
the entirely new curriculum in 1993-1994.  
 Colonel Wagie and his subordinates continued to advance the academic reputation of the 
Military Art and Science Division. His assistant deputy, Lt. Col. Jerry Martin, who was the first 
officer whom Colonel Caine’s directorate had sponsored for a doctorate, had been the division 
head for four years and had returned that summer of 1992 from a year long sabbatical, during 
which he graduated from Air War College. When Martin left for the year, the division was then 
headed by Major Michael Whyte, who also had earned a directorate-sponsored Ph.D.492 As well 
as ensuring that the core courses continued to offer the cadets solid academic instruction, the 
division maintained instruction in some elective courses. Also, the division began an Aerospace 
Study Group, which provided a forum to discuss various military topics. Finally, the division 
inaugurated an academic journal, initially with a small circulation of 600, which included other 
service academies and military schools, the Pentagon, and various entities in Air University at 
                                                 
492 AFAHD, 1 July 1991 – 30 June 1992, Appendix, Vol. V, Documents CW 55-107, 
CW-71, “Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction (CWI),” 1, and CW-75, “Military 
Art and Science Division (CWIS),” 1, 3; AFAHD, 1 July 1992 – 30 June 1993, Appendix, 
Vol. VI, Documents CW 78-119, CW-78, “Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction 
(CWI),” 1-2, and CW-81, “Military Art and Science Division (CWIS),” 1, 4. Martin 
headed the division from 1987-1991, when he went on the sabbatical and completed Air 
War College, in residence. Whyte had headed up the instructional technology division 
under Caine (CWII) until he assumed the leadership of the Military Art and Science 
Division. In 1993, Major Whyte received Senior Associate Professor status, providing 
him a tenured position. This increased stability within the directorate and division. 
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Maxwell Air Force Base.493 Colonel Wagie continued to advance the unit’s academic relevance 
where General Caine had left off. 
 Following the 1992 Air Force-wide unit reorganization and restructuring, which were 
part of the downsizing of the military in the era following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
Commandant’s office at the Academy went through its own organizational realignment, mostly 
in name, during the 1994-95 academic year. Although the Military Studies Division had just 
been renamed the Military Art and Sciences Division, now the entire organization was scheduled 
to align more with designations of the larger Air Force. On 7 November 1994, the Commandant 
of Cadets was renamed as the 34th Training Wing, and the Deputy Commandant for Military 
                                                 
493 AFAHD, 1 July 1992 – 30 June 1993, Appendix, Vol. VI, Documents CW 78-119, 
CW-81, “Military Art and Science Division (CWIS),” 7-8. The ASG had a lecture by the 
RAF Cranwell Briefing Team; a lecture by Lt. Col. Martin on “Airpower Theory in the 
Gulf War” (a CADRE paper produced while he was at Air War College); a briefing by 
Dr. Benjamin Lambeth, RAND Corp., on “The Future of the Russian Air Force”; and, 
various “Military Theory Discussion Colloquiums” on books (Martin van Creveld’s, The 
Transformation of War) and articles (Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, “Military 
Misfortunes”), among other activities that year. The journal was the MAS Quarterly, 
which delivered copies to USMA, USNA, USCGA, Texas A&M, et. al., and provided an 
academic forum that “discusses current military issues.” The division published an issue 
in both the fall and spring academic semesters that year. Since it received such a large 
response, it was continued the following academic year as Soldier-Scholar (the 
Departments of English, History, and Computer Science contributed to the spring edition, 
as well as an Air Force student at the University of Georgia; the publication went from 15 
pages in the fall to 36 pages for the spring edition). See AFAHD, 1 July 1993 – 30 June 
1994, 104. The journal would be renamed the Airman-Scholar journal for the Spring 
1997 edition, and increased its circulation, to include all AF ROTC detachments, and 
continues to be published. See AFAHD, 1 July 1996 – 30 June 1997, 111-112. 
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Instruction was activated as the 34th Education Group (34th EDG), as one of four groups under 
the wing. Also, in another major milestone, Lt. Col. Jerry Martin took command of the group, 
replacing Colonel Wagie.  Lieutenant Colonel Michael M. Whyte assumed command of the 34th 
Education Squadron (ES), which had been the Military Art and Science Division. The division 
kept its three core courses: MAS 220 – Foundations of the Military Profession; MAS 330 – Air 
Power Theory and Doctrine; and, MAS 440 – Joint and Multinational Operations.494 Although 
the changes were mostly in names to be used, this move did open discussion of whether the 
division responsible for providing the academic program in military studies should be moved 
under the Dean’s authority.  
 The restructuring of units late in 1994 provided an opportunity for the Superintendent to 
initiate a review of all USAFA programs. Lieutenant General Paul Stein organized a “Relevance 
Committee” that focused on all aspects of education and training at the Academy, which directly 
involved the 34th Training Wing (previously called the Commandant of Cadets) and its 
subordinate 34th EDG. The issue that affected the 34th EDG was a proposal from the committee 
to house all academic endeavors under the Dean—this would include the military studies 
program.495 What started all of this discussion, however, was that the Military Art and Science 
Division, now renamed the 34th ES, had proposed MAS as an academic minor, which quickly 
                                                 
494 AFAHD, I July 1994 – 30 June 1995, 77, 90. The Wing took the designation of the 
34th Bombardment Group from World War II. The four groups under the 34th Training 
Wing were the 34th EDG, the 34th Training Group (TRG), the 34th Operations Group 
(OG) and the 34th Support Group (SG). 
495 AFAHD, I July 1994 – 30 June 1995, 90. 
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blossomed into advocating an academic major.496 Two issues influenced the committee to make 
the recommendation: One was the belief that the MAS program “was redundant with material 
already taught” by the Dean of Faculty.  The other was the concern among those who recognized 
the Dean as the sole office for “degree-granting authority” and thus believed that any 
organization that desired an academic major should be under the Dean.497 Although the situation 
was a positive indicator of how academically credible the military studies program had become, 
the committee’s proposition did instill a greater concern in the Commandant’s organization. The 
review process revealed that, if the Superintendent disbanded the 34th ES to move it into the 
Dean’s area, then there was a possibility that the coursework and curriculum might slowly be 
eliminated. However, a significant study of why a previous Superintendent, General Tallman, 
had initially established what was now the 34th EDG in 1980, with its own Permanent Professor, 
helped put an end to this endeavor—at least it stopped the momentum to place military studies 
within the Dean of Faculty.498 
 The drive to establish an academic major within the 34th EDG reveals how influential the 
organization had become. During the 1994-95 academic year, the 34th EDG began to advocate 
for a military studies major that would be reflected on a cadet’s academic transcript and diploma. 
This effort had its roots from the time of the break-up of the Soviet Union, which had created a 
                                                 
496 AFAHD, I July 1995 – 30 June 1996, 107. The Commandant, Brigadier General John 
D. Hopper, Jr., became more involved in the discussion, and he was the one who pressed 
for the major. 
497 AFAHD, I July 1994 – 30 June 1995, 101. 
498 AFAHD, I July 1994 – 30 June 1995, 101. The 34th ES member who compiled this 
information, Captain Dave Landfair, developed a talking paper and slide briefing on this 
relevant information—with the assistance of Brigadier General (Retired) Philip Caine. 
However, these informational histories were not found. 
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period of drastic reevaluation in the Commandant’s military studies program. Specifically, the 
senior-year course had focused on conflict with the Soviet Union and the faculty realized that a 
significant change had to be made in this course, since it was the culminating experience in a 
cadet’s military education at the Academy. As discussed above, the course direction now turned 
toward more emphasis on military theory and theorists and toward their relationship to the 
different levels at which warfare is to be understood: strategy, operational art, tactics, and force 
employment.499 Although the transfer of the MAS department to the Dean of Faculty did not 
occur, the 34th EDG leadership, and members of the 34th ES, recognized that idea to move the 
MAS department under the Dean’s authority “reflects the academic credibility” that the 
organization had fostered since its inception in 1980.500  
 Nevertheless, the 34th EDG did get approval for an academic major by the end of the 
1996 academic year. The “Military Doctrine, Operations, and Strategy” major “features 
interdisciplinary studies and offers cadets the opportunity to study the modern military 
profession from the perspective of its evolving doctrine and complex, interdisciplinary 
environment.”501 Although this major would become available only with the Classes of 2000 and 
2001, at that time, a minor was offered for the Classes of 1998 and 1999—enrollment for cadets 
began in the fall of 1997. Members of the 34th ES were excited that they “had a table” seeking 
                                                 
499 Philip D. Caine, “CWI, 1980-1992: End of Tour Report of Brigadier General, USAF 
(Ret), Deputy Commandant for Military Instruction and Permanent Professor, 1980-
1992,” USAFA Special Collections, 111. 
500 AFAHD, I July 1994 – 30 June 1995, 90. 
501 AFAHD, I July 1997 – 30 June 1998, 100. 
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enrollment in the new programs at the Dean’s majors night in fall 1997—a first.502 Having the 
Curriculum Committee and the Academy Board approve an academic major validated the 
decade-and-a-half of work to provide a rigorous, credible, and stable curriculum, and it testified 
to the academic legitimacy of the program.503 
 Even with this accomplishment, the Education Group continued to press for still higher 
academic standing. In March 1998, the 34th EDG commander submitted a strong proposal to 
mirror some Dean of Faculty programs. One proposal, for example, called for a Distinguished 
Visiting Professor (or Professional) and the institution of the Academic Chair Structure. The 
commander saw these two initiatives “as a step in the evolution of the academic quality of 
military education” at the Academy. The proposal received approval from all necessary 
Academy agencies, including the Dean of Faculty.  The Superintendent generally agreed but 
                                                 
502 AFAHD, 1 July 1997 – 30 June 1998, Vol. V, Documents 34 TRW 107-176, 557 FTS 
1-32, Number 34 TRW-111, “34th Education Squadron (34th ES) Annual History, 1997-
1998,” 3. “Majors night” is a night where all departments set up tables to promote their 
disciplines and majors; cadets move visit with the instructors to help assist with their 
decision on what to study in their upper class years. At the end of June 1998, ten students 
were enrolled in the MDOS major for the Class of 2000 and two from the Class of 2001. 
503 The only stipulation was that since the 34th EDG did not move under the Dean, then a 
special “MDOS Committee,” under the direction of Colonel Douglas Murray, the 
Permanent Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science, and composed of 
representatives from the four academic divisions under the Dean (Basic Sciences, 
Engineering, Humanities, and Social Sciences), would help administer the major. See 
AFAHD, I July 1996 – 30 June 1997, 107. 
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wanted more dialogue between the Commandant and Dean.504 Also, the 34th ES began to 
contract with the American Heritage Custom Publishing Company to produce solid texts for the 
core courses.505 This was Lt. Col. Martin’s last major effort to demonstrate the legitimacy and 
seriousness of the military studies program. He retired that summer and turned over the 
continued responsibility to Colonel Larry Smith.506  
 One of the first issues that Colonel Smith faced was the Curriculum Committee’s 
decision to reduce the core course work for cadets. The 34th ES lost one of its three remaining 
core classes, MAS 220, due to this reduction. Academic year 1998-1999 was the last year in 
which all cadets in all three upper classes received a core course in Military Art and Science.507 
To ensure that the curriculum maintained the military theory block that was in the MAS-220 
course, the 34th ES designed two new core courses. The following academic year was a transition 
year for the squadron, so that academic year 2000-2001 saw the implementation of the new 
                                                 
504 AFAHD, 1 July 1997 – 30 June 1998, Vol. V, Documents 34 TRW 107-176, 557 FTS 
1-32, Number 34 TRW-108, “34 EDG/CC SSS. Subject: 34th EDG DVP and Chair 
Positions, 9 Mar 1998.” See Superintendent’s attached note to this document. 
505 AFAHD, 1 July 1997 – 30 June 1998, 101. The texts were: The Foundations of the 
Military Profession; Selected Readings on Military Leadership, Officership, and 
Strategy; Air and Space Power Theory and Doctrine; and, Introduction to Joint and 
Multinational Operations. 
506 AFAHD, 1 July 1997 – 30 June 1998, Vol. V, Documents 34 TRW 107-176, 557 FTS 
1-32, Number 34 TRW-107, “34th Education Group 1997-1998 Academic Year 
Historical Report,” 1. Lt. Col. Martin’s retirement was 10 August 1998. 
507 AFAHD, I July 1998 – 30 June 1999, Vol. V, Number 34 TRW-127, “34th ES Annual 
History,” 13. This was such an anomaly, anyway, that one discipline at the Academy had 
three core courses. By this change, most disciplines were reduced to two core courses, at 
the most. 
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courses—a freshman-level course for 3 semester hours and a junior-level course of 4½ semester 
hours.508 The squadron maintained its major and minor options, and it continued to present 
academically sound core courses for the cadets. 
 The 34th Education Group experienced more than just the core course modifications that 
academic year, as two other changes considerably altered the direction of military studies. First, 
on 2 July 1999, Colonel Thomas A. Drohan became the next Commander and Permanent 
Professor of Military Instruction for the 34th Education Group. Colonel Drohan, a 1979 Air Force 
Academy graduate, former C/HC-130 pilot, and Ph.D. recipient from the Department of Politics 
at Princeton University, then used the opportunity of his arrival to perform an academic and 
professional review of the group.509 Influenced by a recent article published in the journal World 
Politics, Colonel Drohan and his subordinates adapted an idea proposed by social scientist 
Richard Betts and applied it to the Academy’s military studies program.510 The Education Group 
renamed the discipline as “Military Strategic Studies,” believing that this better represented what 
they needed to do for the institution.  They aimed to answer this overall question: “What should 
the military studies faculty teach to enhance the existing academic core curriculum?” Colonel 
Drohan presented this vision: 
Military strategic studies as a distinct field of study differs from military science 
in that the former is broader than the tactical or operational level science of 
                                                 
508 AFAHD, I July 1999 – 30 June 2000, Vol. V, Documents 34 TRW 95-178, Number 34 
TRW-123, “34th Education Squadron (34th ES) Annual History, 1999-2000,” 11. 
509 Biography of Colonel Thomas A. Drohan, 
http://www.usafa.edu/df/dfmi/MSS%20Index_files/Drohan%20Bio.pdf 
510 Richard K. Betts, “Should Strategic Studies Survive?” World Politics 50, no. 1, Fiftieth 
Anniversary Special Issue (Oct., 1997), pp. 7-33, accessed 23 September 2014, JSTOR. 
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winning battles; differs from political science in that it begins military analysis 
where political science typically ends; and differs from history in its method—
focusing on concepts, processes and emerging issues of military power rather than 
historical exploration. As educators in this profession-focused field of study, we 
organized the department along the lines of this field of study to promote the 
development of MSS knowledge.511 
 The 34th Education Squadron courses now took on the prefix of “MSS,” having 
established a philosophy for Military Strategic Studies as a discipline. Also, a new Permanent 
Professor of Military Instruction was prepared to continue expanding its academic respectability. 
 The situation for the 34th EDG changed significantly in 2005 due to another scandal at the 
Air Force Academy. In the early days of 2003, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff 
of the Air Force, Senator Wayne Allard, Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell, other U.S. 
Congressmen, and various media sources received an email under the pseudonym “Renee 
Trindle” alleging that the U.S. Air Force Academy had a “significant sexual assault 
problem…that had been ignored by the Academy’s leadership.”512 This resulted in numerous 
investigations, primarily by the U.S. Congress, led by Congresswoman Tillie Fowler (former 
Representative from Florida, who had served four terms, from 1993 to 2001), the Office of the 
                                                 
511 Department of Military and Strategic Studies, Dr. John Farquhar, Historian, Vol. 1, 
34th Education Group Annual History Reports, “34th Education Group Annual History 
Report, 30 June 2004 to 31 July 2005,” Appendix 1, “DFMI Command Briefing, 8 Jul 
2005,” 3. Emphasis in the original. 
512 “Report to SECAF, Air Force Inspector General Summary Report Concerning the Handling 
of Sexual Assault Cases at the United States Air Force Academy, 14 September 2004,” 
https://web.archive.org/web/20090513235422/http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-
060726-033.pdf, accessed 20 October 2016. 
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Secretary of the Air Force, led by the Air Force General Counsel, the Air Force Office of the 
Inspector General, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. The Air Force had already 
issued its Agenda for Change within two months after the initial exposure, which put in place 
some policies and procedures to “restore trust and confidence” in a policy of zero-tolerance of 
sexual assault among the cadets, faculty, staff, and public.513 However, the succeeding 
investigations implemented greater change, and some specifically affected Military Strategic 
Studies. 
 One result of these investigations was to include in the 2004 National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) a study of the role of the permanent professor positions at the 
Academy. The reason for incorporating this charge in the NDAA was a finding in the first 
completed investigation, the Fowler Panel Report. This report concluded: 
The Panel is concerned that the Dean of Faculty may have become too ingrained 
in the Academy’s institutional culture to have fully appreciated the indicators of a 
sexual misconduct problem. Currently, it is a statutory requirement that the Dean 
of Faculty be appointed from among the permanent professors who have served as 
heads of departments of instruction. This requires the Dean of Faculty position to 
be filled by an individual who has already served at the Academy for some time 
and it precludes expanding the pool of potential candidates to qualified 
individuals outside of the Academy. Accordingly, the Panel recommends that 
the Air Force prepare a legislative proposal to revise 10 U.S.C. § 9335(a) to 
                                                 
513 Charles R. Larson, Admiral (ret.), "Study and Report Related to Permanent Professors 
at the United States Air Force Academy," (paper conducted for the Secretary of the Air 
Force, April 2004), 1-2, USAFA Special Collections, Box 10. 
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expand the available pool of potential candidates for the position of Dean of 
Faculty beyond the current limitation to permanent professors.514  
The issue was that a negative climate had developed at the Academy, and a large part of the 
failure was that the leaders who were most present and stable at the Academy—the Dean of 
Faculty and the various department permanent professors—were the problem. 
 The subsequent report from Admiral (Retired) Charles R. Larson recommended the 
transfer of military studies to the Dean of Faculty. The Larson Report was a 52-page report 
fulfilling the 2004 NDAA’s order to the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Air Force “to 
complete a ‘study and report related to permanent professors at the United States Air Force 
Academy.’”515 Among the findings and recommendations from Admiral Larson was that the 
cadets, “regardless of gender, also consistently show faculty as having the greatest influence over 
their officer development.”  The problem, the study concluded, was that many of the faculty had 
issues with the role of military training at the Academy, specifically how the Commandant 
performed this task, and that “[g]reater integration of the Academy system should ameliorate this 
                                                 
514 Quoted in Charles R. Larson, Admiral (ret.), "Study and Report Related to Permanent 
Professors at the United States Air Force Academy," (paper conducted for the Secretary of the 
Air Force, April 2004), 4-4, USAFA Special Collections, Box 10. See also Fowler Panel Report, 
“Report of the Panel to Review Sexual Misconduct Allegations at the U.S. Air Force Academy, 
September 22, 2003,” 46, http://www.dtic.mil/dtfs/doc_research/p18_18.pdf, accessed 22 
October 2016. Emphasis in the original. 
515 Charles R. Larson, Admiral (ret.), "Study and Report Related to Permanent Professors 
at the United States Air Force Academy," (paper conducted for the Secretary of the Air 
Force, April 2004), ES-1, USAFA Special Collections, Box 10. Admiral (ret.) Larson 
was twice the Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, chaired a study of the 
“Maryland statewide system of higher education,” and was the current vice-chairman of 
the Maryland Board of Regents. 
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issue.”516 The finding that the Academy mission elements were not well integrated led Admiral 
Larson to recommend “that careful consideration be given by the new Superintendent, 
Commandant, and Dean of Faculty to returning [the Military Strategic Studies major and 
curriculum] to the Dean. This will contribute to cooperation and integration of the Academy 
system.”517 The Academy’s leaders followed this recommendation and on 1 August 2005 
                                                 
516 Charles R. Larson, Admiral (ret.), "Study and Report Related to Permanent Professors 
at the United States Air Force Academy," (paper conducted for the Secretary of the Air 
Force, April 2004), 4-4, 5-1, USAFA Special Collections, Box 10. 
517 Charles R. Larson, Admiral (ret.), "Study and Report Related to Permanent Professors at the 
United States Air Force Academy," (paper conducted for the Secretary of the Air Force, April 
2004), 6-3, USAFA Special Collections, Box 10. Admiral Larson compared USAFA with the 
other two main service academies and showed how USMA and USNA did not make this 
separation. He also used the word “return” since, as Chapter 3 and 4 show, at one time there was 
a consideration, and a small period of time, when military studies was under the Dean. As 
Finding 9 states: “The Placement of the Military Strategic Studies Major in the Training Wing 
May Contribute to Unnecessary Competition between the Commandant and the Dean. It appears 
that education has become a competition between the Commandant and the Dean. The 
Commandant is responsible for cadet training as well as an entire academic department and 
major—Military Strategic Studies (MSS). This is in contrast to the other two service academies 
and promotes a separation of the education mission and blurs the distinction between education 
and training. Admiral Larson believes it creates the perception that the Dean’s faculty are neither 
good military role models nor current and capable enough to oversee and teach courses in the 
MSS major,” ES-2. The recommendation begins, “[The Military Strategic Studies major] is the 
only academic major that does not fall under the Dean of Faculty. As discussed in the findings, 
Admiral Larson believes this split may have contributed to the Terrazzo gap.” What is interesting 
is that when the reorganization occurred in 1994, as discussed earlier in this chapter, and the 
Dean wanted to incorporate Military Art and Science into his responsibility, one major dissent 
that came from many senior members in the 34th EDG was that the rising academic credibility 
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inactivated the 34 EDG, moving all elements under the Dean as the Department of Military and 
Strategic Studies.518 Since the military studies program had advanced to become academically 
credible, the transition was rather threatened practically no one. 
 The military studies curriculum had become a rigorous and respectable academic 
program. The inclusion of a Permanent Professor in the Commandant’s area of responsibility had 
produced enormous dividends in creating this solid program. In his article about the Air Force 
Academy’s dilemma regarding professional military studies, Brigadier General (Ret.) Philip 
Caine, who had been the driving force in changing the military studies program and curriculum 
in the 1980s, wrote that the record of military studies at the Academy was “not very good,” 
suggesting that it was “too often characterized by frequently changing courses, poor instruction, 
and second-class status in the education of future officers.”519 By the end of his career, General 
Caine had established a solid professional foundation for the program on which follow-on 
personnel were able to build. When in 2004 crisis once again faced the Academy, and the 
pressure was to place the military studies program under the Dean to help address the crisis and 
                                                                                                                                                             
within the Commandant’s purview “serve[d] as a valuable bridge between the Dean’s 
organization and the Commandant’s area of responsibility.” See AFAHD, 1 July 1994 – 30 June 
1995, 91. This bridge between the Commandant and Dean began with the founding of the 
Academy. This author puts the impetus on the first Commandant, Brigadier General Stillman, 
who said outright that members of the Dean’s faculty were not real officers. See Chapter 4. 
518 Department of Military and Strategic Studies, Dr. John Farquhar, Historian, Vol. 1, 
34th Education Group Annual History Reports, “34th Education Group Annual History 
Report, 30 June 2004 to 31 July 2005,” 1. 
519 Philip D. Caine, Brigadier General, Retired, “A U.S. Air Force Academy Dilemma: 
Professional Military Studies,” in Elliot V. Converse, III, ed., Forging the Sword: 
Selecting, Educating, and Training Cadets and Junior Officers in the Modern World 
(Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1998), 225. 
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to erase possible negative perceptions from cadets, the program was academically and 
philosophically sound enough to ensure that the transition was easy. 
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
 As many histories tend to do, the preceding discussion on professional military education 
at the Air Force Academy appears as a story of progression. But even though the Department of 
Military and Strategic Studies has been under the responsibility of the Dean of Faculty for over a 
decade, the department still works to define itself and prove its relevance as a discipline. 
Nevertheless, it is the department that advances and explores the fundamentals for professional 
military education. The education pursued through the coursework offered by this department 
aims at laying a foundation on which to better integrate various subjects taught in other academic 
disciplines that reinforce military studies for an officer candidate. 
 From the early use of air power in war, the United States air forces recognized a need to 
gain its independence as a separate service branch. Almost hand-in-hand with this aspiration was 
the recognition among air leaders of a related need to establish their own service academy to 
educate a significant segment of the service’s officer corps. Although the early planners 
demanded an academy, the proposed curriculum was often burdened with more specialized 
training rather than education in subjects essential for their officer candidates, such as in theory, 
doctrine, organization, the study of warfare, and, most significantly, how air power affects the 
character of war. Some air leaders recognized the need for this essential education, too. The 
narrative above traces the evolution of military studies within the overall education of officer 
candidates at the Air Force Academy. 
 During the planning and preparation for a service academy specific to the Air Force, and 
during the formative years of developing the curriculum, air leaders and planners wrestled with 
whether to focus the efforts on specialized training, such as flight training, or to integrate more 
academically-oriented military studies coursework into the curriculum. This debate usually 
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occurred within one of the mission elements of the Academy, namely, the Commandant of 
Cadets, who was responsible for the training and education of the officer candidates in military 
matters. 
 In addition, the emphasis was also on educating the officer candidates through a general 
academic program. This, too, created a tension between those who demanded what is often 
viewed as a more vocational education consisting of science and engineering and those who 
advocated a vigorous program of social sciences and the humanities.  
 These two tensions as discussed in this study, which were present during the 
authorization, formation, and later development of the Academy, still continue today. Although it 
had not come in a simple linear progression, by the 1980s the Air Force Academy recognized the 
need for a more stable and rigorous military studies program. To assist in this effort, the 
Academy recommended, and the Senate approved, a Permanent Professor and Deputy 
Commandant for Military Instruction, to ensure the military education of the officer candidates 
through a strong curriculum. The Permanent Professor became the advocate of the military 
studies program to encourage that it contributed to the overall education of the cadet and that 
military studies received some importance over exclusively military training. 
 The continued emphasis on the military studies program became a necessity.  Yet it 
remained difficult to keep a strong military studies emphasis with the necessary elements from 
social sciences and humanities coursework. The observations that John Masland and Laurence 
Radway stated in their seminal work on military education in 1957 remains pertinent today:  
It may be well, however, to summarize at this point some of the obstacles to further 
evolution. First, weapons grow more complex daily. This creates a demand for a more 
technical curriculum….Second, applicants to the academies seem to have a somewhat 
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greater interest and aptitude for technical and mechanical matters. Third, because the 
academies are public, national institutions they must appear to be tending to business. A 
curriculum believed to have inadequate technical content is vulnerable to criticism by 
Congress, by the American people, and by officers who retain reservations about all 
education that is not somewhat vocational in nature…. Fourth, the commandants and 
their staffs are extremely influential agents at the academies, and important aspects of 
their programs are necessarily designed to prepare students for combat leadership rather 
than to interest them in policy level assignments in the service…. 
 A fifth obstacle to further evolution is the prescribed curriculum…a premium is 
placed on courses that can be shown relevant to known future tasks…. Sixth, the purpose 
of the academies is clearly defined…Military and technical courses seem to them to meet 
[the requirement to graduate this known member of the military profession]…and, 
Seventh, not only do the academies know the future business of their graduates, but a 
central part of that business has always been war.520  
And war is chaotic and ambiguous, requiring professionals to be not only the absolutely best 
possible technicians but also the best strategists and theorists. The professional requires a solid 
education in the nature of conflict and its changing character. 
 This requirement for the Air Force professional to be well educated in the military arts 
and sciences as well as in studies that concentrate on the human experience and cultures and 
societies may not yet be fulfilled effectively enough. The question that may yet cause concern is 
whether the service academies are providing a suitable and properly demanding education that 
                                                 
520 John W. Masland and Laurence I. Radway, Soldier and Scholars: Military Education 
an National Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), 234-236. 
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brings preparedness for all the challenges that follow.  More specifically, does the Air Force 
Academy? A recent article posed “Why Airmen Don’t Command.” In looking at regional 
commands in which several services participate, author Rebecca Grant underscored that only 
four of 110 theater commanders, since World War II, have come from the Air Force.521 Although 
Dr. Grant’s thesis concerns various factors such as the overall military’s “stunted” view of air 
power, the scarcity of Air Force leaders at the head of these commands could raise questions 
about the propriety and sufficiency of the education of the Air Force officer. In this effort, a part 
must be played by military and strategic studies, and the decades of work in establishing a 
department for its pursuit at least makes achieving it a possibility.  
  
                                                 
521 Rebecca Grant, “Why Airmen Don’t Command,” Air Force Magazine (March 2008), 
1. Since this article another Air Force officer commanded USEUCOM, and the first 
female combatant commander, Air Force General Lori Robinson, took the reigns at 
USNORTHCOM. 
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Appendix A - Air Force Academy Planning Board 
Air Force Academy Planning Board (September 1948 – May 1949)522 
Members of the Air Force Academy Planning Board 
 Project Office 
  Lt. Col. Arthur E. Boudreau, Project Officer  
  Maj. Ralph W. Keller, Secretary to the Board 
  Capt. Russell J. Gardinier, Editor and Historian 
 Curriculum Group523 
  Lt. Col. Arthur E. Boudreau, Director 
  Maj. Ralph W. Keller, Assistant Director 
  Maj. James E. Crosby 
  Maj. John S. White 
  Capt. Orr Y. Potebnya 
  Capt. William A. Hunter 
  Capt. Russell J. Gardinier 
  Capt. John C. Adams 
  Capt. David B. Thomas 
 Administration and Organization Group 
                                                 
522 AFAPBS, Vol. 1, “A Plan for the Air Force Academy”, xi-xiv. The order of the 
various participants and groups changed from original document to emphasize what may 
be of significance to this study. See AFAPBS, Vol. 1, “The Curriculum”, iv. 
523 This group had a minor change by the time it completed the volume “The 
Curriculum.” Captain Thomas Sheldrake joined the group, while Majors Crosby and 
White left the Group.   
280 
  Lt. Col. David W. Reed, Director 
  Lt. Col. Joseph M. Murphy,  
  Lt. Col. John Coolidge 
  Maj. William L. Mitchell, Jr.* 
  Maj. Capers A. Holmes 
  Capt. Thomas L. Sheldrake  
 Legislative and Interim Group 
  Col. Robert M. Stillman, Director  
  Lt. Col. Joseph R. Ambrose  
  Lt. Col. Sidney F. Wogan 
 Site and Construction Group 
  Brig. Gen. James B. Newman, Jr., Director 
  Col. Clarence Renshaw (C.E.) 
  Maj. William J. Small, Jr. 
  Capt. John F. Schaffner 
  Capt. Arthur G. Witters  
Civilian Consultants 
 Dean Linton H. Baer, Marion Institute, Marion, Ala. 
 Dr. J.H. Belknap, Engineering Advisor, Air Institute of Technology, Wright Field 
 Dr. Oliver E. Boyd, M.D., Director, Department of Hygiene, School of Education,  
 Stanford University 
 Dr. W.G. Carleton, Department of Political Science, University of Florida 
 Dr. Lloyd W. Chapin, Dean of Faculties, Georgia Institute of Technology 
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 Dr. Homer L. Dodge, President, Norwich University 
 Dr. Donald D. Durrell, Dean of School of Education, Boston University 
 Miss Elizabeth Fackt, Social Science Foundation, University of Denver 
 Mr. Carl W. Files, Department of Mechanical Engineering,  
  A & M College of Texas 
 Dr. B. Von Haller Gilmer, Chairman, Department of Psychology and Education,   
 Carnegie Institute of Technology 
 Dr. Henry B. Hardt, Head of Department of Chemistry,  
  Texas Christian University 
 Dr. Richard Hartshorne, Professor of Geography, University of Wisconsin,   
 President of American Association of Geographers 
 Dr. Douglas E. Howes, Professor of Electrical Engineering,  
  Worcester Polytechnic Institute, Worcester, Mass. 
 Mr. Ellery Husted, Representative of the Secretary of the Air Force 
 Dr. Robert F. Jackson, Department of Mathematics, University of Delaware 
 Dr. Irving J. Lee, Department of Speech and Semantics, University of Chicago 
 Dr. William M. Lepley, Department of Psychology, Pennsylvania State College 
 Dean W. W. Little, Dean of General College, University of Florida 
 Dr. Earl McGrath, Department of Education, University of Chicago 
 Dr. John McLure, Dean of College of Education, University of Alabama 
 Mr. Elias T. Novikow, Instructor in the Far Eastern Department,  
  University of Washington 
 Dr. Raymond B. Paty, Chancellor, Regents of the University System of Georgia 
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 Dr. Merritt B. Pound, Department of Political Science, University of Georgia 
 Dr. Robert J. Raudebaugh, School of Chemical Engineering,  
  Georgia Institute of Technology* 
 Dr. Carroll E. Reed, Instructor of German, University of Washington 
 Mr. Walter L. Riley, Assistant Professor of Political Science,  
  University of Washington 
 Dr. Harry S. Rogers, President, Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute 
 Mr. Claude A. Roys, Former Chairman Board of Directors, Babson Institute,   
 Wellesley Hills, Mass. 
 Dr. John Dale Russell, Division of Higher Education, U.S. Office of Education 
 Mr. Harry Clifton Savage, Department of Drawing,  
  Georgia Institute of Technology* 
 Charles R. Scherer, Professor, head of Department of Mathematics, Texas    
 Christian University 
 Dr. Josef Solterer, Graduate School Chairman, Department of Economics,    
 Georgetown University 
 Dr. Lawrence G. Thomas, School of Education, Stanford University 
 Dr. J. J. Tigert, President, Emeritus, University of Florida 
 Dr. Homer S. Weber, School of Mechanical Engineering,  
  Georgia Institute of Technology∗ 
                                                 
∗ Changes from the original document come from Errata inserted on the inside of cover 
for Volume 1, i. 
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 Dr. Arthur Wilson, Director Great Issues Seminar, Dartmouth College 
 Dr. J. Hooper Wise, Chairman, English Courses, University College,  
  University of Florida 
 Dr. Ben Wood, Columbia University 
 Dr. Dean G. Worchester, Jr., Assistant Professor of Economics,  
  University of Washington 
Military Consultants 
 General George C. Kenney, Commanding General, The Air University 
 General Muir S. Fairchild, Vice Chief of Staff, Hq., USAF 
 Lt. Gen. John K. Cannon, Commanding General,  
  United States Air Forces in Europe 
 Lt. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, Hq., USAF 
 Lt. Gen. Barton K. Young (Ret.)  
 Maj. Gen. Robert W. Harper, Commanding General, Air Training Command 
 Maj. Gen. Orvil A. Anderson, Commandant, Air War College, The Air University 
 Maj. Gen. James D. McIntyre, Deputy Director of Legislative Liaison,  
  Office of the Secretary of Defense 
 Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, Superintendent, United States Military Academy 
 Brig. Gen. Kenneth P. McNaughton, Chief, Training Division, Hq., USAF 
 Col. Delmar T. Spivey, Deputy Commander for Education, The Air University 
 Col. Herman Beukema, Professor, United States Military Academy 
 Col. T. L. Futch, Commandant of Cadets, The Citadel 
 Lt Col. S. N. Garrett, Assistant Commandant of Cadets, Virginia Military Institute 
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 Col. G. M. Williamson, Jr., Professor of Military Science and Tactics, Alabama  
  Polytechnic, Institute, Auburn, Alabama 
 Lt. Col. James C. Stewart, Professor of Air Science and Tactics, Alabama    
 Polytechnic Institute, Auburn, Alabama 
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Appendix B - Members of the Service Academy Board and the 
Respective Panels 
 
Service Academy Board: 
Robert L. Stearns, Chairman 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Vice Chairman and General of the Army 
James P. Baxter, President, University of Williams College, Member 
Frederick A. Middlebush, President, University of Missouri, Member 
George D. Stoddard, President, University of Illinois, Member 
Edward L. Moreland, Executive Vice President, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Member 
Major General Bryant E. Moore, Member and Superintendent, United States Military Academy  
Rear Admiral James L. Holloway, Member and Superintendent, United States Naval Academy 
David M. Schlatter, Member and Major General, USAF 
John L. Hoen, Executive Secretary 
Panel on Instruction in Science and Engineering: 
Dr. Harry Hammond, Dean of Engineering, Pennsylvania State College (Chairman) 
Dr. Ivan C. Crawford, Dean, College of Engineering, University of Michigan 
Dr. Louis F. Fieser, Professor of Organic Chemistry, Harvard University 
Dr. Donald B. Prentice, Professor, Mechanical Engineering, Yale University 
Dr. Harold L. Hazen, Head, Department of Electrical Engineering,  
 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Mr. C.J. Freund, Dean of Engineering, University of Detroit 
Panel on Social Sciences: 
Father Edward V. Stanford, Rector, Augustinian College (Chairman) 
Dr. Hardy C. Dillard, Professor of Law, University of Virginia 
Dr. Richard Hartshorne, Professor of Geography, University of Wisconsin 
Dr. Edward S. Mason, Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University 
Dr. Richard A. Newhall, Professor of History, Williams College 
Panel on Language and Area Studies: 
Dr. J. Milton Cowan, Director, Modern Language Division, Cornell University (Chairman) 
Dr. Stephen A. Freeman, Vice President and Director, Language Schools, Middlebury College 
Dr. L. G. Thomas, Associate Professor of Education, Stanford University 
Panel on Military Education: 
Raymond A. Spruance, Admiral, USN (Ret.) (Chairman) 
Troy H. Middleton, Lieutenant General, USA (Ret.) 
F.A. Irving, Major General, USA 
William S. Parsons, Rear Admiral, USN 
George H. Brett, Lieutenant General, USAF (Ret.) 
R.W. Harper, Major General, USAF 
John J. Easton, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Executive Security 
*The Board also had Panels on Teaching and Testing Methods and Health and Physical 
Education 
